I will go first. I hold that objective morality exists. Here are my definitions:
- Objective: True and accessible to all; “expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations” (MW 1a)
- Morality: A set of guidelines for how one should or should not behave
Note that morality does not need to be exhaustive. Even a single guideline constitutes a morality. For example, even if the only moral precept that someone holds is, “Do not murder,” they still have a morality.
My approach is Aristotelian or Thomistic. Just as there is a spectrum of excellence in pine trees and lions, the same is true of human beings. That is, just as a good lion hunts well, provides for its young, and cooperates with the pride, the good human also exhibits specific qualities that are characteristic of good human beings. The goal of human life is happiness, and the way to achieve happiness is through virtue (habituated dispositions that allow one to act well—to act in accordance with human excellence and the human
telos). Once we understand what makes for a good lion we can start judging between better and worse lions. Once we understand what makes for a good human being we can start judging between better and worse human beings and, further, we can know which human acts are conducive or inconducive to human flourishing.
Like medicine or music, morality is an art. Everyone knows that certain things are conducive to health, but only the physician has in-depth knowledge of medicine, the art of health. If we want to know the ins and outs of health we will go to a physician, not a layman. There is a similar expertise with respect to morality. If we want to know the ins and outs of morality we will consult the behavior of the virtuous man. If we want moral knowledge—an account and rationale of moral behavior—we will consult someone who has studied the moral art in much the same way that a physician has studied the medicinal art. Let us call this person who is capable of teaching virtue or morality the moral philosopher, as opposed to the virtuous man who acts well but may or may not be able to give an account of virtue and morality.
The concrete set of guidelines that constitute the morality of Aristotelian virtue ethics involves things like the classical cardinal virtues of justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude. It involves things like being honest, fair, courageous, rational, etc. It is about becoming the kind of person who acts well with ease, but in order to come to the point where we do something with ease we must begin by doing that thing with difficulty and effort.
Aristotelian virtue ethics (AVE) is objective because it is the key to human excellence, flourishing, and happiness regardless of anyone’s personal opinions or biases. The guidelines are knowable, accessible, and verifiable to all. The demands of virtue are intrinsic to human nature. Just as every lion wants to be a good lion, so too every human wants to be a good human. It is of course possible for a human to choose and act poorly and thus to become unhappy, just as it is possible for a man to disobey the physician’s orders, get sick, and die. The relevant counterfactual is that if the vicious man possessed virtue he would see that it is better than vice, and those who have knowledge of both virtue and vice understand that virtue is superior (cf.
Republic,
ST I-II.1.7).
Therefore Aristotelian virtue ethics provides us with a morality that is indeed objective. It is an objectively knowable set of guidelines for how we should and should not act.
[Let me also include a quick word on David Hume’s is-ought objection. My claim is that virtue is proper or fitting for human beings, and therefore humans should seek after virtue. Someone may respond, “I can do whatever I like, and there is nothing that forces me to seek after virtue.” I would say that although humans are indeed free, there is something (like conscience) that impels you to seek after virtue and that this is ignored at your own peril. No one will force you to be happy, or rational, or virtuous. The point is not to deductively constrain you to be a good human being, but if you choose to ignore virtue then you are choosing to be a bad human being and to suffer the consequences.
Since my argument is practical rather than deductive, a legitimate counterargument must also be practical rather than deductive. For example, if a person had full knowledge of virtue and full knowledge of vice and nevertheless chose vice as being more conducive to happiness and human flourishing, then this would count as a counterargument.]