Yes, something like that. Intuitively, we consider murder worse than theft, and I am generally in favour of such moral distinctions. In fact, that is how I generally argue that there must be a real moral order, as some things are just clearly worse than others (feeding as opposed to hurting a child, say). But beyond realising the malevolent nature of a sin, can we finely grade them at all? Heading into Catholic territory, what of concepts such as the Cardinal Sins? Are these not sins that lead to, and generate, other sin? Many of them seem intuitively venial, such as Pride. What is the thinking of that classification versus the mortal/venial one?
Yes, that is a different classification. The Cardinal Sins have more to do with generation than gravity, as you note.
But then, mortal sins can seem venial at the time, perhaps - here I would think of something like the Golden Calf, which would be idolatry (presumably mortal) but to Aaron, he was making an image of 'the God that led us from Egypt'. He was trying to worship God, but that sin of not trusting to Moses' return or the providence of God, lead to idolatry. Can a venial sin not really then be a mortal one, if the root of greater sin? If the severity of the sin is judged on the object and not the intention, then the well-intentioned Aaron's sin is thus that much worse? Good intentions pave the way to Hell, indeed.
Yes, a venial sin could be mortal if it is "the root" of a mortal sin. A good intention could mitigate a sin, but not undo it. I don't think Catholics would say that a good intention could make a mortal sin venial, but apart from that it could reduce the gravity of any given sin. There is quite a bit of fluidity in the doctrine.
Why must the proximate act take precedence? The question here is what is the problem with sin? Is its immediate results the issue, or its ultimate potential to bring distance between us and God? As was pointed out earlier in the thread, Adam willingly ate the fruit in the garden, and that act has had the unintended consequence of all further sin. The act of disobeying God is put in the shadow by the consequences of the Fall, and like the Cardinal sins (which I would assume this to be a species of Pride and Greed, maybe?), the innocuous was far worse.
I think the proximate act--that which is done, that which is intended, and the immediate aftermath--needs to take precedence over remote and unintended consequences. I think this is so because sin and culpability primarily applies to that which is in our control and which we understand to be in our control. It may be that I am somehow responsible for everyone else's sin, but I certainly can't explain how that is the case. I need to take responsibility first and foremost for those things that I can understand myself to be responsible for.
This is also intuitive, as for instance the Nazi idealogue pushing for racial purity is generally considered more to blame than the SS grunt that carried it out. In my latter example it was perhaps intentional, but what of the potential of consequence is known, even if unintended?
...Then we have an instance of double-effect, which is notoriously difficult.
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Here for instance, I would think of someone watching inappropriate contentography, and thus tacitly accepting the potential fact that it might have been exploitative or paying for further production of such? I would make perhaps a differentiation between Justice, which would focus on the act; and sin, which is more of a stain spread over spiritual communion between God and man, no?
Is the distinction between what we owe to man and what we owe to God? Between our relationship with men and our relationship with God? I think that's a reasonable distinction.
I think you are right that sin refers us to God whereas vice or crime refers us to other humans or nature, but I also think that mortal and venial sin is focused on that spiritual communion between God and man. Many authors speak about mortal sin as breaking that communion and venial sin as injuring it. At the same time a single act could be both a sin and a crime, something against God and against man. This is quite common.
I don't agree that morality should focus on malice, which seems more at play if you are seeking punitive measures or retribution, acting in Law. Doestoyevsky's principle draws us away from that, I agree, but did Jesus not say to turn the other cheek and remove the beam from your own eye? To return to another of his works, Crime and Punishment, that crime is more Transgression in the Russian supposedly, to overstep, and it was Raskolnikov's supposed good ends, but also the malice of the pawnbroker, that made him commit the crime.
I mostly just meant that morality ought to criticize the badness of the moral act under the aspect of volitional faults such as malice or selfishness rather than under the aspect of unintended consequences. The fault could also lie in undue proportion, inconsiderateness, overstepping, etc. I think some of that can be reduced to selfishness, but maybe not all of it. I agree that malice is not the only possible problem. I realize that doesn't altogether answer your point, but malice is slippery. We can talk about it more if you'd like.
I do not think it is at all clear that sin is based on individual culpability scripturally. What about all that about reckoning the sins of the fathers onto his descendants for 7 generations? Or original sin, for that matter. The legal metaphor is an easy one to apply, but I am not sure that is what is going on here at all. Is sin not when you do not love God or your neighbour, the image of God? Is it not staining or obscuring your own status as the image of God?
I agree that sin occurs when you do not love God or neighbor, but "you" is the key word. I don't sin when my great-grandpa fails to love God or neighbor. I agree that scripture is confusing on the question of individual culpability, but I am not aware of a strong case for the degree of corporate culpability that holds an unborn descendent responsible for the sin of his ancestor. There are also notable scriptural counter-examples to such an approach (e.g. Ezekiel 18:20). Anyway, I'm worried that this topic could take us too far afield.
True, it is thus selfishness, but why must there be intentionality, unless you are intent to set-up a penitentiary framework? So I think the difference here may lie deeper, that I do not fear Doestoyevsky's principle, as I do not think that it draws away from selfishness - it focuses on it, as it shows that it is not just about me, but about everyone else. It is Father Zosima vs Father Ferrapont in Brothers Karamazov, the more indulgent acceptor of sin unto himself vs the harsh ascetic - Jesus and John the baptist also spring to mind.
That's true, and I think that is the beauty of the passages of literature you are citing. I think either approach can be taken too far (individual and corporate). Dostoevsky's principle can even be twisted to induce selfishness, namely when the person borders on solipsism and refuses to grant autonomy and a share in culpability to others. That is to say, there is also humility in accepting that others make choices which you have no control over. A classic example would be the small child who blames themselves for their parents' divorce. I think there needs to be a balance, but these are interesting and difficult questions.
But then, I am Protestant, so the sacrament of Penitence is foreign to my thinking in general, and I can see how it can confuse sin and forgiveness into an accountant's ledger. However, reifying the principle into concrete things, tablets of stone, is needed for a moral code as you noted with an 'external legislator' - as humans are not always so good with such things. This makes me think again of CS Lewis's bit about the difference between Protestants and Catholics:
Yes, that's a fascinating quote.
Okay, if you differentiate one as more, the other automatically becomes less. Ultimately what saves from Hell is grace, so this runs against the old grace vs works narrative again. If you deny that works save, then they also don't condemn in the face of grace? A bad work, a mortal sin, should be powerless before real grace then. The Lutheran objection is not just that people falsely believe themselves condemned, but that this suggests that human depravity can somehow overpower God's grace.
Okay, true.
But can sinful acts result in good? I am not so sure. The only way I think they could be, is by allowing God's grace, so the only felix culpa could be Adam's leading to the incarnation, or Judas' leading to the Crucifixion. Throttling baby Hitlers in the crib is an unknown and unknowable quantity, and generally sin seems to beget sin, unless by Grace of God. I have no reason to think a good outcome would ever result from a sin, and even if it did, perhaps it would have been better otherwise.
In general I agree with you on this. There is good reason to believe that sin begets sin.
This looks a fruitful avenue to investigate. Only mortal and one assumes a harsh legalist, only venial and a universalist. But this assumes that sin must be either mortal or venial - I would assume sin to be both mortal and venial in a sense, in that the wages thereof are death, but that those wages were paid for on the Cross. If the goal is to embody Christ, then all sin is to be avoided, but if we have failed from the weakness of our flesh, to return penitently to Him. Maybe not someone believing in mortal sin and venial sin, but in mortal venial sin. I don't know, how do we test this? By their fruits? Would that not deteriorate into this denomination is more holy than that one, which seems again to feel Pharisaical.
I don't know, I'll mull on this. I still feel that the immediate act is less than the totality of its effects within holistic creation, and that judgement is of course only God's to make. But as you say, that is very consequence-based, and moral evil should be judged on its spiritual stain to that being, perhaps.
I think some of this can be reconciled by saying that the human approach to morality and sin is necessarily limited and therefore a line must be drawn somewhere. I think intentionality is a good place to start for marking out that line. We try to identify, avoid, and repent of sin the best we can, and it will be imperfect. It is likely that Dostoevsky saw a truth in the depths of reality, but I think we need to be careful about how we appropriate and incorporate that truth into our own understanding. Perhaps the Russian discovered an exceedingly sharp sword, but I don't believe that everyone is meant to handle it--particularly the shoddy swordsmen.
