Are God's Moral Prescriptions Arbitrary, Other, or Other?

[Moral Orel]

You're going back to the "Can God make a rock so big that even He can't lift it?" fallacy.

That's not a fallacy, and neither is the fact that God is incapable of creating more durable humans. Or He's incapable of choosing to control His own destructive power.

We are "fallen" by our proto-parents' own decision. We are not as spiritually robust as they were in their original state, when they were in His Presence regularly.

He has a Means/Offer to return us to that state, however.

Doesn't He return folks to that state by grace alone? So this whole thing is just an arbitrary choice of His to create requirements before He agrees to do it. The requirements of His offer could be anything, right?

Furthermore, how were Adam and Eve in God's presence after they fell if God is an uncontrollable destructive force to all beings that are not spiritually robust enough to withstand it?

 

[Steve Husting]

@Steve Husting --- You did not appear to provide an actual response?

I began to answer and did not finish. I am new here and don't know how to "cancel" a post that was begun and discarded. I thought it would be under "More Options..." but it's not.

 

[Tinker Grey]

I began to answer and did not finish. I am new here and don't know how to "cancel" a post that was begun and discarded. I thought it would be under "More Options..." but it's not.

Just navigate away from the page without pressing/tapping/clicking the "Post Reply" button.

 

[cvanwey]

You can find a third option HERE,

Not seeing a third option presented in the link? I'll explain below...

though I don't know how you "prove" these sort of things. It says "The Euthyphro dilemma is actually a false dichotomy. That is, it proposes only two options when another is possible.

All this was already covered in the OP. A true dilemma would be (A) and not (A). The title of the presented problem might better read... "Euthyphro's Problem", or something adjacent....

The third option is that good is based on God’s nature." I'm not trying to advocate this position, I just thought it might help answer your question.

This answer looks to repurpose one of the existing (2) conclusions, as presented in the false dilemma (i.e.):

B): Or are moral acts considered 'good' [because] they are willed by God?

How does the link present a third option?

Personally, I think morality has a practical aspect, so is not arbitrary. If we were to say it is moral to lie, cheat, steal, kill, etc. then it wouldn't be a practical basis for a culture to thrive and survive. Moral laws are usually ones that are good for the society or culture as a whole.

Just a thought.

Sounds like you ascribe to option (A) in the presented dilemma?

 

[cvanwey]

I began to answer and did not finish. I am new here and don't know how to "cancel" a post that was begun and discarded. I thought it would be under "More Options..." but it's not.

Welcome!

I'll be looking forward to your response. My primary focus here is for interlocutors to posit an actual third option. Thus far, this age-old false dilemma only seems to render two plausible conclusions about God. I would like to know if there exists a third, and maybe even a fourth?

Thus far, seems the running consensus is apologists may not like either A or B

 

[Ken-1122]

The "Euthyphro Dilemma" is certainly nothing new. And yes, it is not a true dilemma. The argument is as follows:

A): Are moral acts willed by God [because] they are considered 'good'?
B): Or are moral acts considered 'good' [because] they are willed by God?

The theist, in the video, has no problem pointing out that if these two above options are the only two available, then God either A) appeals to another standard outside Himself. Or, that B) His commands are arbitrary. Or that 'might makes right'.

IS there a third option, as this theist wants to argue? If so, can this [third option] be proven?

Below is the video, for reference:

If the God of Christianity is the standard for all moral issues, that would mean any Christian who knows God should know the moral standard; agree?
If this is the case, every Christian should agree on every moral issue, because all they would have to do is look to God and they would get the same answer; God's answer. And if a Christian disagrees with another Christian, one of them does not know God. Agree? If not tell me where I'm going wrong.

 

[cvanwey]

If the God of Christianity is the standard for all moral issues, that would mean any Christian who knows God should know the moral standard; agree?
If this is the case, every Christian should agree on every moral issue, because all they would have to do is look to God and they would get the same answer; God's answer. And if a Christian disagrees with another Christian, one of them does not know God. Agree? If not tell me where I'm going wrong.

I agree with what you state, to a some degree. However, this does not address the OP.

Theists, whom study this argument, often conclude that either horn within this presented either/or proposition, quickly realize either conclusion does not bode well for the concept of God.

Hence, they attempt to introduce a third option, and/or continue to point out the obvious... which is this proposition is a false dilemma.

The OP is asking... Can you present a third option to this existing either/or proposition?

 

[durangodawood]

The "Euthyphro Dilemma" is certainly nothing new. And yes, it is not a true dilemma. The argument is as follows:

A): Are moral acts willed by God [because] they are considered 'good'?
B): Or are moral acts considered 'good' [because] they are willed by God?

The theist, in the video, has no problem pointing out that if these two above options are the only two available, then God either A) appeals to another standard outside Himself. Or, that B) His commands are arbitrary. Or that 'might makes right'.

IS there a third option, as this theist wants to argue? If so, can this [third option] be proven?

Below is the video, for reference:

C) We're talking about God here. So there's no requirement - in fact not even an expectation - that claims about His nature must make sense to human mortal minds conditioned as they are by time, space, causality, etc.

 

[cvanwey]

C) We're talking about God here. So there's no requirement - in fact not even an expectation - that claims about His nature must make sense to human mortal minds conditioned as they are by time, space, causality, etc.

Does God deem His own character good, bad, or a mix of both????

Assuming He deems Himself only as 'good', then your above answer still fits with option B).

If He deems Himself 'bad', then I guess the Euthyphro need not apply at all.

 

[durangodawood]

....Assuming He deems Himself only as 'good', then your above answer still fits with option B).....

Only if you require that statements about Him make rigorous sense. Its almost like you completely ignored what I said.

 

[durangodawood]

Neither, goodness is a reflection of God's character.

So its God's character that defines what "goodness" is?

What gave God this particular character?

 

[cvanwey]

Only if you require that statements about Him make rigorous sense. Its almost like you completely ignored what I said.

I can surely say the same thing about your response.

Does God deem His own character good, bad, or a mix?

 

[durangodawood]

I can surely say the same thing about your response.

Does God deem His own character good, bad, or a mix?

I'm told He deems it good. But thats all I actually know about the matter. Still, its the picture I go with.

 

[cvanwey]

I'm told He deems it good. But thats all I actually know about the matter. Still, its the picture I go with.

Great. Do you also understand what the Euthyphro attempts to demonstrate?

 

[durangodawood]

Great. Do you also understand what the Euthyphro attempts to demonstrate?

Yes. But as I said, or at least strongly implied, the dilemma assumes that true statements about God must make sense. I dont think that assumption is necessarily valid.

In fact, for a being presumed to "exist" in a realm outside mind-forming notions such as time, Id expect we'd encounter paradox.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Yes. But as I said, or at least strongly implied, the dilemma assumes that true statements about God must make sense. I dont think that assumption is necessarily valid.

In fact, for a being presumed to "exist" in a realm outside mind-forming notions such as time, Id expect we'd encounter paradox.

But if a statement doesn't make sense, one cannot assess the truth value of the statement.

 

[durangodawood]

But if a statement doesn't make sense, one cannot assess the truth value of the statement.

You assess it poetically/obliquely. Not rationally.

As long as we're presuming a realm beyond rational comprehension, which we are if we're even talking about God, then we cannot presume all real things are rationally comprehensible to us.

 

[cvanwey]

Yes. But as I said, or at least strongly implied, the dilemma assumes that true statements about God must make sense.

Seems if we wish to reduce the argument to this level, then all bets are off; with virtually any proposition

If God deems Himself good, then the argument suggests a conclusion that God's moral pronouncements are arbitrary. Theists are then left to grapple with an alternative solution, for which I have yet to see? But I patiently continue to await....

If it should turn out, that God does not deem Himself good, then the Euthyphro need not apply, and the theist is then led down a completely different path.

 

[Tinker Grey]

You assess it poetically/obliquely. Not rationally.

As long as we're presuming a realm beyond rational comprehension, which we are if we're even talking about God, then we cannot presume all real things are rationally comprehensible to us.

Truth is conformance with reality. One does not assess conformance with reality "obliquely/poetically" whatever that might mean.

ETA: If a statement doesn't make sense one cannot even know what it means to assess it poetically/obliquely. All you've got is deepity.

 

[durangodawood]

Seems if we wish to reduce the argument to this level, then all bets are off; with virtually any proposition

If God deems Himself good, then the argument suggests a conclusion that God's moral pronouncements are arbitrary. Theists are then left to grapple with and alternative solution, for which I have yet to see? But I patiently await.

If it should turn out, that God does not deem Himself good, then the Euthyphro need not apply, and the theist is then led down a completely different path.

Yes this is the problem with "theology": reasoning about a being/realm that is proposed to be beyond human comprehension always breaks down. Claims about such a realm should be considered poetic appeals to a sort of spiritual intuition.