Not as long as emotions are being manipulated it isn't reasonable.
Well that's an interesting statement in itself. I know we've disagreed on how to interpret emotions, but why think that you are manipulating emotions at all? You're
leveraging a widely held emotion that relates to security, but I don't see how you would necessarily be manipulating anyone. People legitimately desire security and you have a legitimate way to achieve it. That's not manipulation.
I don't see reasonable as a spectrum.
..As an aside, I kind of do. I tend to view some propositions and arguments as more reasonable, plausible, or probabilistic than others. I actually think that the mere fact that there can be disagreement over what is true and reasonable means that there must be a spectrum, with some things being more deeply or obviously true than others. Perhaps metaphysically everything is simply true or false, reasonable or unreasonable, but the practicalities and probabilities of human life complicate things considerably..
It isn't reasonable to do what you desire to do.
Why should you strive to do what will make you happy?
It's worth pointing out how strange and doubtful these statements are before looking at them in more detail.
It isn't reasonable to do what you desire to do. "I want to therefore I should"? Why should you do what you want to do?
Because you want to? Isn't that just what wanting means?
Suppose Ben needs a new car and his favorite color car, by far, is blue. He loves blue cars and he wants one very badly. He goes to the store and finds the make and model he desires, and it is within his price range. There are two options for that model, a blue car and a non-blue car. Except for color they are exactly the same. Which should he choose?
Because it will make you happy to have done it? Why should you strive to do what will make you happy?
Because happiness is intrinsically desirable? Because happiness is precisely that thing you desire to have?
You know, I thought you had a good, reasonable discussion with Philo, but now you're getting goofy again.
People will do what makes them happy, but that doesn't make it reasonable.
True, and yet acting for the sake of happiness is reasonable because happiness is intrinsically desirable. Happiness basically just is satisfied desire. If desire itself is incomplete and wanting, then the happiness that is completing and fulfilling is good.
You're better at forming syllogisms than me, we've talked about that before. So maybe you can explain to me how to insert a "should" into a syllogism. In order for there to be a "should" in the conclusion, there needs to be a "should" in a premise, right? But how do you get a "should" in a premise and that premise be true?
I was thinking about that earlier. I haven't looked at practical syllogisms in some time, but I'm generally happy with the explanation you gave here.
The thing is, oughtness or normativity is so much deeper than many realize. Truth itself has that essential character of oughtness, because it ought to be believed. We might as well add that to your two bizarre questions above: "Why should I believe what is true?" Sure, you can convince me beyond doubt that your syllogism is valid and sound, and that the conclusion is therefore true. So what? Why should I believe it? Sure, it's true, but why should I believe it?
The answer is that that's just what you do with truth: you believe it. That's just what you do with desire: you fulfill it. That's just what you do with happiness: you seek it. Hume's dichotomy is neat and tidy, but it just doesn't fit when we get into the deep recesses of reality. There really are proper responses to different metaphysical realities, including desire, happiness, and truth. I'm even tempted to say that these are analytic truths, and that the person who asks such questions doesn't really understand what desire, happiness, and truth are.
Our emotions are are easy to manipulate en masse and we have a hard time distinguishing between them and facts all the time so we base our beliefs all too often on what we feel is true. That's a far cry from objectivity.
My wife hates chocolate. The first time she told me that my immediate response was, "What are you nuts? Chocolate is soooo good!" And as I said it I meant it; she must not be reasonable to not agree that chocolate is tasty. It felt true. Have you ever done that: felt something so strongly it seemed factually true? But then you look back and think about it reasonably, and of course that wasn't true.
Haha, fair enough. I don't want to get into another argument about emotions, at least not yet. I do agree that feeling--or any experience--cannot infallibly verify a truth claim.
It's an objective fact that we value things, just like it's an objective fact that we have thumbs. If there are things we should value, then should we have thumbs? Our biologically ingrained propensity for cooperation is just a novel trait we developed through evolution no different than opposable thumbs because they've both aided in our survival and the continuation of our species. Or rather I should say that at a minimum, it doesn't need to be anything more than that.
Okay, sure. Yet the evolutionist would say that our (species') opposable thumbs indicate the existence of graspable objects. Does our species' moral values indicate the existence of realities graspable by emotion and desire?