What do you want to know about German history?

Freodin · Aug 8, 2013

VikingGirlTBird said:
Guten Tag Freodin!

How are you?

Can you please tell me about the daily life in Ancient Germanic Tribal Germany, in Medieval Germany, and in Germany during the Renaissance please? Thanks so much! Peace!

Auf Wiedersehen!

That is quite a general question you are asking here...is there anything specific I can help you with?

VikingGirlTBird · Aug 9, 2013

Freodin said:
That is quite a general question you are asking here...is there anything specific I can help you with?

Well...there is not really anything specific that you can help me but, thanks so much for offering. The reason why I asked you the general question about daily life in Ancient Germanic Tribal Germany, in Medieval Germany, and in Germany during the Renaissance is because I really wanted to test your knowledge in those areas in German history.

But, what you can help me with is how was daily life in Germany during those periods was different from the daily life in the rest of Europe during those same time periods.

My biggest question is how come Medieval Germany adopted many of the social orders, the culture, and etc that the Normans "invented" or just "advanced" such as knights, feudlism, castles, and etc when the Normans almost never ever settled or conquered Medieval Germany in the first place so that the Normans could spread their ideas, culture, and their "inventions" to Medieval Germany? Just wondering! Thanks so much in advance!

Peace!

Freodin · Aug 10, 2013

VikingGirlTBird said:
Well...there is not really anything specific that you can help me but, thanks so much for offering. The reason why I asked you the general question about daily life in Ancient Germanic Tribal Germany, in Medieval Germany, and in Germany during the Renaissance is because I really wanted to test your knowledge in those areas in German history.

The problem with such general questions is "where to start" and "where to end".
Very basically: daily life for the common people in all these societies was based on working for survival. Agricultural productivity in ancient german times was quite low, and trying to raise enough food to survive was the main goal of everyone. Even specialists like smiths, leatherworkers or carpenters worked as farmers for most of the time.

This basic problem - and thus this "daily life" - continued in the medieval and renaissance times. Though higher productivity, due to new tools, methods and crops, meant that people could indeed specialize on non-agricultural ways of earning their living, even getting rich by these means... and thus spend their "daily life" in completely other ways.

But, what you can help me with is how was daily life in Germany during those periods was different from the daily life in the rest of Europe during those same time periods.

Again, a very general question and thus difficult to answer. Who do you want to compare?
The life of a german serf in ancient times would not be different from that of a roman serf. The life of a german freeman and a roman citizen would be very different.

And again as an answer: the main differences in "daily life" would be dictated in the differences in the economical (and based on that: political) systems. Thus the differences in ancient times could be huge - if you compare germans and romans for example - or non-existent - if you compare ancient germans and (pre-roman) celts.

In medieval and renaissance times, most of Europe was on a very similar level of economic development. Differences in "daily life" would be dictated to a much higher degree by social position than national or geographical conditions.

My biggest question is how come Medieval Germany adopted many of the social orders, the culture, and etc that the Normans "invented" or just "advanced" such as knights, feudlism, castles, and etc when the Normans almost never ever settled or conquered Medieval Germany in the first place so that the Normans could spread their ideas, culture, and their "inventions" to Medieval Germany? Just wondering! Thanks so much in advance!

Peace!

Well, that question is rather simple to answer: they didn't.

None of these things you mentioned are "norman" inventions or advances.

The feudal system is a development based on both late roman and german customs of personal relationships. One side (the patron with the romans, the lord or king with the germans) provides goods and services to the other side (the roman client or the german follower) in exchange for advice and support. In the medieval time, this very often meant that the ruler provided land for his follower to be able to give military service in return.
This was the system used in all of Europe even before the norman expansion.

Knights are very much related to this feudal system. The specialized armored fighter arose from the german freeman fighters, and the cost for his equipment made it necessary for the lords and kings to provide him with additional support so that he could fulfill his role.
The "norman" knight as you might recall him from the Bayeux tapestry is a middle-european development, a response to the norman (and magyar) incursions of the 9th/10th century.
In basic equipment, organization and tactics, the normans of Hastings were not much different from their anglosaxon counterparts.

Castles as well were not a norman invention. Fortifications in all forms are as old as civilization. Indeed the motte-and-bailey type of castles that spread across northern Europe in the 10th/11th century might have been a french-norman developement, but that is not quite certain, and this new development wasn't that different from earlier types. In fact, several earlier castles were converted to this new type in different regions.

Freodin · Mar 16, 2018

Found this old thread of mine and decided to bump it up.

Anyone who has questions about German history?

LucasWhite · Apr 22, 2018

What is your opinion of Helmuth von Moltke, a devoted Christian and the military mind behind the three wars that unified Germany? I think he is underappreciated.

Freodin · Apr 23, 2018

Underappreciated... I wouldn't say that.

Moltke was definitly one of the great military minds of the 19th century. But for all his leadership, his ideas about strategy, his personal accomplishments, his character - all of which might be used to label him a "great man" - in the greater context of history, he was just a tool.

A finely honed and invaluable tool, but only a tool. He didn't make history, he didn't shape nations... he just provided those who did with the militray oomph.

I think his biggest flaw - though not due his own fault - was that he was too good at what he did, and so inspired Willhelm II to have his by far less able nephew appointed as Chief of the General Staff, so that he might "have his own Moltke".

LucasWhite · Apr 23, 2018

Yes the younger Moltke was not up to the quality of the elder. For all the talent that they had, it was a shame that happened.

I respect your opinion, and yes Bismarck was the driver. Moltke was superb at achieving the practical results after Bismarck set him up for success.

Freodin · Apr 23, 2018

LucasWhite said:
Yes the younger Moltke was not up to the quality of the elder. For all the talent that they had, it was a shame that happened.

I respect your opinion, and yes Bismarck was the driver. Moltke was superb at achieving the practical results after Bismarck set him up for success.

It is an interesting combination, the master artisan and (one of) his masterful tools. To shape history, it takes both.
In the Great War, this combination failed. The military leaders - Hindenburg, Ludendorff - were left unchecked, they didn't have the political artisans above them to guide them and reign them in. The military trying to make politics lead to Germany's failure.

LucasWhite · Apr 23, 2018

I agree with you that they could have used someone, even with 20% of the political capacity of Bismarck. It could be said that the post-Bismarck political failures had doomed the war before it had begun.

However I am hesitant to put much blame on the military. As you know, Germany was made through iron and blood, by unifying around military goals, in the name of a King. Ever since then, except for that one period that everyone talks about, it hasn't been much.

Freodin · Apr 23, 2018

LucasWhite said:
I agree with you that they could have used someone, even with 20% of the political capacity of Bismarck. It could be said that the post-Bismarck political failures had doomed the war before it had begun.

However I am hesitant to put much blame on the military. As you know, Germany was made through iron and blood, by unifying around military goals, in the name of a King. Ever since then, except for that one period that everyone talks about, it hasn't been much.

That's not quite correct. Yes, Germany was made through "iron and blood", but the unification was never "around" military goals. The military, the wars, were always a means to an end. Political unification against the dominant dualistic power system. Herding the German states towards a common goal. But the goal was never military domination.

The problem that the Bismarckian Empire was set up with was that due to the military's major involvement in its creation, it got to play a special role in its society. It got a social dominance that its real social power did not justify. During Bismarck's days, this was kept in check... but with a young, brush, simple minded new monarch, it run amok.

The mythical "Prussian militarism" wasn't some national brandenburg, prussian or german characteristic. It was an excess of the historical, social, political and diplomatic situation at the end of the 19th century.

LucasWhite · Apr 23, 2018

Freodin said:
That's not quite correct. Yes, Germany was made through "iron and blood", but the unification was never "around" military goals. The military, the wars, were always a means to an end. Political unification against the dominant dualistic power system. Herding the German states towards a common goal. But the goal was never military domination.

The problem that the Bismarckian Empire was set up with was that due to the military's major involvement in its creation, it got to play a special role in its society. It got a social dominance that its real social power did not justify. During Bismarck's days, this was kept in check... but with a young, brush, simple minded new monarch, it run amok.

The mythical "Prussian militarism" wasn't some national brandenburg, prussian or german characteristic. It was an excess of the historical, social, political and diplomatic situation at the end of the 19th century.

The Germans most certainly did unify around Prussia's military strength, around the military goal of defeating the French. The Franco-Prussian War was the reason that they unified. The Southern states would probably not have consented if not for the war fever.

Now, you might say, the Franco-Prussia War was not a military goal, just a means, but that could be said about any war. No, the goal was not military domination, which is one reason why they let France off more easily than they probably should have.

Although young at his accession, Wilhelm II was 55 years old in 1914.

Now, Prussian militarism was far from a myth, as I'm sure that Maria Theresa, Napoleon I, and Napoleon III could all attest. I don't know why you put it at the end of the 19th century. Friedrich Wilhelm I Soldier King and Friedrich II the Great were 18th century. The Germans and militarism, however, finds its beginning with Herman at Teutoburg, then continues with Clovis and the Franks, then with Charles Martel, then with Charlemagne, etc.

Freodin · Apr 24, 2018

LucasWhite said:
The Germans most certainly did unify around Prussia's military strength, around the military goal of defeating the French. The Franco-Prussian War was the reason that they unified. The Southern states would probably not have consented if not for the war fever.

Again, this is not quite correct. The southern german states - actually the four remaining german middle states left after the formation of the Northern German Federation and the exclusion of Austria from "Germany" - were already militarily allied, even subjected, to Prussia/NGF. After the German War of 1866 and the dissolution of the German Confederation, these states were left without alliance protections against foreign threats - most likely french - and were basically forced into prussian dominated alliances in the peace agreements. When France declared war in 1870, the southern states were required to join and fight under prussian leadership

Economical unification was evolving since the 1830s.

So basically, the Franco-Prussian war would not have changed anything. It wasn't "the reason" for the unification - just the opportunity to raise national feelings as pave the way for integration of the southern states.

Now, you might say, the Franco-Prussia War was not a military goal, just a means, but that could be said about any war. No, the goal was not military domination, which is one reason why they let France off more easily than they probably should have.

They should have "let France off" even more easily. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was a burden on the Franco-German relations that was unnessecary. But hindsight and all that...

But no, it wasn't a military goal. The war against Austria and the rest of the German Confederation was a military goal. There was no political way to solve the Austo-Prussian dualism. It needed to be decided by force of arms. A prussian victory guaranteed the fulfilment of prussian political goals.

The Franco-Prussian war served no such cause. It served no military nor direct political goals. All it did was present an opportunity... and again in hindsight, it turned out to serve prussian interests. But this wasn't the goal of the war. There couldn't be a goal that stated or even implied that a victory in the war meant the unification of Germany.

Although young at his accession, Wilhelm II was 55 years old in 1914.

After 27 years of rule. Personal rule, dominated by his brash and militaristic personality, unbridled by adequate political oversight. A case of old dogs and new tricks.

Now, Prussian militarism was far from a myth, as I'm sure that Maria Theresa, Napoleon I, and Napoleon III could all attest. I don't know why you put it at the end of the 19th century. Friedrich Wilhelm I Soldier King and Friedrich II the Great were 18th century.

Neither of these cases were different from their non-prussian counterpart. The Austrian military of Maria Theresia was formidable. Its forces had fought victoriously over Louis XIV's France and was the dominating force against the Ottomans.
Napoleon I raised France to a military power that dominated Europe for two decades, militarized french society as no one ever did before or after and beat the Prussians several times over.
Napoleon III's rule was based mainly on the support of the military. He waged - successfully - several major european wars. The French army of his time was considered the best in Europe.

Friedrich Wilhelm I - the "Soldier King" - waged only one small campaign in all of his regency. His military reforms strengthened Prussia's army to the limit of the societies capabilities, but did not militarize society as much a giving a stronger societal background to the military.
Friedrich II used this military for his political goals... but his opponents weren't in any way less "militaristic". Except for a stroke of dynastic luck, Prussia would have lost everything in the Seven Year War.

Yes, military expense and support of the army was a majority part of Prussian government. But this was on par with all societies at this time... social systems weren't part of "the state".
So "Prussian militarism" of the 18th or early 19th century wasn't in any way different from "Austrian militarism", "French militarism" or "British militarism".

This only changed in the era of Wilhelm II, when the military came to dominate society. A singular, but examplary story showing this is the famous "Hauptmann von Köpenick" escapade.
The story of "Prussian militarism" being a natural characteristic of the war-mongering Prussians/Germans, who were always up to invading their peachful neighbors is indeed a myth, propagated by the victorious allies after WW2 to support their reorganization of Germany.
Great Britain had waged dozens of campaigns during the 19th century. The French initiated wars from Louis XIV to Napoleon I and Napoleon III had brought decades of European war. But no one had ever suggested the "French militarism" was a danger to world peace. History is written by the victors.

The Germans and militarism, however, finds its beginning with Herman at Teutoburg, then continues with Clovis and the Franks, then with Charles Martel, then with Charlemagne, etc.

Now you are getting polemic. Arminius was an example of "German militarism"... but the Roman wars that conquered the mediteranean world were not? Clovis and Charlemagne were "German militarists"... but not French ones?

No. Wars, defensive as well as expansionist, have happened in all societes in all of history. Organized military is a feature of societies since antiquity. And none (well, very few) of all these systems were ever called "militaristic".
It is only when the military gets to dominate society in such on overburdening way that this term is justified. And this was only the case in Germany in late 19th/early 20th century.

LucasWhite · Apr 24, 2018

Okay, let's take these one at a time. In the first argument, you just proved my point, except in a different way. You just gave some more of the backstory as to why the Franco-Prussian War was the reason that the southern states unified. Of course, they had alliances with the NGF, but they would not have unified politically (given up their sovereignty) if not for the Franco-Prussian War. That is, unless there was another successful event, which there was not. All past events and efforts had failed.

That is what you, in a sort of roundabout way, admitted when you said, "When France declared war in 1870, the southern states were required to join and fight under prussian leadership". Then, in the aftermath of that, the political unification sentiment was strong enough that they gave up their sovereignty. That is a lot different than an alliance. Prussia had many alliances with many nations, but you did not see any other nation give up their sovereignty and form one nation. There is a big difference between having an alliance and forming a single nation.

You - "So basically, the Franco-Prussian war would not have changed anything. It wasn't "the reason" for the unification - just the opportunity to raise national feelings as pave the way for integration of the southern states."

Again, I am not saying that the war was a end to itself. That war, like all others, was rooted in political causes. However, you would not be wrong is saying that the Franco-Prussian War was the reason why the German states unified. That is about as true of a statement as can ever be made about German history. That war is what made the unification happen, the stimulus, the means, the cause, the reason. Of course, there are always underlying reasons behind a reason. You are making the mistake of denying a clear cause and effect, in deference to the cause of the cause. Consider that you can always add more causes that preceded the causes that you mentioned. That does not invalidate the later and more direct causes.

Freodin · Apr 24, 2018

LucasWhite said:
Okay, let's take these one at a time. In the first argument, you just proved my point, except in a different way. You just gave some more of the backstory as to why the Franco-Prussian War was the reason that the southern states unified. Of course, they had alliances with the NGF, but they would not have unified politically (given up their sovereignty) if not for the Franco-Prussian War. That is, unless there was another successful event, which there was not. All past events and efforts had failed.

That is what you, in a sort of roundabout way, admitted when you said, "When France declared war in 1870, the southern states were required to join and fight under prussian leadership". Then, in the aftermath of that, the political unification sentiment was strong enough that they gave up their sovereignty. That is a lot different than an alliance. Prussia had many alliances with many nations, but you did not see any other nation give up their sovereignty and form one nation. There is a big difference between having an alliance and forming a single nation.

You - "So basically, the Franco-Prussian war would not have changed anything. It wasn't "the reason" for the unification - just the opportunity to raise national feelings as pave the way for integration of the southern states."

Again, I am not saying that the war was a end to itself. That war, like all others, was rooted in political causes. However, you would not be wrong is saying that the Franco-Prussian War was the reason why the German states unified. That is about as true of a statement as can ever be made about German history. That war is what made the unification happen, the stimulus, the means, the cause, the reason. Of course, there are always underlying reasons behind a reason. You are making the mistake of denying a clear cause and effect, in deference to the cause of the cause. Consider that you can always add more causes that preceded the causes that you mentioned. That does not invalidate the later and more direct causes.

But that simply isn't true.

First of all, it is not correct that the southern states in the war "gave up their sovereignity". The subjected their fighting forces to Prussian high command... that's all. They were still sovereign states. Their situation after the victorious war was exactly the same as before the war.
The war created a climate better suited for the unificatio, but didn't provide "the stimulus, the means, the cause, the reason". Nothing about the war war relevant for the unification deals. Nothing about the questions the were part of the negotiations were in any way related to the war.

The unification, Bismarcks great project, had been in progress before the war, and included basically the same negotiations that happened during the war. Bismarck didn't wage this war to further the unification... he did it to remove France as a potential obstacle for the future process, however this might have been. He took the opportunity as it presented it... but he didn't try to create this opportunity.

The southern states did not want to join. They were extremely reluctant, and tried their best to gain as much advantages as they could. Basically they had to be bought off... won war or not. But they also knew that unification was basically inevitable. They had lost the support of Austria, they couldn't stay in the situation they were in - kind of second-tier Germans - and they couldn't rely on France as a reliable ally without pretentions.

The Franco-Prussian war was just the opportunity to make the unification happen then... but it didn't cause it. It is definitly not that "All past events and efforts had failed.". The past events and efforts were still going on, and came to fruition with the help of the won war... but not because of it.

LucasWhite · Apr 24, 2018

I'm not at home with access to all of my primary sources, but let me post some relevant passages from some sources that I have access to digitally.

Freodin said:
First of all, it is not correct that the southern states in the war "gave up their sovereignity". The subjected their fighting forces to Prussian high command... that's all. They were still sovereign states. Their situation after the victorious war was exactly the same as before the war.

Okay, I hate to quote wiki but:
"Prussia and the other states in Northern and Central Germany united as a federal state, the North German Federation, on July 1, 1867. The Southern states Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt entered military alliances with Prussia. In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, those states joined the North German Federation. It was consequently renamed to German Empire, and the parliament and Federal Council decided to give the Prussian king the title of German Emperor (since January 1, 1871). The new German Empire included 25 states (three of them, Hanseatic cities) and the imperial territory of Alsace-Lorraine. Within the empire, 65% of the territory and 62% of the population belonged to the state of Prussia."
States of Germany - Wikipedia

Yes, they were still states, but they had a new greater sovereign, Emperor Wilhelm I. Their situation after the victorious war was absolutely not like it was before. They were now part of the German Empire. They were now in a stronger commitment to Prussia and Wilhelm. They were part of an Empire, and not just an alliance.

Freodin said:
The war created a climate better suited for the unificatio, but didn't provide "the stimulus, the means, the cause, the reason". Nothing about the war war relevant for the unification deals. Nothing about the questions the were part of the negotiations were in any way related to the war.

Yes, the war most certainly was "the stimulus, the means, the cause, the reason". There may have been other, of each item on that list, that were deeper (subjective) and earlier than each of those, but to deny that the war was not each of those things is not right.

Here is an outtake from Finnemore's History of Germany:

"During the course of the war a great step had been taken by Germany, a step to which her best thinkers and noblest patriots had looked forward for many, many years, the uniting of her states into a German nation. It was felt that as all the states were now joined in war to defend the Fatherland, so should they be joined in peace to protect it. In November 1870, while the siege of Paris was going on, Bismarck invited the representatives of other states to Versailles to confer on the subject of German union.

An agreement was made, and on December 3 the King of Bavaria, the chief ruler of South Germany, proposed that the Imperial crown should be offered to the King of Prussia as head of the new German Empire. William I accepted the crown on January 18, 1871. He did so at Versailles, in the great hall of the palace of Louis the Great, a hall hung with pictures of the victories of the mighty Napoleon, he who had destroyed the ancient empire, and amid the joyous shouts of princes who had but a few years since fought against Prussia : all were now united under one ruler and as members of one empire."

Yes, I think the war was the stimulus, means, cause, and reason. Yes, I don't think it was exactly the same for the states after that. This was pretty important, a turning point in their history, I think.

Freodin said:
The unification, Bismarcks great project, had been in progress before the war, and included basically the same negotiations that happened during the war. Bismarck didn't wage this war to further the unification... he did it to remove France as a potential obstacle for the future process, however this might have been. He took the opportunity as it presented it... but he didn't try to create this opportunity.

Bismarck had indeed dreamed of and had been planning for unification for a long time. Now, you and I will never know why he did what he did. We have his Memoirs, which I would like to review on this when I am home. It seems a logical conclusion to me if unification was his great project, and this war accomplished it, that he did not just luck into that in the process of acting solely to remove France. If that was his only goal, he should have hit them harder after the war than he did, not easier as you recommend, which we will have an argument on later.

I am sure you are familiar with the Ems Dispatch:
"Bismarck took it upon himself to edit the report, sharpening the language. He cut out Wilhelm’s conciliatory phrases and emphasized the real issue. The French had made certain demands under threat of war; and Wilhelm had refused them. This was no forgery; it was a clear statement of the facts.[7] Certainly the edit of the telegram, released on the evening of the same day (13 July) to the media and foreign embassies, gave the impression both that Benedetti was rather more demanding and that the King was exceedingly abrupt. It was designed to give the French the impression that King Wilhelm I had insulted Count Benedetti; likewise, the Germans interpreted the modified dispatch as the Count insulting the King.

Bismarck had viewed the worsening relations with France with open satisfaction. If war had to come, now was as good a time as any. His editing, he assured his friends, "would have the effect of a red rag on the Gallic [French] bull."[8] The edited telegram was to be presented henceforth as the cause of the war."
Ems Dispatch - Wikipedia

Since you are obviously very studied in German history (no sarcasm intended, you are impressive). Then, how can you say, "he didn't try to create this opportunity"? Do you deny the details of this incident as related above? I can say that I have read variations on it.

Freodin said:
The southern states did not want to join. They were extremely reluctant, and tried their best to gain as much advantages as they could. Basically they had to be bought off... won war or not. But they also knew that unification was basically inevitable. They had lost the support of Austria, they couldn't stay in the situation they were in - kind of second-tier Germans - and they couldn't rely on France as a reliable ally without pretentions.

Yes, because of all this reluctance, if not for the war the unification would not have happened. That was their tipping point. It was finally enough to overcome the hindrances that had been plaguing unification what seemed like forever. Was it just a coincidence that it happened in January 1871, at that point in the war? If the southern states could have been bought off, war or not, what a coincidence that was.

Freodin said:
It is definitly not that "All past events and efforts had failed.". The past events and efforts were still going on, and came to fruition with the help of the won war... but not because of it.

This is subjective. I guess you could say that Charlemagne's past efforts were still ongoing in their hearts in 1871. At least you admit that your causes needed the war to help them get over the hump.

Freodin · Apr 24, 2018

LucasWhite said:
I'm not at home with access to all of my primary sources, but let me post some relevant passages from some sources that I have access to digitally.

Okay, I hate to quote wiki but:
"Prussia and the other states in Northern and Central Germany united as a federal state, the North German Federation, on July 1, 1867. The Southern states Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt entered military alliances with Prussia. In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, those states joined the North German Federation. It was consequently renamed to German Empire, and the parliament and Federal Council decided to give the Prussian king the title of German Emperor (since January 1, 1871). The new German Empire included 25 states (three of them, Hanseatic cities) and the imperial territory of Alsace-Lorraine. Within the empire, 65% of the territory and 62% of the population belonged to the state of Prussia."
States of Germany - Wikipedia

Yes, they were still states, but they had a new greater sovereign, Emperor Wilhelm I. Their situation after the victorious war was absolutely not like it was before. They were now part of the German Empire. They were now in a stronger commitment to Prussia and Wilhelm. They were part of an Empire, and not just an alliance.

A slight misunderstanding, and I see where I should have phrased that differently and more in depth.
The southern states were treaty bound to enter the war and fight under Prussian control when the war started. They were sovereign states, yet their situation was a difficult one, with the process of unification already in progress, even completed in several accounts.

This situation - not their political state - was the same after the war. The war hadn't changed anything about the need, want or progress of the unification. The war didn't provide the southern states with any reasons to give up their sovereignity and submit to Prussian rule.

Yes, the war most certainly was "the stimulus, the means, the cause, the reason". There may have been other, of each item on that list, that were deeper (subjective) and earlier than each of those, but to deny that the war was not each of those things is not right.

How do you think the war would have done this? What reasons would it have give the southern states to unify with the the NGF?

Here is an outtake from Finnemore's History of Germany:

"During the course of the war a great step had been taken by Germany, a step to which her best thinkers and noblest patriots had looked forward for many, many years, the uniting of her states into a German nation. It was felt that as all the states were now joined in war to defend the Fatherland, so should they be joined in peace to protect it. In November 1870, while the siege of Paris was going on, Bismarck invited the representatives of other states to Versailles to confer on the subject of German union.

That is much too simplified. The states already were "joined to defend / protect the Fatherland". That is what their defensive alliances were meant to do. It was what basically the old German Confederation was meant to do.
The unification process was already going on, it was basically inevitable, and it would have happened without that war. Consider that it was only five years since the old system was disbanded. Practically everyone was looking for a way to replace it... and the clemency that Prussia had shown towards the losing side of 1866 made negotiations easier.
And the negotiations were meant to ensure the southern states of their - if reduced - sovereignity. A lot of internal systems was left to the states... our current system of federalism is still heavily based on this.

An agreement was made, and on December 3 the King of Bavaria, the chief ruler of South Germany, proposed that the Imperial crown should be offered to the King of Prussia as head of the new German Empire. William I accepted the crown on January 18, 1871.

What this doesn't say is that Ludwig von Bayern didn't do this of his own accord, the letter was provided by Bismarck for Ludwig to send... and Ludwig was basically bribed to do it.
Nor does it say anything about the reluctance of Wilhelm to accept this offer... the old fellow didn't want to do what he thought was giving up Prussian sovereignity, and he considered the emperorship a farce. "Charaktermajor", he called it... a meaningless title.

He did so at Versailles, in the great hall of the palace of Louis the Great, a hall hung with pictures of the victories of the mighty Napoleon, he who had destroyed the ancient empire, and amid the joyous shouts of princes who had but a few years since fought against Prussia : all were now united under one ruler and as members of one empire."

With tons of coercion, cajoling and shady deals behind the scenes.

Yes, I think the war was the stimulus, means, cause, and reason. Yes, I don't think it was exactly the same for the states after that. This was pretty important, a turning point in their history, I think.

Again, a slight misunderstanding. What I should have said was, the situation would have been the same for all the sides after the victorious war. There were reasons to unite. There was reasons not to unite. None of these were changed by the war. All that did change was a kind of an atmosphere soaked in jingoistic euphoria.

Bismarck had indeed dreamed of and had been planning for unification for a long time. Now, you and I will never know why he did what he did. We have his Memoirs, which I would like to review on this when I am home. It seems a logical conclusion to me if unification was his great project, and this war accomplished it, that he did not just luck into that in the process of acting solely to remove France. If that was his only goal, he should have hit them harder after the war than he did, not easier as you recommend, which we will have an argument on later.

I am sure you are familiar with the Ems Dispatch:
"Bismarck took it upon himself to edit the report, sharpening the language. He cut out Wilhelm’s conciliatory phrases and emphasized the real issue. The French had made certain demands under threat of war; and Wilhelm had refused them. This was no forgery; it was a clear statement of the facts.[7] Certainly the edit of the telegram, released on the evening of the same day (13 July) to the media and foreign embassies, gave the impression both that Benedetti was rather more demanding and that the King was exceedingly abrupt. It was designed to give the French the impression that King Wilhelm I had insulted Count Benedetti; likewise, the Germans interpreted the modified dispatch as the Count insulting the King.

Bismarck had viewed the worsening relations with France with open satisfaction. If war had to come, now was as good a time as any. His editing, he assured his friends, "would have the effect of a red rag on the Gallic [French] bull."[8] The edited telegram was to be presented henceforth as the cause of the war."
Ems Dispatch - Wikipedia

That is correct... but the reasons for Bismarck's politics are a little different. There was no reason for Bismarck to assume that a war against France would bring on the German unification... because no such reason existed. What kind of reason would that have been: "Hurray, we won against France, now let's bow to some other foreign monarch"?

The earlier stages in this play had only been possible due to French neutrality. A French intervention in the German War would have least made it a lot more difficult for Prussia.
Napoleon III expected recompensations for this neutrality... but Bismarck denied him that. Bismarck knew that without a decisive victory against France, there would always be the threat of french intervention in southern Germany.

The Spanish crises presented a perfect opportunity for either a diplomatic or military victory. Both sides were willing to risk a war, but only Napoleon couldn't risk to lose the diplomatic struggle.

Since you are obviously very studied in German history (no sarcasm intended, you are impressive). Then, how can you say, "he didn't try to create this opportunity"? Do you deny the details of this incident as related above? I can say that I have read variations on it.

He created this situation - the game of chicken between France and Prussia, as the opportunity presented itself. But his goal was to beat France, reduce her potential influence in southern Germany and her involvement in the unification process. He did not incite the war to unify Germany.

Yes, because of all this reluctance, if not for the war the unification would not have happened. That was their tipping point. It was finally enough to overcome the hindrances that had been plaguing unification what seemed like forever. Was it just a coincidence that it happened in January 1871, at that point in the war? If the southern states could have been bought off, war or not, what a coincidence that was.

That now is a case where hindsight is rather an obstacle than an advantage. Our distance in time lead us to misjudge the timeline of the events.
Unification had not been plagued "like forever". It was only four years since the old system was (partially) destroyed. Much of the old structures, especially the economical ones, still existed. The topic of a German unification with or without Austria had been in question since the 1848 revolution... and that was now settled. Unification would happen, it would happen under Prussian dominance, and it would happen without Austria. Everyone could see the signs. The only question left was "How soon?" The war with France only rushed this question... and in hindsight, this was a major mistake.

This is subjective. I guess you could say that Charlemagne's past efforts were still ongoing in their hearts in 1871.

Charlemagne was a Frankish king and a Roman Emperor. Both the later German as well as French historiography stylised him as the father of their respective nation - nationalistic 19th century historiography foremost. But he was neither. Both French and German nationalism comes from a later period, when the basic idea of "nation" was invented... and the idea of "nation state" was even later. In Germany, it continuously clashed with the universal imperial claim, and it could take hold only after this system had died.

At least you admit that your causes needed the war to help them get over the hump.

Almost.

I don't think that they needed that push. As I said, the outcome was basically inevitable, given the European situation after 1866.

LucasWhite · Apr 24, 2018

I will give you a reply to this. I want to consult and quote my better sources, and will be busy with other things for the next week or so. I will reply and am enjoying this discussion.

Come on now though, you took my phrase "seemed like forever" and quoted "like forever" to make it seem like I spoke Kardashian?

Anyway you state it though, German unification was an age-old problem. I am talking about how the German people were splintered from the time of Germanic tribes up to the German Empire/Kaiserreich. There was never a unified German entity until then, unless you count the Holy Roman Empire which, given the way you see things, I am nearly certain that you will not. Of course precisely speaking not even the Kaiserreich unified all of them, and here we get into the complex question of who is really Germanic and who is not. Of course, Austrians are just as German as Prussians. Well we will catch up later Freodin, and I look forward to continuing the discussion.

Freodin · Apr 25, 2018

LucasWhite said:
I will give you a reply to this. I want to consult and quote my better sources, and will be busy with other things for the next week or so. I will reply and am enjoying this discussion.

Take your time... I will be here.

Come on now though, you took my phrase "seemed like forever" and quoted "like forever" to make it seem like I spoke Kardashian?

Sorry. English is not my native language, and some nuances might evade me. I meant it exactly as it should be, as far as I understand English: a comparison. I guess in Kardashian, it would have to be spelled "like, forever."

Anyway you state it though, German unification was an age-old problem. I am talking about how the German people were splintered from the time of Germanic tribes up to the German Empire/Kaiserreich. There was never a unified German entity until then, unless you count the Holy Roman Empire which, given the way you see things, I am nearly certain that you will not. Of course precisely speaking not even the Kaiserreich unified all of them, and here we get into the complex question of who is really Germanic and who is not. Of course, Austrians are just as German as Prussians. Well we will catch up later Freodin, and I look forward to continuing the discussion.

But this is an unhistorical approach to this problem, based on our understanding of "nation", "country", "unified entity"... which is in turn based on the developement of these terms in the late 18th and 19th century.
It is also based on the common anglo-saxon misusage of the terms "germanic" and "german". In German itself, it is so much more difficult to confuse these concepts.
The "Germanic tribes" were germanic... not german. "Germanic" is a far broader and far-reaching concept, and in itself doesn't include any concept of "nation" as we understand it today.
The Germanic tribes of the Roman or late antiquity didn't have a concept of a "Germanic nation". Their main concept of unity was the tribe... and that wasn't based on ethnicity, but on cultural and structural unity. The tribes of the Great Migration especially were known to incooperate groups of vastly different ethnicities into their "tribes".

In later times, after the final division of the Frankish Empire, the respective "nations" were still mostly cultural, not political. The division between the new "French" and "German" kingdoms was based mostly on language. The very way the Germans came to call themselves - "deutsch" - is based on linguistic concepts. It means basically "the way the people here speak", in contrast to "how the foreigners speak".
Based on that, the idea of "nation" was first introduced. Where many people met, they tended to group themselves into "nations", based on their language.

The very idea of "nation" as a union of ethnicity, government and land is only slowly evolving in the 18th and 19th century. It is based on these ideas, implemented and propagated by Revolutionary France, that the concept of "German Unification" took the form we now identify with "nation".

So, yes, the question of German unification had been an issue for some time in 1870... but much less than you imply, and not in the form that you imply.

Trimeresurus · Apr 25, 2018

Why do Bavarians not know how to speak proper German?
Is there a historical background for the lack of communication skills in Bavaria? (Maybe the daily amount of beer)
-
Echt jetzt, euch verstehe keine Sau. Ihr seid schlimmer als die Ossis. Im Übrigen klingt Schwäbisch eh viel elitärer, gell.

Freodin · Apr 25, 2018

Trimeresurus said:
Why do Bavarians not know how to speak proper German?
Is there a historical background for the lack of communication skills in Bavaria? (Maybe the daily amount of beer)
-
Echt jetzt, euch verstehe keine Sau. Ihr seid schlimmer als die Ossis. Im Übrigen klingt Schwäbisch eh viel elitärer, gell.

Wie war das mit, "Wir können alles. Außer Hochdeutsch"?

Also erstmal an die eigene Nase fassen.

What do you want to know about German history?

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