Can Orthodoxs affirm Scotist position?

[dóxatotheó]

Can EOs affirm the Scotist position on Formal Distinction of Gods acts and essence or you can only affirm the Palamite position of Metaphysical Distinctions of Gods acts and essence?

 

[ArmyMatt]

Can EOs affirm the Scotist position on Formal Distinction of Gods acts and essence or you can only affirm the Palamite position of Metaphysical Distinctions of Gods acts and essence?

what do you mean by formal distinction?

 

[dóxatotheó]

what do you mean by formal distinction?

mind independent distinction

 

[ArmyMatt]

mind independent distinction

what do you mean by that?

 

[dóxatotheó]

what do you mean by that?

Scotus’s theory of the Trinity rests on treating the divine essence as having a commonness to the three Persons very much like that a universal
has to the particulars under it, even though the essence is an individual. . . . In Scotus’s discussion of universals, he recognizes that on the
Aristotelian philosophical principles he usually accepts one individual
cannot be common to many. To allow otherwise is to fall into the sort of
extreme realism Aristotle was anxious to reject. But in the divine Trinity,
Scotus proposes, something of this sort occur

 

[ArmyMatt]

Scotus’s theory of the Trinity rests on treating the divine essence as having a commonness to the three Persons very much like that a universal
has to the particulars under it, even though the essence is an individual. . . . In Scotus’s discussion of universals, he recognizes that on the
Aristotelian philosophical principles he usually accepts one individual
cannot be common to many. To allow otherwise is to fall into the sort of
extreme realism Aristotle was anxious to reject. But in the divine Trinity,
Scotus proposes, something of this sort occur

the Persons aren’t under the essence, and the essence isn’t an individual, and what does this have to do with the energies?

 

[dóxatotheó]

the Persons aren’t under the essence, and the essence isn’t an individual, and what does this have to do with the energies?

he uses individual in a sense that it is communicable, also you asked what mind independent mean I answered. Here what I mean, a Scotistic formal distinction is not the same as a real distinction, but neither is it the same as a merely conceptual distinction. It’s supposed to be a kind of middle ground between them. There is, for Scotus, no real distinction between God’s goodness and wisdom insofar as they are not separable. The one could not exist without the other. However, the distinction between them is not merely a distinction in thought. There is something in extra-mental reality that makes wisdom and goodness different. The Scotist way of putting this is that there is a difference in formalities between wisdom and goodness – and thus, again, a formal distinction between them. So, for the Scotist, while there is no real distinction between the divine attributes, it is not correct to say that they are identical full stop. Not only is the concept of wisdom different from the concept of goodness, but wisdom and goodness themselves are not formally identical.

 

[ArmyMatt]

he uses individual in a sense that it is communicable, also you asked what mind independent mean I answered. Here what I mean, a Scotistic formal distinction is not the same as a real distinction, but neither is it the same as a merely conceptual distinction. It’s supposed to be a kind of middle ground between them. There is, for Scotus, no real distinction between God’s goodness and wisdom insofar as they are not separable. The one could not exist without the other. However, the distinction between them is not merely a distinction in thought. There is something in extra-mental reality that makes wisdom and goodness different. The Scotist way of putting this is that there is a difference in formalities between wisdom and goodness – and thus, again, a formal distinction between them. So, for the Scotist, while there is no real distinction between the divine attributes, it is not correct to say that they are identical full stop. Not only is the concept of wisdom different from the concept of goodness, but wisdom and goodness themselves are not formally identical.

except that the essence of anything according to Orthodoxy is unknown, it’s the energies that are communicable.

 

[dóxatotheó]

except that the essence of anything according to Orthodoxy is unknown, it’s the energies that are communicable.

read after

 

[ArmyMatt]

read after

I did. you said the essence is an individual in the sense that it’s communicable. that for us is false. I don’t really have an issue with the rest

 

[abacabb3]

Scotus’s theory of the Trinity rests on treating the divine essence as having a commonness to the three Persons very much like that a universal
has to the particulars under it, even though the essence is an individual. . . . In Scotus’s discussion of universals, he recognizes that on the
Aristotelian philosophical principles he usually accepts one individual
cannot be common to many. To allow otherwise is to fall into the sort of
extreme realism Aristotle was anxious to reject. But in the divine Trinity,
Scotus proposes, something of this sort occur

this sounds like dancing around modalism

 

[dóxatotheó]

this sounds like dancing around modalism

Its no where near modalism

 

[abacabb3]

Its no where near modalism

of course you think that, because you want Orthodoxy to be reduced into a scholastic lens of your choosing.

 

[dóxatotheó]

of course you think that, because you want Orthodoxy to be reduced into a scholastic lens of your choosing.

modalism is the idea that personas are mutually and collectively one
this is the idea that the 3 persons are distinct in ways in their origin