Cracking our humanitarian teeth on Godless Human Rights ...

[2PhiloVoid]

It is clear you don't want to talk about it.

Right, because apologetics is not allowed in this section of CF. Besides, this thread is about how fault lines run through other ethical thought lines, even those heavily subscribed to in modern, secular times.

Can anyone pick up the bible read it and get the correct meaning from it? The evidence says no.

Some parts, yes, and some parts, no.

None of those other things threatens us with eternal torment.

And again, we're not concerned about that in this thread. We're concerned here with the shortcomings of modern ethical trains of thought, like godless human rights.

 

[muichimotsu]

You can disagree, but the fact is, Secular Ethics and the various moral systems it comprises is a field dredged in conceptual multiplicity, a multiplicity that drains all of both your, and my, efforts to make absolutely concrete moral evaluations into sludge pond of existential morass. And neither you, nor can escape this fact.

And you've just admitted here, then, that you are operating on personal standards, not some cosmic truth by which we all must assent. See, this is what I mean by 'tenuous.' Shall I take this further, with further points to make? (Keep in mind, I'm doing this as an educational procedure, not one by which I'm aiming to completely destroy your personal moral position; I rather appreciate the fact that you seem to be a fairly moral individual, with a conscience to protect your children from certain liberal influences [like those we saw represented during the Super Bowl ... ]

Not sure why a standard has to be external to be valid unless you demand absolute certainty and appeal to authority as the foundation for the impact and validity of ethics, in which case, how is that different than authoritarian/totalitarian mentalities that demand obedience because it is perceived to be "for one's own good?"

Moral evaluations gets into the epistemology of it, justifying the idea of something being good or evil, but that requires the moral ontology and moral semantics as well, so we're already jumping ahead in terms of the discussion and I don't think we've agreed necessarily on all these points, which means we're talking past each other

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Not sure why a standard has to be external to be valid unless you demand absolute certainty and appeal to authority as the foundation for the impact and validity of ethics, in which case, how is that different than authoritarian/totalitarian mentalities that demand obedience because it is perceived to be "for one's own good?"

Moral evaluations gets into the epistemology of it, justifying the idea of something being good or evil, but that requires the moral ontology and moral semantics as well, so we're already jumping ahead in terms of the discussion and I don't think we've agreed necessarily on all these points, which means we're talking past each other

I think you're misunderstanding my angle in this thread, muichimotsu. My point with it is to assert that the overtness of competing ethical systems of thought, despite their assertions to robust morality, don't actually provide ontologically what they say they prescribe morally. At best, what each ethical viewpoint offers is a provisional, and incomplete, assessment of values and "right courses of action, accordingly."

The great thing about this thread is that I don't even have to 'touch' the Bible or refer to it to carry out this gripe session ...

 

[muichimotsu]

I think you're misunderstanding my angle in this thread, muichimotsu. My point with it is to assert that the overtness of competing ethical systems of thought, despite their assertions to robust morality, don't actually provide ontologically what they say they prescribe morally. At best, what each ethical viewpoint offers is a provisional, and incomplete, assessment of values and "right courses of action, accordingly."

The great thing about this thread is that I don't even have to 'touch' the Bible or refer to it to carry out this gripe session ...

Well, that's the problem, morality is not necessarily prescriptive to the extent you seem to desire, so you're essentially asking the impossible and finding only an impossible system to justify it

Robust morality does not claim to be absolute in scope or perfect, that's a religious angle

Meta ethics is prior to the ethical systems, so it seems to me your thread title is slightly misleading in what it's criticizing.

If you fully admit that all moral systems are incomplete, then why is your particular viewpoint on morality meant to be taken more seriously except as you can argue some points that seem to ignore the distinction of is and ought?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Well, that's the problem, morality is not necessarily prescriptive to the extent you seem to desire, so you're essentially asking the impossible and finding only an impossible system to justify it

Robust morality does not claim to be absolute in scope or perfect, that's a religious angle

Meta ethics is prior to the ethical systems, so it seems to me your thread title is slightly misleading in what it's criticizing.

If you fully admit that all moral systems are incomplete, then why is your particular viewpoint on morality meant to be taken more seriously except as you can argue some points that seem to ignore the distinction of is and ought?

You have a certain point ... tell me more about your understanding of 'meta-ethics.'

 

[muichimotsu]

You have a certain point ... tell me more about your understanding of 'meta-ethics.'

There are 3 questions commonly: moral semantics (what is the meaning of moral terms/judgments), moral ontology (what is the nature of moral judgments) and moral epistemology (how may moral judgments be supported/defended)

You get into a variety of positions with each of those: moral semantics generally either cognitivist or non cognitivist as regards what moral propositions entail (cognitivism having more robust investigations), moral ontology tends to be universalist or relativist, with varieties within universalism (which can technically manifest as cognitivist ethical subjectivism in the form of divine command theory and still hold that those moral judgments are universal in nature from one perfect person's perspective, effectively) and moral epistemology would generally be split between empiricists and rationalists with intuitionists a third less common option

The three questions and the theories respective to them can all to some extent be seen as compatible, because they're answering different questions in terms of morality as a multi faceted aspect of human thought

I can't say I studied it in college, not entirely sure how high in the philosophy department that would've been or how commonly it would've been offered. Sad I didn't, similar to studying Islam in college, because our religious studies professors did it really well in terms of conveying various subjects

 

[2PhiloVoid]

There are 3 questions commonly: moral semantics (what is the meaning of moral terms/judgments), moral ontology (what is the nature of moral judgments) and moral epistemology (how may moral judgments be supported/defended)

You get into a variety of positions with each of those: moral semantics generally either cognitivist or non cognitivist as regards what moral propositions entail (cognitivism having more robust investigations), moral ontology tends to be universalist or relativist, with varieties within universalism (which can technically manifest as cognitivist ethical subjectivism in the form of divine command theory and still hold that those moral judgments are universal in nature from one perfect person's perspective, effectively) and moral epistemology would generally be split between empiricists and rationalists with intuitionists a third less common option

The three questions and the theories respective to them can all to some extent be seen as compatible, because they're answering different questions in terms of morality as a multi faceted aspect of human thought

I can't say I studied it in college, not entirely sure how high in the philosophy department that would've been or how commonly it would've been offered. Sad I didn't, similar to studying Islam in college, because our religious studies professors did it really well in terms of conveying various subjects

Ok. I think you've got a basic grasp on the inherent 'meta-ethical' thrust which I was attempting to draw out for discussion in this thread. And don't worry, I'm not going to contest what you're saying here in your last post. I've only had a few more classes on this kind of thing than you have, and I'm no expert yet, which means I have to constantly refer to the various experts on this subject matter.

So, with what you've just said above, and with our both realizing the fact that there's much more involved in these issues than many folks think, how 'should' we conceptualize Human Rights in a way that is surely to be so authoritative that it'll displace what are called 'religious objections' to the current political frame of human rights thinking in the world? Or, in other, more simple words, how would you then specifically apply all of what you've generally spotted above with the content of the article in my OP in this thread?

 

[muichimotsu]

Ok. I think you've got a basic grasp on the inherent 'meta-ethical' thrust which I was attempting to draw out for discussion in this thread. And don't worry, I'm not going to contest what you're saying here in your last post. I've only had a few more classes on this kind of thing than you have, and I'm no expert yet, which means I have to constantly refer to the various experts on this subject matter.

So, with what you've just said above, and with our both realizing the fact that there's much more involved in these issues than many folks think, how 'should' we conceptualize Human Rights in a way that is surely to be so authoritative that it'll displace what are called 'religious objections' to the current political frame of human rights thinking in the world? Or, in other, more simple words, how would you then specifically apply all of what you've generally spotted above with the content of the article in my OP in this thread?

I don't phrase human rights and morality as rooted in pure authority, but evidence and substantiation, so we're already at a major disagreement about the fundamental justification aspect and what you seem to think secular human rights should rest upon (except secularism is, not unlike atheism, a diverse position in how it manifests in people's actions, etc).

The article, in rough summary, seems to suggest that the notion of human rights is purely normative rather than descriptive, which is arguably oversimplifying things to insinuate a political agenda as the primary or even sole basis for why we assert human rights as a thing. But that's not only disingenuous to discussion, it violates Hanlon's razor by ascribing some conspiratorial malice rather than considering that people may not have thought things through as much in particular argumentation

I don't think anyone is claiming there is a perfect moral system, only one that is better than others at assessing the moral quality of actions in various circumstances

 

[FredVB]

Humanity, today, as it continues to increasingly reject a really substantial metaphysics by which to buttress what should be a Prescriptive admonishment to treat other human beings with respect, compassion and care, is pandering instead to an ethereal sense of Human Rights, one that isn't made up of principles containing much in the way of any evident axiomatic integrity: no, it just kind of floats upon a thin veneer of talk about something called "Well-Being."

No, if anything, today's supposed ethical superior position of secularized Human Rights over and against a more Christian sense of Human Rights is nearly, although not quite, the push to acquire equality and humanitarian essentials through the social exertion of sheer will-power, to bring about a pragmatic application to meet human needs that were defaced through Two World Wars, various horrors of the Cold War and fragmentation over various international squabbles that have been taking place for the last several decades.

So, with that said, it's time for everyone to start getting up to speed on the basic ideas that are really at play in our world on the international ethical stage. I think, too, personally, the discussion about the supposed nature of Human Rights and Ethics and Morality, and how it should be articulated and how it is applied, even legally, should start with our reading of a chapter from Langlois' brief tour of the development of thinking on modern Human Rights and its inherent problems.

I've only had a few more classes on this kind of thing than you have, and I'm no expert yet, which means I have to constantly refer to the various experts on this subject matter.

So how 'should' we conceptualize Human Rights in a way that is surely to be so authoritative that it'll displace what are called 'religious objections' to the current political frame of human rights thinking in the world?

It is a pretty heady topic, and you have classes for it as you say, which I have not, and others have not. We would not all use the same terms that you would. I see there is no real contrast between treating others with respect, compassion and care, which is within biblical Christianity, and human rights, recognized in secular society. It can be recognized that we have the dignity we do with it given from God our Creator, who creates with purpose, that we and all living have purpose. Many others besides Christians believe there is God, and God is basis for these things. It is a separate issue with atheists, who are in denial, and by extension agnostics who would have the same problem with there being no God that is the position of atheists. That position is not merely in denial of God, those with it are in denial of any problem for a source and any real meaning for anything like love or justice, in a merely physical reality, there is much more than being in denial of any problem for a source and any real meaning for rights, for humans, or for any select group designated.

 

[Clizby WampusCat]

It is a pretty heady topic, and you have classes for it as you say, which I have not, and others have not. We would not all use the same terms that you would. I see there is no real contrast between treating others with respect, compassion and care, which is within biblical Christianity, and human rights, recognized in secular society.

I think generally this is true. But sometimes we determine how treating others with respect is different. Some christian have denied same sex marriage fr example and some non believers deny he rights of the unborn based on their understanding of respect, compassion and care.

It can be recognized that we have the dignity we do with it given from God our Creator, who creates with purpose, that we and all living have purpose. Many others besides Christians believe there is God, and God is basis for these things. It is a separate issue with atheists, who are in denial, and by extension agnostics who would have the same problem with there being no God that is the position of atheists.

This is a good time for a reminder what atheism is. It is the denial that a god exists or the lack of belief a god exists. Most atheists today would describe themselves as having a lack of belief and not a denial that god exists.

That position is not merely in denial of God, those with it are in denial of any problem for a source and any real meaning for anything like love or justice, in a merely physical reality, there is much more than being in denial of any problem for a source and any real meaning for rights, for humans, or for any select group designated.

Non believers believe people have value, we just don't think people have intrinsic value. People have value becasue we place value on them based on our love for them. The meaning I give to justice or purpose or any other issue is the purpose I give it based on reason. We can discuss as communities what this means for a society but that is the same as what Christians do on morality and purpose. Not all christian believe the foundation says the same thing.

 

[Caliban]

... that's right! You heard what I said! Humanity, today, as it continues to increasingly reject a really substantial metaphysics by which to buttress what should be a Prescriptive admonishment to treat other human beings with respect, compassion and care, is pandering instead to an ethereal sense of Human Rights, one that isn't made up of principles containing much in the way of any evident axiomatic integrity: no, it just kind of floats upon a thin veneer of talk about something called "Well-Being."

No, if anything, today's supposed ethical superior position of secularized Human Rights over and against a more Christian sense of Human Rights is nearly, although not quite, the push to acquire equality and humanitarian essentials through the social exertion of sheer will-power, to bring about a pragmatic application to meet human needs that were defaced through Two World Wars, various horrors of the Cold War and fragmentation over various international squabbles that have been taking place for the last several decades.

So, with that said, it's time for everyone to start getting up to speed on the basic ideas that are really at play in our world on the international ethical stage. I think, too, personally, the discussion about the supposed nature of Human Rights and Ethics and Morality, and how it should be articulated and how it is applied, even legally, should start with our reading of a chapter from Langlois' brief tour of the development of thinking on modern Human Rights and its inherent problems:

Langlois, Anthony J. "Normative and Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights."

As someone who does ground his moral considerations in the concept of Well-being, I find Langlois' article uncomplying. Here are some of my thoughts on his treatment of the moral and ethical reasoning of the Nuremberg Prosecutors:

Langlois attempts to explain away the reasoning for the ingenuity of rights in the Nuremburg trials as having rots in Natural Law. He writes, “Members of the Nazi leadership were charged and tried at the Nuremberg Tribunal (1945–1949), under the auspices of the natural law, with crimes against humanity. This charge was not extant in any formal international document or law, but was one that, so it would be held, was patently clear and known to any reasonable person because it was a part of the natural law” (Langlois 8). Langlois makes an error linking the rational for justice to Natural Law. If by Natural Law we mean laws based of human reason and experience with social customs and norms, then yes, Langlois would be correct. But that is not what Langlois means. He claims the Nuremberg Trials were grafted from Judeo Christian roots. However, the prosecutors of the trial conspicuously avoids any mention of rights emanating from a creator or a religious perspective. The fact that the phrase crimes against humanity, explicitly finds blame for the atrocious acts of the Nazis by their effects on fellow humans and not against a god. That is an important point considering Psalm 51:4: “Against you, you only, have I sinned and done what is evil in your sight....” Considering the just cause of the Jewish people, they could have cited the Law of God and their holy texts—they did not. They proceeded with a radical new and secular position of international law based that was uniquely human centered and argued. The ethical view of justice in Nuremberg was completely secular and it successfully lead to the prosecution and conviction of hundreds of Nazi criminals.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

As someone who does ground his moral considerations in the concept of Well-being, I find Langlois' article uncomplying. Here are some of my thoughts on his treatment of the moral and ethical reasoning of the Nuremberg Prosecutors:

Langlois attempts to explain away the reasoning for the ingenuity of rights in the Nuremburg trials as having rots in Natural Law. He writes, “Members of the Nazi leadership were charged and tried at the Nuremberg Tribunal (1945–1949), under the auspices of the natural law, with crimes against humanity. This charge was not extant in any formal international document or law, but was one that, so it would be held, was patently clear and known to any reasonable person because it was a part of the natural law” (Langlois 8). Langlois makes an error linking the rational for justice to Natural Law. If by Natural Law we mean laws based of human reason and experience with social customs and norms, then yes, Langlois would be correct. But that is not what Langlois means. He claims the Nuremberg Trials were grafted from Judeo Christian roots. However, the prosecutors of the trial conspicuously avoids any mention of rights emanating from a creator or a religious perspective. The fact that the phrase crimes against humanity, explicitly finds blame for the atrocious acts of the Nazis by their effects on fellow humans and not against a god. That is an important point considering Psalm 51:4: “Against you, you only, have I sinned and done what is evil in your sight....” Considering the just cause of the Jewish people, they could have cited the Law of God and their holy texts—they did not. They proceeded with a radical new and secular position of international law based that was uniquely human centered and argued. The ethical view of justice in Nuremberg was completely secular and it successfully lead to the prosecution and conviction of hundreds of Nazi criminals.

I might actually agree with you that Langlois either makes an error or doesn't explicate well enough his position about any reference to 'Natural Law' that those involved in the Nuremburg Trials appealed to. But in this case of citing his shortcomings, what is your source(s) by which you are offering this critique?

Personally, I'd see what Michael Freeman has to say about it, among other thinkers.

 

[Caliban]

I might actually agree with you that Langlois either makes an error or doesn't explicate well enough his position about any reference to 'Natural Law' that those involved in the Nuremburg Trials appealed to. But in this case of citing his shortcomings, what is your source(s) by which you are offering this critique?

Personally, I'd see what Michael Freeman has to say about it, among other thinkers.

Here is a source describing the development of the development of secular approached to law in Europe. The Nuremberg Trials are a classic example.

Langlois attempts to ground Natural Law in the concept of divinity. He means more than the fact that Natural Law develops from the ideas of theistic belief; he suggests that Natural law is inextricable from an actual divine source. I don't know how one could ever demonstrate that.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Here is a source describing the development of the development of secular approached to law in Europe. The Nuremberg Trials are a classic example.

Langlois attempts to ground Natural Law in the concept of divinity. He means more than the fact that Natural Law develops from the ideas of theistic belief; he suggests that Natural law is inextricable from an actual divine source. I don't know how one could ever demonstrate that.

If that is what Langlois on the whole is doing with his own view of Human Rights, apart from the book chapter I've posted in the OP, then I'd agree with you. However, my whole point in presenting this thread wasn't to posit that Natural Law provides the grounding of human morality and ethics. In fact, my point in this excercise is to challenge EVERY position that asserts some 'grounding' of Human Rights as lately conceived, including yours.

 

[Caliban]

If that is what Langlois on the whole is doing with his own view of Human Rights, apart from the book chapter I've posted in the OP, then I'd agree with you. However, my whole point in presenting this thread wasn't to posit that Natural Law provides the grounding of human morality and ethics. In fact, my point in this excercise is to challenge EVERY position that asserts some 'grounding' of Human Rights as lately conceived, including yours.

What do you mean by grounding--because I might agree with you. I think human rights are subjectively, but strongly agreed upon. I don't think there is a universal/transcendent set of right one can objectively point to. However, people can agree upon a principle and then, from that standard, morality can be objectively determined. The initial foundation is relatively chosen. A moral system based on wellbeing works this way--so could a different construct. I think a religious or a theological construct works exactly the same.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

What do you mean by grounding--because I might agree with you.

... personally, I don't refer to an ultra-specific, exacting 'meaning' for grounding other than to cite it as a concept often associated with the attempt by various folks to establish some point they like as an axiomatic 'truth.' No, I'm going to lean more toward Pascal and Kierkegaard than I am toward Descartes in my epistemological thinking; this is most especially so where ethics are concerned. Essentially, I think Strong Foundationalists ... are cracked/fractured here and there.

I think human rights are subjectively, but strongly agreed upon.

Sure, I'd say so too, but then I'd have to qualify what I mean by "Subjective" ...

I don't think there is a universal/transcendent set of right one can objectively point to.

There may not be a set that we can come by and to which we all will assent absolutely, but this wouldn't mean that there might not be a few principles of human life that most of us who are sane or who live in more a knowledgeable culture couldn't "rationally" cite and agree upon.

However, people can agree upon a principle and then, from that standard, morality can be objectively determined.

I agree with the first part on a Descriptive level, but I think this approach of yours founders on the Prescriptive level and quickly descends into a kind of weak relativism (I say 'weak' because I think of a lot of this on a continuum of value ... )

The initial foundation is relatively chosen. A moral system based on wellbeing works this way--so could a different construct.

I don't equate subjectivity with relativism. They're different and we should make sure not to confuse the two.

I think a religious or a theological construct works exactly the same.

I don't.

 

[Caliban]

I don't equate subjectivity with relativism. They're different and we should make sure not to confuse the two.

I wasn't conflating the two. I did not use the phrase relativism.

Why do you think a religious or theological construct of morality is dissimilar to one based on well-being or any another subjective principal?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I wasn't conflating the two. I did not use the phrase relativism.

Well, just to be fair to me, you did say, "The initial foundation is relatively chosen." So, whether or not relativism was meant, you might want to consider how your articulation may come across in the process of communication. Otherwise, I'll accept that you mean to say that subjectivity then has some connection to objectivity, even if an absolute property within our objective efforts is difficult to come by.

Why do you think a religious or theological construct of morality is dissimilar to one based on well-being or any another subjective principal?

Because biblical epistemology essentially undercuts the notion that morality and ethics in a religious context of revelation will have the same process of education; human scientific thinking, however rationally employed, will only partially grasp at the ontology behind the ethics. And if God withholds certain insights from various individuals, then there will be missing data and/or points of disconnection in the overall [set] of ethical and moral principles one could know about Human Social Reality.

Now, with that said, I'm not by any means implying that just anyone should 'get' the right morality automatically in the full sense; on the other hand, if biblical ethics and its ontology are considered, we might expect that there be some principle common to all human beings that plays into the minimum ethical sense that any one person could have or maybe should have.

 

[Caliban]

if God withholds certain insights from various individuals, then there will be missing data and/or points of disconnection in the overall [set] of ethical and moral principles one could know about Human Social Reality.

Thats a rather substantial assertion. What data am I missing or do not have access to? I don't see how you might demonstrate a god actively withholds this information from some people and yet somehow admits other to suck knowledge. If I thought that was impossible, how would you show me my error?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Thats a rather substantial assertion. What data am I missing or do not have access to?

The data that comes by seeing additional spiritual patterns in the world that lend themselves to the further growth of a sense of coherency about the claimed 'truths' of Christianity. But without going to far afield, I'm going to shortcircuit this statement of mine for the purpose of not taking us astray from the focal point of this thread: the focal point being that neither you nor I, all by ourselves, has any really substantial ontological & axiological justification for claiming the ethical viewpoints that we do, respectively.

So, at this point in our discussion, I can actually just kick the Bible to the curb and let it sit and stifle in the watery gutter of secularist pretension. For me to cut down other people's ethical over-assertions, I don't need the Bible for that, just the tools of Philosophy (which again, is the focal point of this thread).

I don't see how you might demonstrate a god actively withholds this information from some people and yet somehow admits other to suck knowledge. If I thought that was impossible, how would you show me my error?

As I've told another poster here in this same thread who was asking essentially similar questions to the one your aking---I don't and I won't be doing any demonstrations (if they could be had .... which I don't think that directly can other than me giving you a hug and asking you what I can help you with in life). Otherwise, this will suddenly become an 'apologetics' thread and apologetics isn't allowed here in this section of the Forums. Of course, as I stated above, I don't need the bible or its assumptions to cut apart the fragility of modern day ethics. That can be done with philosophical tools.

I will leave you with this one little teaser of an answer, though, since you posed the question that you did: you'll have to understand that the field of Biblical Epistemology is a thing, an academic thing, and you'd have to engage it in order to gain at least some additional insight about the epistemology that the Bible infers or states. But enough about that. Back to the fragility of Modern Human Rights thinking, whether that be yours or mine ... two approaches that, though they differ, still hold some form of Human Rights as valuable to the human existential condition. The question though is: are they true and are they prescriptive for human conduct?