As people come and go on these boards, from time to time I repeat a contention which I have never heard satisfactorily answered. The Bible doesn't say we're justified by choice. The Bible doesn't say we're justified by will. The Bible says we're justified by faith.
To get free will into the salvation process, it is therefore necessary for the Arminian to have a notion of how the human mind and soul work wherein we choose what we have faith in. "Faith," I readily confess is a vast concept, going further than mere intellectual assent, but belief is still one significant sine qua non of saving faith. Thus, choice must also govern belief.
However, I have never chosen to believe anything in my life. If I believe something, it is because I have a reason to believe something. If I say I believe something but don't actually have some facts and arguments stored away in my brain that cause me to believe it, I'm lying, or at least overstating my own certainty. I do not believe I am alone in this condition. I have in the past issued a challenge to Arminians to arbitrarily choose to believe something in order to empirically demonstrate that the power of the will over the mind can be as they suggest it is. As of yet, no one has been willing to try to will to believe that the sky is orange.
None of this necessarily means the will is entirely divorced from belief. But does it not require that, at the very least, when we discuss the relationship of the will to conversion, we cannot consider conversion to be analogous to any old vanilla-flavored choice one makes, insofar as it applies to questions about free will? Clearly, whatever restraints exist upon the will, further restraints exist upon it as it applies to the formation of beliefs. This does necessarily torpedo libertarian free will as it pertains to conversion.
To get free will into the salvation process, it is therefore necessary for the Arminian to have a notion of how the human mind and soul work wherein we choose what we have faith in. "Faith," I readily confess is a vast concept, going further than mere intellectual assent, but belief is still one significant sine qua non of saving faith. Thus, choice must also govern belief.
However, I have never chosen to believe anything in my life. If I believe something, it is because I have a reason to believe something. If I say I believe something but don't actually have some facts and arguments stored away in my brain that cause me to believe it, I'm lying, or at least overstating my own certainty. I do not believe I am alone in this condition. I have in the past issued a challenge to Arminians to arbitrarily choose to believe something in order to empirically demonstrate that the power of the will over the mind can be as they suggest it is. As of yet, no one has been willing to try to will to believe that the sky is orange.
None of this necessarily means the will is entirely divorced from belief. But does it not require that, at the very least, when we discuss the relationship of the will to conversion, we cannot consider conversion to be analogous to any old vanilla-flavored choice one makes, insofar as it applies to questions about free will? Clearly, whatever restraints exist upon the will, further restraints exist upon it as it applies to the formation of beliefs. This does necessarily torpedo libertarian free will as it pertains to conversion.
Last edited: