Canadian SC: Christian law school can't forbid students from gay sex

[Tinker Grey]

No wedding cake is ever made for the wedding; it's for the post-ceremony celebration -- a party.

 

[bhsmte]

Only for weddings. This was not a wedding. Not by law and not in his faith, as a secondary consideration.

LOL

 

[PeaceByJesus]

If the dude provides.wedding cakes to customers, it is part of the normal course of his business, whether it pains you to admit or not.

]If the dude conditionally provides.wedding cakes to customers, it is part of the normal course of his business, whether it pains you to admit or not. The conditional nature is the issue, contrary to your reductionism.

 

[PeaceByJesus]

None of this implies that it is now OK to deny custom wedding cakes for homosexuals.

That was not the contention, but the issue was recognizing bakeries had a valid objection to providing special cakes for homosexual marriage because of what they represented to the baker.

The first case was in Ireland and has no bearing on US law.

You said "no court." In addition, they consider the judgments and reasoning of other such courts, as Ireland did as regards Masterpiece. Thus such can have some bearing.

If you are speaking of a different case please tell me the name of it. The Phillips case was narrowly decided so it does not in any way validate his argument.

Nor does it invalidate it.

The only thing that can concluded from the Phillips case is that the CO commission needs to work on its hostility to religion

.
Its not alone, and its bias obviously affected its reasoning, which SCOTUS criticized, and thus the verdict.

 

[bhsmte]

]If the dude conditionally provides.wedding cakes to customers, it is part of the normal course of his business, whether it pains you to admit or not. The conditional nature is the issue, contrary to your reductionism.

In a public accommodating business, what conditions are you referring to?

 

[RestoreTheJoy]

LOL

Well, you can laugh out loud, or you can educate yourself as to the law at the time. Not a wedding. Not recognized as legitimate in any way in Colorado.

 

[Belk]

That was not the contention, but the issue was recognizing bakeries had a valid objection to providing special cakes for homosexual marriage because of what they represented to the baker.

The court ruled against the compelled speech in the written message, not against the cake itself.

You said "no court."

Yes. No court has found the reasoning you are using compelling. They still have not since the reasoning against compelled speech is different then the reasoning you are using.

In addition, they consider the judgments and reasoning of other such courts, as Ireland did as regards Masterpiece. Thus such can have some bearing.

They consider the reasoning in US courts, not foreign courts as far as I am aware.

Nor does it invalidate it.
.
Its not alone, and its bias obviously affected its reasoning, which SCOTUS criticized, and thus the verdict.

The court issued a narrow opinion. That means it has no bearing on anything other then this specific case and it is not in any way a reflection of the reasoned arguments.

 

[PeaceByJesus]

The court ruled against the compelled speech in the written message, not against the cake itself.

Why is it so hard to comprehend that providing a custom, special order "wedding cake" for the purpose of celebrating a wedding itself is sending a message? SCOTUS affirmed that Phillips objection that he is doing so has a significant First Amendment speech component. But which you disallow.

Yes. No court has found the reasoning you are using compelling.

The objection by the bakery to giving sanction by providing a pro-gay message was upheld in Ireland, which cited SCOTUS as re. Masterpiece, and which is the same objection of Phillips by facilitating gay marriage. And which objection SCOTUS recognized as having a significant First Amendment speech component, if not ruling on whether it was compelling as regards the verdict.

They still have not since the reasoning against compelled speech is different then the reasoning you are using.

So you say, since you do not recognize that being required to provide a custom, special order "wedding cake" for the purpose of celebrating a wedding itself is sending a message.

They consider the reasoning in US courts, not foreign courts as far as I am aware.

Ireland considered SCOTUS, and a man named Stephen Breyer states ,

International law, the domestic laws and customs of other nations, and the decisions of foreign courts have become part of today’s American judicial experience. Twenty years ago, out of the 70 or so cases that the Supreme Court fully considers each year, perhaps 3 or 4 percent required us to look beyond our own shores in order to understand the legal problems involved and find the appropriate solution. Today that figure is closer to 20 percent, and is sometimes greater. Only some of those cases concern the application of treaties or other forms of international law. More of them concern domestic statutes, administrative regulations, or interpretations of the U.S. Constitution

The court issued a narrow opinion. That means it has no bearing on anything other then this specific case and it is not in any way a reflection of the reasoned arguments.

You say so, but I do not this SCOTUS was just criticizing the reasoning of CO because of its bias, versus the resultant reasoning.

 

[PeaceByJesus]

In a public accommodating business, what conditions are you referring to?

As explained, the condition is whether the service being requested is morally objectionable or not. There is no unconditional offer of service, which is a strawman.

 

[hedrick]

The Commission ruled against Phillips in part on the theory that any message on the requested wedding cake would be attributed to the customer, not to the baker. Yet the Division did not address this point in any of the cases involving requests for cakes depicting anti-gay marriage symbolism [which CO held as valid denials].

Let's be clear about the argument. The Supreme Court didn't say that they were required to exempt Phillips based on that argument, just that if they did so for others, they needed to justify why they didn't do it for Phillips.

 

[Belk]

Let's be clear about the argument. The Supreme Court didn't say that they were required to exempt Phillips based on that argument, just that if they did so for others, they needed to justify why they didn't do it for Phillips.

hedrick, would be so kind as to explain the Phillips decision? I'm trying to point out that the narrow decision does not mean that bakers are free to discriminate now but I do not seem to be getting through. Perhaps if you as lawyer explained it so that it is clear?

 

[PeaceByJesus]

hedrick, would be so kind as to explain the Phillips decision? I'm trying to point out that the narrow decision does not mean that bakers are free to discriminate now but I do not seem to be getting through. Perhaps if you as lawyer explained it so that it is clear?

Indeed, the narrow SCOTUS decision does not mean that bakers are free to discriminate now, which is not what I argued, so why (once again) so misrepresent the issue. Which was that, contrary to your reductionist argument that "baking cakes is not a religious expression," providing a custom, special order "wedding cake" for the purpose of celebrating a wedding itself is sending a message, that he was using his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, implying sanction. And that Phillips saw himself as complicit in the celebration by facilitating it, and denied to do so because of his religious convictions is a valid argument worthy of consideration.

What led to this issue was your attempt to deny that there was any case for the baker's argument I just referred to, in which, in response to the argument relative to this that wedding cakes typically cost hundreds of dollars and must be contracted for well in advance, with down payment, you argued it was not that of signing a contract, but which simply is not required to one to agree to provide for something, and be complicit in it.

You also attempted to dismiss the argument providing custom a wedding cake denotes recognition of what it is for by arguing, its just "A cake. A piece of confection."

In addition, after denying that the state constitution not recognizing homosexual marriage had anything to do with Phillips denial to do so, you tried to make the issue the legality of selling a cake to those who are not married, thereby once against misrepresenting the issue.

And the issue at hand here is that Phillips denial of a custom service because he saw himself as complicit in the celebration of it, contrary to his religious convictions, is a valid argument, thus being worthy of consideration.

 

[PeaceByJesus]

Let's be clear about the argument. The Supreme Court didn't say that they were required to exempt Phillips based on that argument, just that if they did so for others, they needed to justify why they didn't do it for Phillips.

Correct, but as cited, it also opined that that rather than the objection of Phillips that he was using his artistic skills to make an expressive statement being "merely rhetorical, SCOTUS saw his objection as having a significant First Amendment speech component, though as said, not ruling on whether it was compelling as regards the verdict.

And it faulted CO's for its theory that any message on the requested wedding cake would be attributed to the customer (as has been argued here), not to the baker, as not being consistent with CO's other rulings in similar cases.

Would you agree that Phillips seeing himself as complicit in the celebration by facilitating an immoral celebration, and denying to do so because of his religious convictions is a valid argument worthy of consideration?

 

[Belk]

Indeed, the narrow SCOTUS decision does not mean that bakers are free to discriminate now, which is not what I argued, so why misrepresent the issue.

Because you seem keep making claims that do not seem to be backed up by the decisions in these cases.

Which was that providing a custom, special order "wedding cake" for the purpose of celebrating a wedding itself is sending a message, that he was using his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, implying sanction. And that Phillips saw himself as complicit in the celebration by facilitating it, and denied to do so because of his religious convictions is a valid argument worthy of consideration.

Yes, that was his claim. This is not validated by any ruling I am aware of. Neither the case in Ireland which was about a written message nor Phllip's case say anything about a cake conveying a message.

 

[PeaceByJesus]

Because you seem keep making claims that do not seem to be backed up by the decisions in these cases.



Yes, that was his claim. This is not validated by any ruling I am aware of. Neither the case in Ireland which was about a written message nor Phllip's case say anything about a cake conveying a message.

Once again you misrepresent the issue, which not just "a cake" but one created for the expressed purpose of celebrating that which is not lawful in the eyes of God nor in the highest law of the state. But your version has a man whose objection is seen by the court as having a significant First Amendment speech component, yet which means nothing about a cake conveying a message, which it would not if it were not a contracted "wedding cake" for a known, expressed immoral purpose.

 

[hedrick]

Neither the case in Ireland which was about a written message nor Phllip's case say anything about a cake conveying a message.

I agree with this. Written messages are typically protected, and this wasn't a written message. However the constitutional question is whether simply making a cake for an event constitutes a message, and is protected. I don't *think* it is, but it's not as clear as you might think.

(By the way, I'm not a lawyer. I've just read a bunch of the background carefully.)

Basically all the arguments about being involved in an immoral event and so forth don't seem to match precisely anything that I've seen in legal commentary. That could apply just as well to the guy who has to set up chairs. The form the argument is going to take is the limits of protected expression. I think if Phillips has a legal case it's going to rest on the idea that making a cake is an expression. The court has recognized things other than speech as expressions. In particular, they recognized giving money to a cause as protected in Citizen's United. At least some of the justices in concurring and dissenting opinions suggested that Phillips cakemaking (or refusal) might be expression that could be protected. I don't think we can be entirely sure whether the majority would end up accepting that argument in another case.

My arguments so far have been to discourage people who think the Court has already accepted that argument. It has not. But that doesn't mean it won't in the future. I've also had to correct the common claim that Phillips was asked to put something on the cake supporting gay marriage. He cut things off before there was any discussion of design.

 

[hedrick]

Incidentally, it's my impression that US and Canadian law are slightly different here. The US appears to me to provide slightly more protection for religious expression.

 

[Belk]

Once again you misrepresent the issue, which not just "a cake" but one created for the expressed purpose of celebrating that which is not lawful in the eyes of God nor in the highest law of the state. But your version has a man whose objection is seen by the court as having a significant First Amendment speech component, yet which means nothing about a cake conveying a message, which it would not if it were not a contracted "wedding cake" for a known, expressed immoral purpose.

How can I misrepresent the issue when I made no mention of it?

 

[Belk]

I agree with this. Written messages are typically protected, and this wasn't a written message. However the constitutional question is whether simply making a cake for an event constitutes a message, and is protected. I don't *think* it is, but it's not as clear as you might think.

(By the way, I'm not a lawyer. I've just read a bunch of the background carefully.)

Basically all the arguments about being involved in an immoral event and so forth don't seem to match precisely anything that I've seen in legal commentary. That could apply just as well to the guy who has to set up chairs. The form the argument is going to take is the limits of protected expression. I think if Phillips has a legal case it's going to rest on the idea that making a cake is an expression. The court has recognized things other than speech as expressions. In particular, they recognized giving money to a cause as protected in Citizen's United. At least some of the justices in concurring and dissenting opinions suggested that Phillips cakemaking (or refusal) might be expression that could be protected. I don't think we can be entirely sure whether the majority would end up accepting that argument in another case.

My arguments so far have been to discourage people who think the Court has already accepted that argument. It has not. But that doesn't mean it won't in the future. I've also had to correct the common claim that Phillips was asked to put something on the cake supporting gay marriage. He cut things off before there was any discussion of design.

Thank you. I was under the impression you were a lawyer, maybe you should think of a career switch?

 

[PeaceByJesus]

Basically all the arguments about being involved in an immoral event and so forth don't seem to match precisely anything that I've seen in legal commentary. .

It need not be precise, plus what one may be legally culpable for is not necessarily the same thing as being morally culpable, and SCOTUS considers this in cases as the one at issue. A sabbatarian is normally protected from having to provide the service he otherwise agreed to if it conflicts with his sincere religious convictions, but he would not be doing anything legally wring by working in his day of worship.

But as shown, legally in principle there can be complicity by knowingly, willingly providing for and specifically facilitating illegal acts.

Spoiler: Complicit

The range of behaviors “complicit” encompasses is vast. Senator Chuck Schumer recently denounced Trump’s behavior on the world stage as “puerile” and accused Republicans who fail to speak out against him of “complicity in the degradation of the presidency,..”

“Complicit” traces back to the French complice (a partner or associate), which derives from the Latin complex — which means “folded together,” as in the ingredients of a cake. It also means “complex.” There are so many ways to be complicit that you could make trading cards and never collect them all. You can be complicit through action or inaction, speech or silence, association or omission. You can engage in outright collusion, aiding in wrongdoing and lying your way through the cover-up. You can take advantage of an immoral situation to promote your book or your brand. But you can also feel coerced into complicity, intimidated or brainwashed. You can look the other way because you fear for your job or your reputation, or because you refuse to feel responsible for the systems around you....

If we take everyday life “as a moral and social space” in which “our common humanity is created and sustained,” then we must take responsibility not only for what we produce and put into the world but also for how we consume — passively and mindlessly, or actively and critically. - Behind Every Villain Stands Someone ‘Complicit’

Accomplice Mens Rea and Actus Reus
In order to obtain a conviction of a defendant for being a principal or an accessory before the fact, the prosecution must prove that the defendant committed an act that either encouraged or actually helped the criminal, that he had the requisite intent of encouraging or helping the criminal, and that the criminal who was encouraged or assisted by the defendant actually committed the crime...

In order to demonstrate that the defendant committed the requisite actus reus, the prosecution must show that the defendant either directly or indirectly encouraged or facilitated the commission of the crime. A person has facilitated a commission of the crime if he provides the criminal with the means that the criminal uses to commit the crime...

Other jurisdictions only require the prosecutor to show that the accomplice knew that his actions would either assist or encourage the commission of a crime. The difference is that, in jurisdictions that require the prosecution to prove only that the accomplice acted while knowing that his actions would aid or encourage the commission of a crime, the accomplice can be convicted even if he did not actually want his actions to aid or encourage the commission of a crime. In these jurisdictions, even if the accomplice was dead-set against his actions being used to encourage or aid in the commission of a crime and even if he did not intend for his actions to aid or encourage the commission of the crime, so long as he knew that his actions would aid or encourage the commission of a crime, he can be convicted as an accomplice. Accomplice Mens Rea and Actus Reus - LawShelf Educational Media (emp. mine)