Argument for God's existence.

[createdtoworship]

Being logical doesn’t make it true. It’s logical to say universe-creating pixies made the universe, too. Logic isn’t the sole factor in determining what’s true or likely true. It only sorts out what’s hypothetically possible.

Maybe reread what you posted after your morning coffee. You just said pixies creating the universe was logical.

 

[gaara4158]

Maybe reread what you posted after your morning coffee. You just said pixies creating the universe was logical.

Yes, it is logical. If that surprises you, then (as we all strongly suspect) you don’t know what logic actually is.

 

[createdtoworship]

It make sense that there was something rather than nothing. I don't know of anyone, including naturalists, who propose that something came from absolutely nothing. Someone might have said "nothing" but really meant "no matter", while there would still be energy of some form. After all, we do have that principle that energy is neither created nor destroyed, just converted into one form or another, including matter.

So I do feel that there was a creator of the universe. Whether that creator was intelligent, or a sequence of natural processes from some pre-existing condition, I don't know.

So there was something that created the something, I get it. But where did that something come from? Ultimately you must say it came from nothing. I say it came from God. Much more logical.

 

[createdtoworship]

Yes, it is logical. If that surprises you, then (as we all strongly suspect) you don’t know what logic actually is.

No, sir it's not logical.

 

[createdtoworship]

It make sense that there was something rather than nothing. I don't know of anyone, including naturalists, who propose that something came from absolutely nothing. Someone might have said "nothing" but really meant "no matter", while there would still be energy of some form. After all, we do have that principle that energy is neither created nor destroyed, just converted into one form or another, including matter.

So I do feel that there was a creator of the universe. Whether that creator was intelligent, or a sequence of natural processes from some pre-existing condition, I don't know.

Oh I see, you are a theist then. That's a good start. How intellectual of you, I thought you were going to say nothing created the universe, like most athiests do here. Oh it's a few steps more complicated sure, but it boils down to nothing creating the universe.

 

[gaara4158]

No, sir it's not logical.

Yes, it is, and your denial confirms that you don’t know what logic is.

 

[Yttrium]

So there was something that created the something, I get it. But where did that something come from? Ultimately you must say it came from nothing. I say it came from God. Much more logical.

Spacetime as we know it is pretty much defined by matter. At the time of the creation of the universe, before matter, there was no spacetime as we understand it. One could say that the energy, whatever form it was in, existed outside of time.

If you go back far enough with cause and effect, there must be a first cause. The chain can't be infinite, or we would never arrive at the present day. The cause, whether intelligent or not, would be outside spacetime. The logical trick at that point is to determine whether that first cause needs to be intelligent or not.

No, I'm not a theist (or atheist), since I don't know whether that cause is intelligent or not.

 

[Moral Orel]

Also, do check out Aristotle, but keep in mind that he's got a much more robust system of causality. The elements of Aristotelian casuality that are so powerful in cosmological arguments (formal and final causes) are very easily misunderstood these days, since we've been trying to eliminate them with mixed results for several centuries now.

If you're using Aristotle to explain causality, then you need a material cause though, don't you? That's what I'm getting at. You can't pick and choose which of the four causes to throw out, that's all. I don't disagree that creating from nothing is logically a-okay, but it doesn't fit in that concept of causality, so we can't use that concept of causality to prove that the universe needed a creator. You would need something other than Aristotle, right?

On an unrelated note, I have a question for you about something someone else said. I hear things like this all the time:
"If you go back far enough with cause and effect, there must be a first cause. The chain can't be infinite, or we would never arrive at the present day."
I'd really like to see a good defense of infinite regress being impossible around here, but no one really gets into it. What I'm wondering though is if this proposed problem is even a problem at all in the B-Theory of time. I've heard you mention a few times that you prefer it, so I figure you might already have thoughts on that.

 

[Silmarien]

If you're using Aristotle to explain causality, then you need a material cause though, don't you? That's what I'm getting at. You can't pick and choose which of the four causes to throw out, that's all. I don't disagree that creating from nothing is logically a-okay, but it doesn't fit in that concept of causality, so we can't use that concept of causality to prove that the universe needed a creator. You would need something other than Aristotle, right?

I cannot speak for everyone, but my personal understanding is actually that all four causes would need to be discarded when explaining something that reaches outside of created reality. I would not think of God as an efficient cause, or a final cause, or anything along those lines--causality as we understand it does presuppose that physical reality exists, so whatever brought both physical reality and the causal laws that appear to govern it into existence is beyond both. In that sense, God would not be bound by physical laws of causality, since they only exist because he wills them to.

Perhaps it would be useful to distinguish between explanations broadly and causality more narrowly. Some people claim that if physical reality did not come about through the normal laws of causality, then that exempts it from needing any explanation whatsoever, but I don't think that this is actually true. There ought to still be some ineffable explanation, even if it is outside of our experience of reality.

A second point that ought to be brought up is that there's a very interesting idea that shows up from time to time in Aristotelian philosophy called prime matter. Aristotelians tend to identify matter with potentiality--the ability to be shaped--rather than seeing it as a concrete, atomic reality. (Modern physics actually seems to vindicate this view, since the more we know about matter, the stranger it becomes.) If matter ultimately breaks down completely into pure potentiality, without form or substance, then I think you have to wonder what a material cause actually is. There's nothing problematic about creatio ex nihilo if matter itself is ultimately just another piece of nothingness.

On an unrelated note, I have a question for you about something someone else said. I hear things like this all the time:
"If you go back far enough with cause and effect, there must be a first cause. The chain can't be infinite, or we would never arrive at the present day."
I'd really like to see a good defense of infinite regress being impossible around here, but no one really gets into it. What I'm wondering though is if this proposed problem is even a problem at all in the B-Theory of time. I've heard you mention a few times that you prefer it, so I figure you might already have thoughts on that.

Well, there are two types of infinite regresses: temporal sequences and what I'd consider more along the lines of a sequence of simultaneous causes. Temporal sequences are fairly easy: you're here because your parents were here, and they existed because their parents existed, ad infinitum. The second type of sequence is trickier, though the easiest example I can think of is to say that a bird is flying because it is capable of flight, and it is capable of flight because it has wings, and it has wings because its DNA is such that said wings developed, etc.

I don't really care about temporal infinite regresses, since I don't entirely believe in time at all, but I do have issues with simultaneous infinite regresses. For example, people like to say that the laws of causality are emergent and came into being at the very beginning of the universe. All fine and good, but the concept of emergence itself relies upon some notion of causality, so there need to be deeper laws of causality that would allow for traditional causality to emerge. Those deeper laws would need to be explained as well, so we would ultimately end up with an infinite simultaneous sequence of laws emerging from deeper laws emerging from deeper laws. I vaguely recall reading one of the theologian-scientists describe this concept in terms of calibration, if I recall correctly. If reality is not calibrated a certain way, then that sort of simultaneous chain of causes doesn't simply bring itself into existence. I wish I could remember where I saw that--possibly Polkinghorne, though I don't own any of his books to go check.

I don't know if that helps at all. My postmodern scholasticism is a little bit out of control, lol, and my thoughts have become so labyrinthine that I'm not sure I can answer any question without accidentally changing the topic.

 

[Moral Orel]

I cannot speak for everyone, but my personal understanding is actually that all four causes would need to be discarded when explaining something that reaches outside of created reality. I would not think of God as an efficient cause, or a final cause, or anything along those lines--causality as we understand it does presuppose that physical reality exists, so whatever brought both physical reality and the causal laws that appear to govern it into existence is beyond both. In that sense, God would not be bound by physical laws of causality, since they only exist because he wills them to.

Perhaps it would be useful to distinguish between explanations broadly and causality more narrowly. Some people claim that if physical reality did not come about through the normal laws of causality, then that exempts it from needing any explanation whatsoever, but I don't think that this is actually true. There ought to still be some ineffable explanation, even if it is outside of our experience of reality.

A second point that ought to be brought up is that there's a very interesting idea that shows up from time to time in Aristotelian philosophy called prime matter. Aristotelians tend to identify matter with potentiality--the ability to be shaped--rather than seeing it as a concrete, atomic reality. (Modern physics actually seems to vindicate this view, since the more we know about matter, the stranger it becomes.) If matter ultimately breaks down completely into pure potentiality, without form or substance, then I think you have to wonder what a material cause actually is. There's nothing problematic about creatio ex nihilo if matter itself is ultimately just another piece of nothingness.

Then it seems I'm on the right track. If we're talking about the beginnings of the universe, then the Four Causes have to be discarded, so they can't be used to argue about the beginnings of the universe at all.

Well, there are two types of infinite regresses: temporal sequences and what I'd consider more along the lines of a sequence of simultaneous causes. Temporal sequences are fairly easy: you're here because your parents were here, and they existed because their parents existed, ad infinitum. The second type of sequence is trickier, though the easiest example I can think of is to say that a bird is flying because it is capable of flight, and it is capable of flight because it has wings, and it has wings because its DNA is such that said wings developed, etc.

I don't really care about temporal infinite regresses, since I don't entirely believe in time at all, but I do have issues with simultaneous infinite regresses. For example, people like to say that the laws of causality are emergent and came into being at the very beginning of the universe. All fine and good, but the concept of emergence itself relies upon some notion of causality, so there need to be deeper laws of causality that would allow for traditional causality to emerge. Those deeper laws would need to be explained as well, so we would ultimately end up with an infinite simultaneous sequence of laws emerging from deeper laws emerging from deeper laws. I vaguely recall reading one of the theologian-scientists describe this concept in terms of calibration, if I recall correctly. If reality is not calibrated a certain way, then that sort of simultaneous chain of causes doesn't simply bring itself into existence. I wish I could remember where I saw that--possibly Polkinghorne, though I don't own any of his books to go check.

I don't know if that helps at all. My postmodern scholasticism is a little bit out of control, lol, and my thoughts have become so labyrinthine that I'm not sure I can answer any question without accidentally changing the topic.

No, you answered it, with quite a bit of extra, albeit interesting, material. If time is an illusion, then claiming that not enough time passed from infinity past until now doesn't make sense. So I think that no, an infinite regress doesn't necessarily have a temporal problem.

 

[Silmarien]

Then it seems I'm on the right track. If we're talking about the beginnings of the universe, then the Four Causes have to be discarded, so they can't be used to argue about the beginnings of the universe at all.

None of the Aristotelian flavored arguments are specifically about the beginning of the universe, though. The Kalam is just one type of cosmological argument, and I would say a fairly weak one. Most Aristotelian arguments are more concerned with providing an explanation for the sustained existence of any specific contigent creature, or for causality itself.

No, you answered it, with quite a bit of extra, albeit interesting, material. If time is an illusion, then claiming that not enough time passed from infinity past until now doesn't make sense. So I think that no, an infinite regress doesn't necessarily have a temporal problem.

Hmm, I actually don't think I did. The thing is, if one accepts a B theory of time whereby time is contingent and actually came into existence with the universe, then there should still be a Point 1 in time before which there are no preceding moments. I suppose it depends on how you look at time and contingency, but given modern cosmology, I don't really see how you can get around the existence of a Point 1. Spacetime is effectively a giant four dimensional block on B theory, but it seems to still have boundaries, so I think that B theory can actually be significantly more hostile to an infinite regress than A theory.

Whether the impossibility of an infinite temporal regress actually matters on a B theory is a serious question, since all moments of time are in some sense eternally present. (I kind of think it does matter, actually, but I loathe the Kalam and refuse to go down that road, lol.)

 

[Moral Orel]

Spacetime is effectively a giant four dimensional block on B theory, but it seems to still have boundaries, so I think that B theory can actually be significantly more hostile to an infinite regress than A theory.

Why does it have boundaries? Because we generally think of the universe as having boundaries, or something inherent with B-Theory?

 

[Silmarien]

Why does it have boundaries? Because we generally think of the universe as having boundaries, or something inherent with B-Theory?

I mean boundaries in more of a... mathematical sense, I think. If time is something that comes into being, then it is bound. There is a Point A, before which time does not exist.

If time pre-exists space, then you don't run into this problem for an infinite regress. I'm unaware of any good reason to think that it does, though.

 

[Moral Orel]

I mean boundaries in more of a... mathematical sense, I think. If time is something that comes into being, then it is bound. There is a Point A, before which time does not exist.

If time pre-exists space, then you don't run into this problem for an infinite regress. I'm unaware of any good reason to think that it does, though.

Is it impossible for time to not come into being with B-Theory? I only have a very basic understanding of B-Theory, so I may be asking questions that don't make sense. Understand that I'm not trying to disprove it though, I'm trying to exploit it.

What if space-time is infinitely large in B-Theory? Does it make sense to have that four-dimensional cube infinite in size? Or does B-Theory itself require that starting point?

 

[Silmarien]

Is it impossible for time to not come into being with B-Theory? I only have a very basic understanding of B-Theory, so I may be asking questions that don't make sense. Understand that I'm not trying to disprove it though, I'm trying to exploit it.

What if space-time is infinitely large in B-Theory? Does it make sense to have that four-dimensional cube infinite in size? Or does B-Theory itself require that starting point?

I'm not really sure what would motivate someone to adopt a B theory of time aside from modern cosmology, which does certainly seem to favor some sort of initial point where things we would identify as physical laws start to coalesce. I lean in this direction for scientific reasons rather than philosophical ones, but that just means that nothing here is really logically necessary. It just looks like the better empirical fit.

That said, you could go full Parmenides and posit some sort of timeless, unchanging, eternal reality, yes. Eternal regress should be possible on that type of B theory, but it's so riddled with problems, I don't know why anyone would defend it.

 

[Moral Orel]

I'm not really sure what would motivate someone to adopt a B theory of time aside from modern cosmology, which does certainly seem to favor some sort of initial point where things we would identify as physical laws start to coalesce. I lean in this direction for scientific reasons rather than philosophical ones, but that just means that nothing here is really logically necessary. It just looks like the better empirical fit.

That said, you could go full Parmenides and posit some sort of timeless, unchanging, eternal reality, yes. Eternal regress should be possible on that type of B theory, but it's so riddled with problems, I don't know why anyone would defend it.

Actually, my reasoning for it is purely philosophical. Imagine God created our universe, including space and time. Since He is outside space and time, He can see all the moments in our time at once, right? And if He isn't planning on destroying it all at some point in time, there's no end to time. Which means that this "ball" of our universe is infinite in size, isn't it? I think you need to imagine the universe as a four-dimensional cube, like you said, to even think about a universe with a god that is "outside" of it.

 

[createdtoworship]

Yes, it is, and your denial confirms that you don’t know what logic is.

ad hominem fallacy.

lol.

logically your statements attack the poster, and not the post.

which is against forum rules.

 

[createdtoworship]

Spacetime as we know it is pretty much defined by matter. At the time of the creation of the universe, before matter, there was no spacetime as we understand it. One could say that the energy, whatever form it was in, existed outside of time.

If you go back far enough with cause and effect, there must be a first cause. The chain can't be infinite, or we would never arrive at the present day. The cause, whether intelligent or not, would be outside spacetime. The logical trick at that point is to determine whether that first cause needs to be intelligent or not.

No, I'm not a theist (or atheist), since I don't know whether that cause is intelligent or not.

sir, if we have intelligence in the universe, does that not follow that the first cause, would have to have intelligence as well?

imaging baking something that did not have the raw materials in this worlds agriculture.

it's just does not happen.

 

[gaara4158]

ad hominem fallacy.

lol.

logically your statements attack the poster, and not the post.

which is against forum rules.

I can’t help what you view as an attack, but I’m factually telling you the way you use the word “logical” is not correct. It’s not entirely idiosyncratic, but it’s not effective in the way you think it is.

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

sir, if we have intelligence in the universe, does that not follow that the first cause, would have to have intelligence as well?

The implication of this line of argument is that if it's a feature of the universe, it must be a feature of the 'first cause'. So in order to be consistent with that, you would have to answer 'yes' to all of these,

If we have stupidity in the universe, does it not follow that the first cause would have to have stupidity as well?

If we have gravitational pull in the universe, does it not follow that the first cause would have to have gravitational pull as well?

If we have spicy chicken wings in the universe, does it not follow that the first cause would have to have spicy chicken wings as well?

If we have iron sulfide in the universe, does it not follow that the first cause would have to have iron sulfide as well?

If we have elephant dung in the universe, does it not follow that the first cause would have to have elephant dung as well?

And so forth.