The Six-Day War: 5 June 1967
Israeli intelligence was outstanding, having pinpointed the location of every Egyptian squadron, revealed the layout of every air base, and mastered every detail of Egyptian Air Force operational procedure
. During the course of the morning, the Israelis struck 18 of Egypts Air Force bases, cratering runways, blowing up aircraft, and destroying support facilities. The Egyptians lost over 300 of their 420 combat aircraft, and 100 of their 350 qualified combat pilots.
Kenneth Pollack[28]
Israeli intelligence was, indeed, outstanding in the Six-Day War. It demonstrated how strategic intelligence can be used in conjunction with operational intelligence to provide senior decisionmakers information necessary to make well-informed national security decisions and to give leaders opportunities to mitigate the numerical superiority of an adversary. Yet, just as Israeli intelligence in this case can be viewed as an example of how intelligence operations should be conducted, Egypts poor intelligence opened the door to its own defeat.
In 1967, Israel faced a monumental security task: defense of the nation against several Arab armed forces that, when combined, held an advantages of two to one in manpower, two to one in tanks, seven to one in artillery, three to one in aircraft, and four to one in warships. On its southern border, Israel had roughly 70,000 troops in the Sinai against Egypts 100,000; 700 tanks against 950; and it had to distribute its 200 aircraft across all fronts while facing Egypts concentrated 430.[29]
Nor could Israel count on technological superiority to overcome the odds. Israeli intelligence, for example, had scored a coup by obtaining a MiG-21 fighter from an Iraqi defector, and it had determined that Egypts MiGs were better than all but their Mirage aircraft. Egyptian artillery was superior, and their T-55 tanks were more capable than the majority of Israels tanks.[30] And while Israeli forces were better trained, had superior leadership, and had a far more flexible doctrine, Egypts army could boast that the majority of its soldiers were combat veterans.
Israel faced a similar situation to its north, against Syria and Lebanon, and to its east, against Jordan. Finally, Israel faced a hostile international community; the United States was an ally but eager to avoid any spark that could ignite a conflict with Egypts ally, the Soviet Union.
Events began spinning into war in November 1966, with the signing of an Egyptian and Syrian alliance, and led to an Egyptian threat to use force on 18 May 1967. Egypt had mobilized its military and announced combat readiness in the Sinai, followed on the 23rd by a closure of the Straits of Tiran, blockading the Israeli port of Eliat.
Israel took these acts, particularly the blockade, to be cause for war. Further, Israeli intelligence was able to verify that Egypt had plans for an attack, code named Asad, on Eliat and other targets in the Negev on the 27th. This revelation was passed to the United States, which placed sufficient pressure on the Soviet Union and Egypt to force a cancellation of the attack.[31] But all other diplomatic efforts failed, and the Israelis confronted the decision of (1) preempting their enemies first strikes; (2) allowing themselves to be hit first by a numerically stronger adversary; or (3) continuing an unacceptable status quo. Israel chose to attack first.
A preemptive strike against the Arabs had always been a major part of the Israeli concept of operations, but it was their military intelligence, under the command of the bright and aggressive Aharon Yariv, that proved decisive.
Know your enemy was not, Yariv told his heads of departments, merely a figure of speech; it had to be taken literally. It was not enough to know Arab strategy on the grand scale; Yariv wanted to know everything about every Arab unit down to the menus served in the sergeants mess.[32]
And, quite literally, Israeli intelligence had a clearer picture of the Egyptian order of battle and capabilities than did Egypts own commanders.
In the two-years before the Six-Day War, Yariv not only set about knowing the whereabouts of every Arab air base, but also having each inspected. Israeli intelligence officers, often working as chefs or coopting Egyptian soldiers, provided a complete picture of the EAF, including:
the whereabouts of every aircraft and name/information on the pilot;
the name, background, status, and schedule of every base commander;
schedules and turnovers of Egyptian radar controllers;
reveille and morning schedules for the pilots and ground crews;
the complete Egyptian battle codes and communications networks; and
when senior air officials would be absent from their commands, and unable to direct operations.[33]
From this information, Israeli intelligence developed a precise targeting package. It knew when the EAF would be most vulnerablewhen the aircraft would be most exposed; when the pilots would be slowest in getting to their aircraft for flight operations; and when leadership would be unable to provide direction. With comparable intelligence on Egypts land forces and effectiveness, Yariv believed that Israel could not conceivably lose the war. So finely tuned was his intelligence apparatus that he was able to predict an outcome which was to astonish the world when it was all over.[34]
Coupled with military operational intelligence, the Israeli Mossadits state intelligence agencyhad developed relationships with foreign governments and intelligence agencies that provided new and corroborated strategic and tactical intelligence before the war. The relationship with the United States, in particular, served a critical role before the preemptive strike by making clear to both the CIA and Pentagon that war was inevitable and getting tacit buy-in on the plan. The United States understood Israels reasoning and did not object to the preemptive attack. Amits (head of the Mossad) achievement in secret diplomacy was built upon the international intelligence links which the Mossad had worked so hard to foster for years.[35]
Knowing that the United States would not condemn the attack and armed with an exceptionally well-developed plan, Israeli leaders authorized the use of force, thus seizing the initiative from their adversaries.
The preemptive air strike proved decisive. The attack caught the Egyptian Air Force with its commander, General Mahmud, out of contact with his forces. In his absence, the EAF was paralyzed. Without specific authorization, the vast majority of Egypts air force officers, from air sector commanders all the way down to pilots, were uwilling to take even the most obvious emergency procedures.[36] Only eight MiGs got into the air to defend their airfields; every one was shot down. The airfields that were undamaged in the initial strikes managed to get only 20 aircraft into the air, all of which were either shot down or crashed when they could find no undamaged airstrips to which to return. All told, three-quarters of the EAF was destroyed in the first hours of the war. Intelligence had paved the way for the Israeli Air Force to win one of the most lopsided victories in history.
But credit for Israels success cannot be explained by its intelligence alone; indicators and warning should have prepared the Egyptians for what was to come. As Kenneth Pollack contends, There was a colossal failure on the part of Cairos intelligence services to provide the Egyptian military with the information required to fight Israel. He notes that Egyptian intelligence:
was biased to the political climate and, therefore, did not provide clear and decisive analysis on whether Israel was going to attack;
issued reports to commanders that changed daily and were often contradictory;
provided no credible intelligence on Israels order of battle, effectiveness, doctrine, or planned strategy;
had no intelligence on where Israeli forces were and, to the extent that it had information, fell victim to Israels denial and deception campaign; and
did not understand the concept of flexibility stressed by the Israeli military in conducting joint and independent operations.[37]
As a result of these failings, even had Egypts military been better trained and led, it was at a significant disadvantage from the outset. Once combat began, Egyptian forces had no understanding of where Israel would strike, with what force, in what manner, with what tactics or effect, over what duration, or with what objectivein short, they were blind.
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