So long as the chaos of battle does not break their lines, the movement of armed troops within a given landscape depends upon their fighting techniques, their numbers, and the limits of the topography and man-made features (terraces, boundary walls, stone piles, etc.). When the forces of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem manoeuvred in a fighting march formation, the main body of mounted knights was usually divided into three forces, each one encircled by rings of defensive lines of foot soldiers to protect the
knights and their horses from ballistic weapons (mainly arrows). The number of defensive lines depended on the way the main body was arranged, according to the topography and man-made features, on the one hand, and the position of the enemy, on the other. When an order to charge was given, the horses and riders would break through the lines of defence that opened up for them. The efficiency of the charge thus depended upon the amount of horses falling upon the enemy; the more horses linked together, the more destructive the results (Smail 1956, 164; Nicolle 1993, 48–49; Bennett 2001, 10–12, 16).
However, when the horses moved in a single file, they were more vulnerable to an
enemy attack and their charge was less efficient. At Hattin, various features of the
coaxial field system of El-Kasair constrained movement through the landscape, directing
it through specific paths and junctions, weakening charges and enabling attacking knights to be blocked and ambushed.
Estimates regarding the number of people who fought at the Battle of Hattin vary, but
even the most minimal estimate suggests 1200 Frankish cavalry and turcopoles (mounted archers fighting under Latin forces), and 7000 foot soldiers. Lowest estimates for the Muslim forces are more than 12,000 mounted archers and 20,000 foot soldiers (Nicolle 1993, 58–61; Harari 1997, 80–81; Lewis 2013, 12, fn 12). One suggestion is that the Muslim force numbered around 40,000 (France 2015, 82). Although many participants had already left the battle arena at a previous stage of the fighting, the question remains of how many of these people were moving through this landscape, an area that was confined to only 2.1 km2? Although the plain of Hattin has the appearance of open country that would not present much of a real obstacle to marching forces, our archaeological reconstruction of this landscape shows the opposite to be true.
The area to the west of the volcano, where the final stage of the battle occurred, can be
described in military terms as ‘closed country’, with many obstacles. The northern edge was bordered by the steep slopes descending to the Arbel Valley, slopes which pose a real obstacle to men travelling on horseback. Consequently, the only way to descend to the valley below on horseback was via a narrow path located at the north-western part of the plain (Figure 4(a)- road 18). Another serious obstacle is located on the eastern side of the plain: the Horns of Hattin volcano. Although the western slopes of the mountain are quite moderate (17.7% maximum incline) and should allow for riders to climb to the main volcanic crater at the centre of the two mountaintops, the Late Bronze age (fourteenth century BCE) walls enclosing the southern top and the Iron Age 2a-b (tenth century BCE) wall surrounding the crater would have prevented this from happening(Gal 1992, 213). These earlier walls would have made the mountain almost unapproachable to horses and riders. The only way to bypass the volcano would have been via the Roman road crossing El-Kasair, the same area which is characterised by an extensive coaxial field system.
Since the walls, terraces and rock piles in the area of El-Kasair date to a period from
much earlier than that of the Battle of Hattin, they were clearly present in the battle
field. The average height of these features today is around 1.4 m, posing a substantial
obstacle for large groups of horse-mounted men (Figure 3). Furthermore, even if
horses did manage to cross this area and continue to Tiberias along the 5.6 m wide
road which crosses the coaxial fields of El-Kasair, the troops would have needed to
move in single file, a formation which would have left them vulnerable.
We suggest that the Lower and Middle Palaeolithic E&R piles also played a significant role in the development of the Hattin landscape, as they were used as the foundations of both the Roman road system and the Roman coaxial field system. The E&R piles run from north to south, and a few major Roman field stone fences run parallel to it (Figures 5(a)
and 9). It seems that the Roman field and Roman road in the Hattin landscape was actually founded on pre-existing E&R piles, which followed the Timrat formation exposure.
The use of the Palaeolithic E&R tailing piles as the structural base for the El-Kasair
field system is similar to the way in which Tors outlined how coaxial field systems in
Britain were aligned during the Early Bronze Age, at sites such as the Rippon Tor
system in Dartmoor, Devon (Brück 2019, 190–196).
When it came to landscaping planning, Roman engineers often used pre-existing
elements in landscapes. This is evident in extensive agricultural terracing that took
place in the central highland regions during the Early Roman period, work which was
based on pre-existing terraces that had been built in the Iron Age 2 (eighth century
BC), and in some cases, as for example at Sataf, terraces date back to the EBI (early
third millennium BC) (Gibson 2003, 5; Gibson and Lewis 2017a, 261, 2017b, 292).
Hence, in regard to roads, a similar phenomenon can be seen in the Iron Age pass connecting Qumran to the Hyrcania Valley. This pass was initially cut in the Iron Age 2, and went through a modification and reuse during the Early Roman period (Taylor and Gibson 2011, 6–7).
During the battle of Hattin, once the Franks were on the Hattin plain, Road 4 crossing
El-Kasair was the only way for them to continue east to the city of Tiberias (Figure 4). This road also served as the main axis of the coaxial field system. The field boundary walls joining the road from north and south, which were aligned with the Palaeolithic tailing piles, weaving a warp and weft system of walls which created a substantial barrier for the Frankish forces trying to cross it, preventing them from continuing eastward
(Figure 9). Consequently, the tailing piles are not only the earliest manmade feature in
the landscape, but they continued to influence its development and current appearance(Figures 2–5), and as suggested here, also played a significant role in the outcome of the Battle of Hattin. In brief, we suggest that the limited manoeuvrability of Frankish troops in their defeat at the battle of Hattin was caused by hunter-gatherer flint
exploitation.
