A Defense of Abraham and the Binding of Isaac

Michie

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The binding of Isaac, or Aekedah, in Genesis 22 is a theological and psychological narrative of immense depth, as commentators and writers have noted throughout the millennia. Relationships, trust, and the duty to the divine are thrust into the mind of the reader, forcing him or her to come to face to face with the striking notion of the Abrahamic God commanding the sacrifice of Isaac. Unsurprisingly, this text is as controversial as it is famous. While many believers laud the devotion and obedience of Abraham, others rightly question what sort of father would willingly attempt to kill his son at the behest of another, even God Himself. Perhaps, they say, this Abraham is a moral monster who did not care for others. Others worry about what readers will take from the story: if Abraham was just in sacrificing his son to God, should not I do the same? This paper will attempt to find the elusive middle ground between the two, holding that Abraham acted rightly in attempting to offer up his son while also positing that his act was of a very special, and likely not to be repeated, circumstance.

I will show this thesis by examining a host of interpretations, from modern commentaries to both Christian and Jewish thought. Further, this paper is itself a work of theological commentary upon the text. While I may use the fruits of historical-critical scholarship, my focus is not on the original authorial intent or discerning between the different sources or redactors. As such, questions of Ancient Near East methods of child sacrifice will not be touched upon, though the text clearly presents a motif of substitution for human sacrifice.

First, I would like to clarify something about the nature of this narrative, and perhaps religion as a whole. Any thought system used by flawed humans will result in a use of said system for evil, regardless of the system’s inherent goodness or badness. This observation is more prominent in the realm of religion which often constitutes the most deeply held beliefs. As Moberly writes on the Binding, “The higher the stakes, the more the ancient principle applies, that abuse does not remove right use…it is of primary importance to promote the conditions for that right use and not let exceptional abuses trump it.” It is with this principle in mind that we turn to the famous objection to the Binding of one Immanuel Kant. He writes that

if the voice commands him to do something contrary to the moral law… he must consider it an illusion… [Abraham ought to respond] “That I ought not to kill my good son is quite certain. But that you, this apparition, are God – of that I am not certain, and never can be, not even if this voice rings down to me from visible heaven

Can one, for any reason, go against the moral law, especially on a case so heinous as murder? In other words, “Isn’t the certaintyof the ethical always greater than the conviction that it is God who demands the violation of the ethical?” Kant, although addressing a more epistemological claim rather than a theological one, still raises the crux of the moral question to us. What is Abraham to do when the divine command seems to conflict with the most basic of the tenets of moral law? And how ought we to react to his choice?

Continued below.
A Defense of Abraham and the Binding of Isaac