All the same, I think distinctions, such as those between mortal and venial sin, are still possible and useful. Your idea reminds me of something like the Sorites paradox, where a certain vagueness in definition or knowledge is said to prevent a distinction altogether. Yet we can say with confidence that--ceteris paribus--to murder someone is more grievous than to steal half a day's wage from them.
Yes, something like that. Intuitively, we consider murder worse than theft, and I am generally in favour of such moral distinctions. In fact, that is how I generally argue that there must be a real moral order, as some things are just clearly worse than others (feeding as opposed to hurting a child, say). But beyond realising the malevolent nature of a sin, can we finely grade them at all? Heading into Catholic territory, what of concepts such as the Cardinal Sins? Are these not sins that lead to, and generate, other sin? Many of them seem intuitively venial, such as Pride. What is the thinking of that classification versus the mortal/venial one? But then, mortal sins can seem venial at the time, perhaps - here I would think of something like the Golden Calf, which would be idolatry (presumably mortal) but to Aaron, he was making an image of 'the God that led us from Egypt'. He was trying to worship God, but that sin of not trusting to Moses' return or the providence of God, lead to idolatry. Can a venial sin not really then be a mortal one, if the root of greater sin? If the severity of the sin is judged on the object and not the intention, then the well-intentioned Aaron's sin is thus that much worse? Good intentions pave the way to Hell, indeed.
If we can't differentiate sin and we can't give a special priority to the evil of the proximate act itself (as opposed to its unintended consequences) then I'm not sure the moral understanding of life will survive. The key with respect to culpability is the act itself and the intended consequences, not unintended or unforeseen consequences. Morality really needs to focus on that aspect of malice or selfishness, and the danger of Dostoevsky's principle is that it draws us away from that.
Why must the proximate act take precedence? The question here is what is the problem with sin? Is its immediate results the issue, or its ultimate potential to bring distance between us and God? As was pointed out earlier in the thread, Adam willingly ate the fruit in the garden, and that act has had the unintended consequence of all further sin. The act of disobeying God is put in the shadow by the consequences of the Fall, and like the Cardinal sins (which I would assume this to be a species of Pride and Greed, maybe?), the innocuous was far worse. This is also intuitive, as for instance the Nazi idealogue pushing for racial purity is generally considered more to blame than the SS grunt that carried it out. In my latter example it was perhaps intentional, but what of the potential of consequence is known, even if unintended? Here for instance, I would think of someone watching inappropriate contentography, and thus tacitly accepting the potential fact that it might have been exploitative or paying for further production of such? I would make perhaps a differentiation between Justice, which would focus on the act; and sin, which is more of a stain spread over spiritual communion between God and man, no? I don't agree that morality should focus on malice, which seems more at play if you are seeking punitive measures or retribution, acting in Law. Doestoyevsky's principle draws us away from that, I agree, but did Jesus not say to turn the other cheek and remove the beam from your own eye? To return to another of his works, Crime and Punishment, that crime is more Transgression in the Russian supposedly, to overstep, and it was Raskolnikov's supposed good ends, but also the malice of the pawnbroker, that made him commit the crime.
I do not think it is at all clear that sin is based on individual culpability scripturally. What about all that about reckoning the sins of the fathers onto his descendants for 7 generations? Or original sin, for that matter. The legal metaphor is an easy one to apply, but I am not sure that is what is going on here at all. Is sin not when you do not love God or your neighbour, the image of God? Is it not staining or obscuring your own status as the image of God? True, it is thus selfishness, but why must there be intentionality, unless you are intent to set-up a penitentiary framework? So I think the difference here may lie deeper, that I do not fear Doestoyevsky's principle, as I do not think that it draws away from selfishness - it focuses on it, as it shows that it is not just about me, but about everyone else. It is Father Zosima vs Father Ferrapont in Brothers Karamazov, the more indulgent acceptor of sin unto himself vs the harsh ascetic - Jesus and John the baptist also spring to mind. But then, I am Protestant, so the sacrament of Penitence is foreign to my thinking in general, and I can see how it can confuse sin and forgiveness into an accountant's ledger. However, reifying the principle into concrete things, tablets of stone, is needed for a moral code as you noted with an 'external legislator' - as humans are not always so good with such things. This makes me think again of CS Lewis's bit about the difference between Protestants and Catholics:
The one suspects that all spiritual gifts are falsely claimed if they cannot be embodied in bricks and mortar, or official positions, or institutions: the other, that nothing retains its spirituality if incarnation is pushed to that degree and in that way. The difference about Papal infallibility is simply a form of this. The proper corruptions of each Church tell the same tale. When Catholicism goes bad it becomes the world-old, world-wide religio of amulets and holy places and priestcraft; Protestantism, in its corresponding decay, becomes a vague mist of ethical platitudes
The other point is that it isn't clear why the doctrine entails a "decision to label some sin less than another" rather than a decision to label some sin more than another. A common Lutheran objection would be just the opposite, that the doctrine of mortal sin leads people to believe they are in danger of Hell when in fact they are not. I take it that the same point could be applied to Dostoevsky's idea. Sinful acts could lead to good outcomes, such as that "felix culpa."
Okay, if you differentiate one as more, the other automatically becomes less. Ultimately what saves from Hell is grace, so this runs against the old grace vs works narrative again. If you deny that works save, then they also don't condemn in the face of grace? A bad work, a mortal sin, should be powerless before real grace then. The Lutheran objection is not just that people falsely believe themselves condemned, but that this suggests that human depravity can somehow overpower God's grace.
But can sinful acts result in good? I am not so sure. The only way I think they could be, is by allowing God's grace, so the only felix culpa could be Adam's leading to the incarnation, or Judas' leading to the Crucifixion. Throttling baby Hitlers in the crib is an unknown and unknowable quantity, and generally sin seems to beget sin, unless by Grace of God. I have no reason to think a good outcome would ever result from a sin, and even if it did, perhaps it would have been better otherwise.
Perhaps a good way to approach the issue is to ask, "Is someone who believes in mortal sin and venial sin better off than either someone who believes only in mortal sin or else someone who believes only in venial sin?"
This looks a fruitful avenue to investigate. Only mortal and one assumes a harsh legalist, only venial and a universalist. But this assumes that sin must be either mortal or venial - I would assume sin to be both mortal and venial in a sense, in that the wages thereof are death, but that those wages were paid for on the Cross. If the goal is to embody Christ, then all sin is to be avoided, but if we have failed from the weakness of our flesh, to return penitently to Him. Maybe not someone believing in mortal sin and venial sin, but in mortal venial sin. I don't know, how do we test this? By their fruits? Would that not deteriorate into this denomination is more holy than that one, which seems again to feel Pharisaical.
I don't know, I'll mull on this. I still feel that the immediate act is less than the totality of its effects within holistic creation, and that judgement is of course only God's to make. But as you say, that is very consequence-based, and moral evil should be judged on its spiritual stain to that being, perhaps.
