First, it begs the question: What is a desire?
Well this isn't an easy question to answer. I would say there are many theories of desire, each bringing a shed of truth to the table. For instance, according to an action theory of desire, it is "to be disposed to take whatever actions it believes are likely to bring about p." Pleasure based desires differ from the action based desires in that "to desire p is for the organism to be disposed to take pleasure in it seeming that p and displeasure in it seeming that not-p". I personally don't exclude those two theories, and go with a more "holistic" view which incorporates the two and other thoughts of what desire is.
So if you're asking for a single definition, IMO, it would not be comprehensive enough, especially in regards to our discussion.
If I want to have Mexican for dinner and my wife wants Italian, and I agree to Italian, was it my desire to eat Italian or was an external force applied? I would say it is both. Again, you seem to think of things too simply. You speak of desire as a singular thing. But in this case I have at least 2 desires and they conflict. One is to satisfy a desire for food. The other is a desire to make my wife happy. This whole "desire" thing just gets very messy.
Hopefully my comments above clarify that I am indeed not speaking of desires as a singular thing. If not, my explanation here should suffice. So yes, it is both. You want tacos and your wife lasagna. You want your dinner item but also want to make your wife happy by eating whar she desires. You were influenced by her desires. This is what is referred to as second order desires. Second-order desires are desires regarding one's first-order desires, and first-order desires are desires for ordinary things such as your tacos. Thus, a desire to eat Mexican is a first-order desire, while a desire that you not act on the desire to eat Mexican is a second-order desire. Or maybe it is the other way around: your first order desire is to make your wife happy so you go with her option, while your second order desire is to eat Mexican.
Regardless, any account of free will, whether it be indeterminist or not, must include a robust theory of desires.
Second, it begs the question: Where did my desires come from? This is the one-sided-coin thing. You say I'm free, but all the supporting explanations you give indicate I'm not free. It feels as if you're trying to put free and not free on the same side of the coin.
Well this question is relevant for both an indeterminist and determinist position, though the question takes on a different form for each view. For you, the question is: Are you the sole originator of your desires? If not, an explanation of indeterminism becomes more difficult. If so, this is to blantly ignore the environmental, psychological, and other factors that are significant to who we are which are beyond our control.
The question for me is as you stated here about the "one sided coin" thing. Though, what you think is "not free" has not been established as such, just assumed, and so it would be premature to claim I am putting free and not free together. What I think "not free is" is far different from what I described so far.
No. The universe had a beginning, but I don't think of time as a "thing". It's a measure - an abstraction.
Time is a feature of the universe. More so, time and space are interwoven. For there to be time there needs to be space. So without space, there is no time. That is why I would say the universe is finite as far as the past. Hence time has a beginning
I don't understand. Are you saying my view leads to this or are you saying your view leads to this? I don't agree with that statement.
My view has no implications of God not knowing anything. Not even in a general sense. So of course this is in regards to your view. You're saying when God chooses not to causally determine an event it becomes logically impossible to know what that future event will be, thus God would not know of it. He would become aware of it as it unfolds. Whatever future events that are unknowable, are indeed unknowable until they happen. You say you cannot claim for certain and with specificity which events, however, those events still would exist. Just because you don't know which events those are does not mean that they do not occur, I mean afterall this is your theory.
I just want to be very clear about 2 things: 1) There is nothing that is teaching God - nothing greater than or above him. There is no law to which he is required to adhere. All the things I speak of are done by God because God chooses to do them. 2) There is nothing in this acquiring that implies something extant that God could have known but didn't.
If you understand those 2 things, then I'm OK with you saying my view means God is acquiring knowledge.
You're asking me to understand there is nothing teaching God, yet saying if so God is acquiring knowledge, however, the very definition of "teach" is to impart knowledge. I cannot see past that inconsistency. The very future that is unfolding that God has not causally determined is knowledge that is imparted to God. There is nothing conscious teaching God this, though the very experience God is undergoing of the unfolding future and acquiring that knowledge can be seen as an act of learning, as being taught doesn't always have to come by a teacher. Experiential knowledge is knowledge gained by experience, and seems more like what it is you're describing. The very experience is what is teaching God.
Are you asking me to quote a Bible verse that contains the phrase, "God didn't know x"? I can't do that.
No. Although Scripture is not to be left out of this discussion. I am not sure what that would contribute.
My question is: If I am wrong and God is morally responsible for our sins why does that matter?
Well this is to assume that if you are wrong God is morally responsible for our sins. Which again I believe is a premature conclusion.
I thought it would be a fun exercise - even worth publishing if we succeeded. The first step, then, in my mind was a quick literature search to see if anyone has ever tried. The answer, as it turns out, is yes. Just recently (2015) someone published some formalized logic based on the Free Will Theorem and concluded compatibilist free will is not possible.
On the notion of free will in the Free Will Theorem
- Klaas Landsman
I'm sure someone will come along with different logic and show compatibilist free will is possible, so maybe it's a pointless exercise.
I know John Conway and Simon Kochen, originally in 2006, published a theorem on free will. They then revised their publication with a more strengthened version in 2009. I believe Landsman is giving his account of that. Christian Wüthrich has argued pretty extensively that the indeterminism that Conway and Kochen claim to have established was already assumed in the premises of their proof. Going on to shed light of the many other inconsistencies the theorem faces, his conclusion is that, "determinism question is a subtle matter that is far from decided." With thst said, I too believe it would be a pointless exercise, less we were to get into the issues with the theorem itself.
For me, however, the interesting part is that the best model we have of the universe at this point in time indicates the future is indeterminate.
I disagree with this wholly, and think it's rather inaccurate. The best model of the universe we have indicates we simply do not know...
