Atheism and nihilism

Is atheism inherently nihilistic?

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FrumiousBandersnatch

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At the core, I think basic morals are almost completely universal.

But there's also all kinds of culturally or geographically contingent morality also in play, a level or two up from the basics. But even that doesnt just emerge out of the individual subjective imagination. I think there's reasons that are objectively demonstrable, in principle at least.
That's my point; one can argue that all moral views agreed by a group (that don't just emerge from individual imagination) are objective in that sense.
 
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durangodawood

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Sure, there are some basic universals for which you can make such objective arguments (e.g. the sense of fairness seems to be a feature of cognitively sophisticated social mammals). But the differences in moral views seem to be in the practical application of these universals - e.g. exactly what do we mean by murder? when is it permissible to kill? etc. There are many variations of interpretation & application that don't inherently destabilise societies yet are sufficiently different for them to cause deep animosity between societies.
Absolutely there are these differences between societies. But it seems almost preposterous that they emerged from coincidence of individual subjective whim with each society.

My sense is these differences arose in response to varying social or natural conditions. For example certain societies exist side by side in agrarian situations, leading to more cooperation as a deep value. Maybe other conditions for other societies demands a warrior ethos, in which slightly different values prevail, trickling down into a variety of moral rules. Either way, the basis is real world conditions, and not individual subjective opinion.
 
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Moral Orel

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Technically axioms aren't true or false, and truth and falsity are considered functions of a logical system, including functions of its axioms. This is at least how it is understood in mathematical logic. In any case I'm not sure you actually disagree with what Frumious said.
Well, axioms aren't proven true, correct. But they're still the sort of thing that is either true or false, aren't they? a=a For instance. A subjective opinion (chocolate ice cream is tasty) isn't the sort of thing that can be evaluated in the same manner.
How does making an agreement to not-steal eliminate "shoulds" and "oughts"? Rather, it seems to establish them.
I argued that people would like making the pact. If you want to take it to the next step and argue that people "should" honor the pact, I would instead argue that one would not like the consequences of violating it. You don't need to argue that people should do what they like, and shouldn't do what they don't like, people are going to do what they're motivated to do whether they "should" or not. But I honestly think that finagling a "should" into an argument can't be done without accepting a base axiom like Frumy said, but I find that wholly unnecessary.
 
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Moral Orel

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1 Humans naturally like personal security.
...(objective fact)
2 Neighbors murdering each other hinders that and renders society unstable.
...(objective fact)
3 Therefore we develop the social rule "dont murder your neighbor"
...(reasonable to argue this objectively happened)
4 We call it "bad" and build up myths around it so it lives in the individual's subjectively experienced conscience.

Seems like those who think morality is subjective only appreciate step 4. But I find the whole basis for not murdering your neighbor to be completely objective.
Are we correct to like personal security?
 
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FrumiousBandersnatch

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Absolutely there are these differences between societies. But it seems almost preposterous that they emerged from coincidence of individual subjective whim with each society.

My sense is these differences arose in response to varying social or natural conditions. For example certain societies exist side by side in agrarian situations, leading to more cooperation as a deep value. Maybe other conditions for other societies demands a warrior ethos, in which slightly different values prevail, trickling down into a variety of moral rules. Either way, the basis is real world conditions, and not individual subjective opinion.
Even individual subjective opinion is (arguably) the result of prior real-world causal sequences...
 
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Moral Orel

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What I meant was that it seems that the closest you can get to objectivity in a moral framework is to build it on axiomatic moral principles, i.e. principles taken to be self-evidently true (as the article suggested). Given those axioms, it should be possible, in principle, to build an 'objective' moral framework as a formal system. I said it was a pity there were no examples because I have doubts about its feasibility in practice.
Then we generally agree. It can be done that way, but you said (at first) it's the only way to make it work. I think it works just fine without it.
 
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zippy2006

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Well, axioms aren't proven true, correct. But they're still the sort of thing that is either true or false, aren't they? a=a For instance. A subjective opinion (chocolate ice cream is tasty) isn't the sort of thing that can be evaluated in the same manner.

Okay, sure.

I argued that people would like making the pact. If you want to take it to the next step and argue that people "should" honor the pact, I would instead argue that one would not like the consequences of violating it. You don't need to argue that people should do what they like, and shouldn't do what they don't like, people are going to do what they're motivated to do whether they "should" or not. But I honestly think that finagling a "should" into an argument can't be done without accepting a base axiom like Frumy said, but I find that wholly unnecessary.

The problem is that your system is no better at solving the problem, since you are apparently relying on the principle that agreements should be honored. To say that, "One would not like the consequences of violating it," is a threat, not an agreement. You can threaten people in order to force them to do your will, but that is very different from establishing a common moral system. Even a community which enforces agreements by force is establishing an axiom and punishing the denial of the axiom. The axiom is that one should not renege on an agreement.

All moral systems require imperatives whether they are categorical or hypothetical. A system that is based only on hypothetical imperatives may technically be based on arbitrarily-imposed consequences rather than strict normativity, but practically speaking it amounts to the same thing. Technicalities aside, there is very little difference between, "Convert or die," and "You ought to convert."

To say that a base axiom is unnecessary because threats will suffice seems strange to me. Certainly it is, "might makes right," but it also carries with it the strange idea that the hypothetical imperatives established by the ruling class are arbitrary, with no extra-mental connection to reality. As Durangodawood pointed out, that leaves us with some pretty amazing coincidences. Even your claim, "One would not like the consequences of violating it," is either normative or a claim based on human nature. That is, it seems to say, "One should not like the consequences of violating it." Else if you want to be consistent you should use "might" rather than "would." It is impossible to control behavior without some notion of normativity.
 
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stevil

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Some religious people claim that atheism, which is defined as a lack of belief in deity or deities, is inherently nihilistic.
Atheism isn't a thing.
Atheist is a label which can be applied to an individual merely because they lack a belief in the gods.
I don't think anyone believes in all the gods. So most people lack believe is most gods. Some people believe in just one god. Others believe in a specific subset of gods.
But we are all united in that there are many many many gods that we don't believe in.

Does it define us?
I mean, given our collective disbelief in Thor or Ra or Estre, does that define other characteristics or beliefs for us collectively?

For many Theists they read a scripture, they subscribe to a church, a mosque or whatever, and collectively there are a set of stories that they believe, a set of morals, a set of rules, they get together and they talk about their beliefs, they influence each other.

For an atheist, there is no scripture, no church or place of worship, most atheists don't frequent atheist forums, don't actively seek out theist forums in order to challenge the believers. Atheism isn't really a thing.

Since atheists come from all nationalities, races, socio-economic backgrounds,
As do theists as well.


and indeed all walks of life, it is reasonable to say that making such a sweeping generalization of all atheists isn’t fair.
I'd say that a large number of atheists probably don't know what "nihilism" means

However, many atheists spend an inordinate amount of time criticizing religion.
Most don't
Visit any atheist blog on the internet, and there you won’t find one positive article on faith.
Do theists on theist sites post positive articles about lack of faith?


It seems like everything they post is hostile towards religion.
People typically focus on issues, things that are dangerous. Just watch the news, mostly about issues, not many feel good articles.

You’ll never see them post a link to a news story about Christians feeding the poor or being good people in general.
How many posts are there on theistic sites talking about atheists that give money to the poor or being good people in general?

The same can be said about atheist books: read any book from renowned atheists such as Richard Dawkins or Sam Harris, and all they have to say about religion is bad.
These are two people, they don't represent all atheists. I think Dawkins books on biology and evolution are fantastic. I haven't read his atheist or anti-theist books.

In fact, the world's most famous blasphemy advocate Christopher Hitchens even wrote a book called How Religion Poisons Everything.
I haven't read this book, but I do see there is a lot of bad that theism does bring into the world. For example their insistence on having the right to discriminate.

Since it seems like almost all atheists are hostile towards religion, particularly Christianity,
This is not true.
Most atheists want a society where people are free to choose whatever religion or non religion they want.

which is an inherently peaceful faith that improves morals and provides eternal salvation for all believers,
I don't agree with much of this.


wouldn’t it make sense to think that atheism is inherently nihilistic?
You haven't yet addressed what nihilism means or why an atheist should subscribe to nihilism.

It’s not like you ever see atheists praising religion and talking about how good it is. If that is what they believed, they probably wouldn’t be atheists in the first place.
We aren't a theism or Christian appreaciation group. If that is what you are hoping for.
We aren't a group at all.
Just individuals who happen not to believe in any gods.
 
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durangodawood

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Even individual subjective opinion is (arguably) the result of prior real-world causal sequences...
Yeah if we drill in we could probably blow up the subjective / objective distinction at some deep level.

But my point is that even using the conventional distinction between the two, enduring morality has an objective basis. I dont like destroying perfectly good concepts and distinctions unnecessarily.
 
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Moral Orel

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The problem is that your system is no better at solving the problem, since you are apparently relying on the principle that agreements should be honored. To say that, "One would not like the consequences of violating it," is a threat, not an agreement. You can threaten people in order to force them to do your will, but that is very different from establishing a common moral system. Even a community which enforces agreements by force is establishing an axiom and punishing the denial of the axiom. The axiom is that one should not renege on an agreement.

All moral systems require imperatives whether they are categorical or hypothetical. A system that is based only on hypothetical imperatives may technically be based on arbitrarily-imposed consequences rather than strict normativity, but practically speaking it amounts to the same thing. Technicalities aside, there is very little difference between, "Convert or die," and "You ought to convert."

To say that a base axiom is unnecessary because threats will suffice seems strange to me. Certainly it is, "might makes right," but it also carries with it the strange idea that the hypothetical imperatives established by the ruling class are arbitrary, with no extra-mental connection to reality. As Durangodawood pointed out, that leaves us with some pretty amazing coincidences. Even your claim, "One would not like the consequences of violating it," is either normative or a claim based on human nature. That is, it seems to say, "One should not like the consequences of violating it." Else if you want to be consistent you should use "might" rather than "would." It is impossible to control behavior without some notion of normativity.
Eh... it isn't necessarily a threat. The consequences might be that society will have you locked up, sure. On the other hand, if people don't agree to a no-stealing pact then other folks have no motivation to not steal from you. Society would be of the type that security in possessions doesn't exist, and that would be a consequence that people don't like, but I'm not threatening you with it.

I will concede though, that "one might not like the consequences". Especially in the realm of subjectivity there are going to be exceptions.
 
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Moral Orel

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We naturally like personal security. Its a natural fact about the human organism.
That doesn't answer my question. Are we correct to like personal security?

Think about this. It is a fact that I like chocolate ice cream; that's a natural fact about me based on the way my taste buds interact with things like sugar molecules. Am I correct to like chocolate ice cream? Is chocolate ice cream objectively delicious?

Of course not because people aren't "correct" about what they like. They aren't "incorrect" either. Subjective feelings aren't evaluated in such a manner.

And since Zippy said this next bit about what you've been saying, I'm going to put it here:

As Durangodawood pointed out, that leaves us with some pretty amazing coincidences.
It's an amazing coincidence that many values are so incredibly intersubjective in the same way that it's an amazing coincidence humans have opposable thumbs.
 
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zippy2006

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Eh... it isn't necessarily a threat. The consequences might be that society will have you locked up, sure. On the other hand, if people don't agree to a no-stealing pact then other folks have no motivation to not steal from you. Society would be of the type that security in possessions doesn't exist, and that would be a consequence that people don't like, but I'm not threatening you with it.

You seem to want to accept Hume's dichotomy and also do away with "ought" altogether, but it's curious that your arguments here look very similar to natural law arguments for objective morality. For example, you seem to think that it is inherently reasonable for a society to form a no-stealing pact. That's pretty darn close to establishing objective morality on the basis of natural reason.

You seem to be saying, "Given the constraints that reality imposes on us, moral action, such as not-stealing, is naturally incentivized." Again though, incentivization and preference at the level of species is still a substantial form of normativity. It is precisely that sort of normativity that natural objective morality is based on.

I will concede though, that "one might not like the consequences". Especially in the realm of subjectivity there are going to be exceptions.

If there are exceptions, there are rules. ;)

It's an amazing coincidence that many values are so incredibly intersubjective in the same way that it's an amazing coincidence humans have opposable thumbs.

I think so too, except I don't declare moral values subjective and thumbs objective.
 
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Moral Orel

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You seem to want to accept Hume's dichotomy and also do away with "ought" altogether, but it's curious that your arguments here look very similar to natural law arguments for objective morality. For example, you seem to think that it is inherently reasonable for a society to form a no-stealing pact. That's pretty darn close to establishing objective morality on the basis of natural reason.

You seem to be saying, "Given the constraints that reality imposes on us, moral action, such as not-stealing, is naturally incentivized." Again though, incentivization and preference at the level of species is still a substantial form of normativity. It is precisely that sort of normativity that natural objective morality is based on.
I don't think it's reasonable to form a no-stealing pact, I think human motivations are predictable. I think my arguments for any given moral are a little too darn close to being outright appeals to emotion, but I'm fine with that because they can affect the change I want. Let's face it, fallacious appeals to emotion are the most persuasive arguments for the vast majority of people; validity and soundness are important less-so.

The nature of what morality is is interesting and all, but what's important to me is whether I can persuade people to feel the way I do, not whether or not I'm correct to feel one way or another. Can people be persuaded via emotional manipulation to feel differently about how they should behave? Of course, and that's all it really takes to make a moral system. It doesn't matter if it's a farce, it doesn't matter if people recognize it as a farce, people are still going to do what they desire to do.

If there are exceptions, there are rules. ;)
I thought about our previous more heated exchanges when I wrote that too, and that's why I was happy to concede my wording needed to be changed to reflect the lack of strength of my statement. ;)
 
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Moral Orel

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Is it correct for geese to migrate?
I missed this somehow. It looks like you recognize that it's an absurd question, but that's my point. If we aren't correct to believe that personal security is good, then it isn't objectively true. It's an absurd question to ask because it isn't the sort of thing that is correct/incorrect like my other post about ice cream flavor.

I am correct to believe that the Earth is round. It cannot be said that I am correct/incorrect to believe that personal security is good. If personal security is not in fact good, then we aren't talking about objectivity.
 
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zippy2006

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I don't think it's reasonable to form a no-stealing pact, I think human motivations are predictable. I think my arguments for any given moral are a little too darn close to being outright appeals to emotion, but I'm fine with that because they can affect the change I want. Let's face it, fallacious appeals to emotion are the most persuasive arguments for the vast majority of people; validity and soundness are important less-so.

The nature of what morality is is interesting and all, but what's important to me is whether I can persuade people to feel the way I do, not whether or not I'm correct to feel one way or another. Can people be persuaded via emotional manipulation to feel differently about how they should behave? Of course, and that's all it really takes to make a moral system. It doesn't matter if it's a farce, it doesn't matter if people recognize it as a farce, people are still going to do what they desire to do.

So you try to persuade people to feel the way you do. Say you try to persuade people that they ought to enter into your no-stealing pact. Are you telling me that you try to persuade them to enter into a pact, and yet you don't think entering into the pact is reasonable? Perhaps human motivations are predictable, but doesn't reason take into account human motivations? Further, if human motivations are predictable, doesn't that mean that we are all motivated by similar things, such as pleasure and security? If, say, most humans are motivated by security and you provide a mechanism for improving security with your no-stealing pact, wouldn't it be reasonable for most humans to enter into your pact?

The very fact that humans are persuadable en masse is evidence of moral, behavioral, and rational notions that are more than merely subjective.

I thought about our previous more heated exchanges when I wrote that too, and that's why I was happy to concede my wording needed to be changed to reflect the lack of strength of my statement. ;)

Fair enough. Thanks for that. I will try to be more civil as well. ;)

It's an amazing coincidence that many values are so incredibly intersubjective in the same way that it's an amazing coincidence humans have opposable thumbs.

I think so too, except I don't declare moral values subjective and thumbs objective.
 
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Moral Orel

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So you try to persuade people to feel the way you do. Say you try to persuade people that they ought to enter into your no-stealing pact. Are you telling me that you try to persuade them to enter into a pact, and yet you don't think entering into the pact is reasonable? Perhaps human motivations are predictable, but doesn't reason take into account human motivations? Further, if human motivations are predictable, doesn't that mean that we are all motivated by similar things, such as pleasure and security? If, say, most humans are motivated by security and you provide a mechanism for improving security with your no-stealing pact, wouldn't it be reasonable for most humans to enter into your pact?
Not as long as emotions are being manipulated it isn't reasonable. I don't see reasonable as a spectrum. Just like an argument is either sound or unsound. If just one premise isn't true, then it isn't reasonable. It isn't reasonable to do what you desire to do. "I want to therefore I should"? Why should you do what you want to do? Because it will make you happy to have done it? Why should you strive to do what will make you happy? People will do what makes them happy, but that doesn't make it reasonable.

You're better at forming syllogisms than me, we've talked about that before. So maybe you can explain to me how to insert a "should" into a syllogism. In order for there to be a "should" in the conclusion, there needs to be a "should" in a premise, right? But how do you get a "should" in a premise and that premise be true?

The very fact that humans are persuadable en masse is evidence of moral, behavioral, and rational notions that are more than merely subjective.
Our emotions are are easy to manipulate en masse and we have a hard time distinguishing between them and facts all the time so we base our beliefs all too often on what we feel is true. That's a far cry from objectivity.

My wife hates chocolate. The first time she told me that my immediate response was, "What are you nuts? Chocolate is soooo good!" And as I said it I meant it; she must not be reasonable to not agree that chocolate is tasty. It felt true. Have you ever done that: felt something so strongly it seemed factually true? But then you look back and think about it reasonably, and of course that wasn't true.

I think so too, except I don't declare moral values subjective and thumbs objective.
It's an objective fact that we value things, just like it's an objective fact that we have thumbs. If there are things we should value, then should we have thumbs? Our biologically ingrained propensity for cooperation is just a novel trait we developed through evolution no different than opposable thumbs because they've both aided in our survival and the continuation of our species. Or rather I should say that at a minimum, it doesn't need to be anything more than that.
 
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zippy2006

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Not as long as emotions are being manipulated it isn't reasonable.

Well that's an interesting statement in itself. I know we've disagreed on how to interpret emotions, but why think that you are manipulating emotions at all? You're leveraging a widely held emotion that relates to security, but I don't see how you would necessarily be manipulating anyone. People legitimately desire security and you have a legitimate way to achieve it. That's not manipulation.

I don't see reasonable as a spectrum.

..As an aside, I kind of do. I tend to view some propositions and arguments as more reasonable, plausible, or probabilistic than others. I actually think that the mere fact that there can be disagreement over what is true and reasonable means that there must be a spectrum, with some things being more deeply or obviously true than others. Perhaps metaphysically everything is simply true or false, reasonable or unreasonable, but the practicalities and probabilities of human life complicate things considerably..

It isn't reasonable to do what you desire to do.

Why should you strive to do what will make you happy?

It's worth pointing out how strange and doubtful these statements are before looking at them in more detail.

It isn't reasonable to do what you desire to do. "I want to therefore I should"? Why should you do what you want to do?

Because you want to? Isn't that just what wanting means?

Suppose Ben needs a new car and his favorite color car, by far, is blue. He loves blue cars and he wants one very badly. He goes to the store and finds the make and model he desires, and it is within his price range. There are two options for that model, a blue car and a non-blue car. Except for color they are exactly the same. Which should he choose?

Because it will make you happy to have done it? Why should you strive to do what will make you happy?

Because happiness is intrinsically desirable? Because happiness is precisely that thing you desire to have?

You know, I thought you had a good, reasonable discussion with Philo, but now you're getting goofy again. ^_^ :p

People will do what makes them happy, but that doesn't make it reasonable.

True, and yet acting for the sake of happiness is reasonable because happiness is intrinsically desirable. Happiness basically just is satisfied desire. If desire itself is incomplete and wanting, then the happiness that is completing and fulfilling is good.

You're better at forming syllogisms than me, we've talked about that before. So maybe you can explain to me how to insert a "should" into a syllogism. In order for there to be a "should" in the conclusion, there needs to be a "should" in a premise, right? But how do you get a "should" in a premise and that premise be true?

I was thinking about that earlier. I haven't looked at practical syllogisms in some time, but I'm generally happy with the explanation you gave here.

The thing is, oughtness or normativity is so much deeper than many realize. Truth itself has that essential character of oughtness, because it ought to be believed. We might as well add that to your two bizarre questions above: "Why should I believe what is true?" Sure, you can convince me beyond doubt that your syllogism is valid and sound, and that the conclusion is therefore true. So what? Why should I believe it? Sure, it's true, but why should I believe it?

The answer is that that's just what you do with truth: you believe it. That's just what you do with desire: you fulfill it. That's just what you do with happiness: you seek it. Hume's dichotomy is neat and tidy, but it just doesn't fit when we get into the deep recesses of reality. There really are proper responses to different metaphysical realities, including desire, happiness, and truth. I'm even tempted to say that these are analytic truths, and that the person who asks such questions doesn't really understand what desire, happiness, and truth are.

Our emotions are are easy to manipulate en masse and we have a hard time distinguishing between them and facts all the time so we base our beliefs all too often on what we feel is true. That's a far cry from objectivity.

My wife hates chocolate. The first time she told me that my immediate response was, "What are you nuts? Chocolate is soooo good!" And as I said it I meant it; she must not be reasonable to not agree that chocolate is tasty. It felt true. Have you ever done that: felt something so strongly it seemed factually true? But then you look back and think about it reasonably, and of course that wasn't true.

Haha, fair enough. I don't want to get into another argument about emotions, at least not yet. I do agree that feeling--or any experience--cannot infallibly verify a truth claim.

It's an objective fact that we value things, just like it's an objective fact that we have thumbs. If there are things we should value, then should we have thumbs? Our biologically ingrained propensity for cooperation is just a novel trait we developed through evolution no different than opposable thumbs because they've both aided in our survival and the continuation of our species. Or rather I should say that at a minimum, it doesn't need to be anything more than that.

Okay, sure. Yet the evolutionist would say that our (species') opposable thumbs indicate the existence of graspable objects. Does our species' moral values indicate the existence of realities graspable by emotion and desire?
 
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The happy Objectivist

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Hey Frumius,

Sorry it took me so long to get back to you. I had a minor disaster. Three very large limbs fell from my Cottonwood tree in the front yard and practically blocked us in the house. I've been dealing with that.


Not according to dictionaries it's not. You're not talking about morality; you're talking about a kind of expediency towards arbitrary goals.

Let me just highlight some of the contradictory languages that points to this same conclusion...

Well, dictionaries tell us how words are commonly used and the vast majority of people hold a deontological view of morality which is wrong. The notion of a duty-based morality is a contradiction in terms. A duty is something that you must do regardless of your thinking and judgment on the matter. To divorce morality from choice is to commit the fallacy of the stolen concept. Are you familiar with this pernicious fallacy? My definition of morality is that it is a code of values to guide one in one's choices and actions, which actions determine the course of one's life. See, my definition includes the essential connection between moral values and life as well as the fact that man must think in order to live and he must act on his judgment and not blindly follow the dictates of authority. On my view morals or values are not handed down by an authority, nor are they dictated by society or your parents. Moral values are some aspect of reality in relation to man's life as identified by an objective process, i.e., one based on facts, and by an objective standard: man's life and its requirements.


No, you should have said, "It's only because we choose to live," not "It's only because we must choose to live..." On your view we need not choose to live. "Must, must, must," is categorical language. All you're describing is doing things for ends. That's just planning, not morality.

My point was that man is a being of volitional consciousness. Life is an active process. Life is a process self generated, self sustaining action. Every living organism has a means of survival. For man that means is reason. Plants and the other animals act automatically to gain their values. Man does not. Man is the rational being. That doesn't mean all men are rational, it means that man is a being who survives by thinking and judging. So living for a man means thinking rationally. Reason does not happen automatically, it must be undertaken volitionally. So I think must is the right word to use in that context. I forget that you are probably not an Objectivst so I should have spelled it out explicitly. I've lived with these ideas for so long that they almost seem self-evident. I need to remember that they are not. Man must choose to live as man.

You say that your actions matter and yet you think it is equally moral to commit suicide as to live your life. How is it that life matters if, "The choice to live or die is pre-moral"?
Whoa, where did I say this? I said that the choice to live or not is pre-moral which means its outside of the realm of morality. Morality begins with the commitment to live, which means to take such actions that your nature requires if you want to continue living. The choice to live is just that, a choice. It won't give you the values your life requires. That requires thinking, judging, making logical connections, planning, discovering causal connections, and all of the things that you must do to live.

Apparently what you mean is that your actions have consequences, but since there are no inherently good or evil consequences there are also no good or evil actions. If dying is as good as living, then your actions don't matter.I never said that dying is as good as living.
Life is a value. In fact it is the ultimate value. Life is the only value that is an end in itself. It is the source of values, so how could it not be a value? But nothing forces you to live and if you don't want to live, no action on your part is required and there's no standard by which to judge such choices. I call it pre-moral because to do otherwise would be to make use of stolen concepts. A rational morality does not permit one to drop context or to steal concepts. I'm simply remaining true to reason by doing it.


And it makes a difference to my life whether I grow a beard or shave. What does this have to do with morality? Can you give a definition of morality?
I gave it above but I'll do it again here: morality is a code of values to guide one's thinking and actions, which actions determine the course of one's life.

Notice how I gave examples of diverging actions that mean the difference between life and death and then you gave an example that is not a life and death choice. Of course, it might be a life or death choice if you lived under sharia law or at the north pole. I'm glad that you agree with me that man's life is conditional. If man's life is conditional then that means that some actions are good for him and some are bad, if he wishes to continue living. I don't think this is controversial at all.

I don't think you even believe in good and bad. If you're not willing to say that death is bad, then what is?

Then you would be very wrong. All that is proper to the life of a rational being is the good. All that destroys it is the bad. Death is bad if one wants to live. See, there's that all important context that you keep dropping. Good and bad have no meaning apart from the context of a living being's goal to continue its life. The concept of good and bad presuppose the answer to two questions: good for whom and for what purpose. You would never say that something is good but it's good for nothing, just good, would you? Good does not exist in any object intrinsically, nor does it exist in the mind apart from any object. It exists in the relationship between some object or action and the life of a living organism. Just like truth is not in reality apart from the mind nor is it in the mind apart from reality. Truth exists in the relationship between the contents of a mind and the facts of reality. Hence its basis in the primacy of existence.


Why care about the "project of living?" I agree with you that eating food causes us to live longer, but you don't even think life is good; so why would eating food be good?
Because one wants to live. Hopefully, after the above, you know that it is not the case that I "don't think life is good". I love life, life is wonderful and rich. I want to live it fully and to the marrow. That is precisely why I need a rational code of values.
 
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The happy Objectivist

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It's individual actions in response to the facts that are moral or immoral.

I would call those moral virtues. The actions we take to gain and keep values are virtues. Both moral values and moral virtues require reason. Reason is a moral value. Rationality, the commitment to reason as ones only means of knowledge and one's only guide to action, is a moral virtue.
 
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