Hi food4thought,
Consider a few points you make:
- Our will is limited by our sinfulness
- Our will is limited by our finite power
- Our will is limited by our finite minds and knowledge
- Everything we do is determined by God before He ever created
- Man cannot earn salvation
It seems to me that the only thing an Arminian would disagree with is 4. But the rest of your post makes me thing that you do not hold 4 in a Calvinistic or even Thomistic way, which in turn would make it seem that it is compatible with Arminianism. For example, it is not incompatible with Arminianism to hold that everything happens according to God's eternal decree, where the decree factors in the free choices of individuals.
Our free will is decreed by God, in the sense that what we freely choose within our limitations has been known and decreed by God from all eternity. Is that Thomistic? I am regrettably not familiar with Thomas Aquinas' teachings on the matter.
That's not to say that the points don't present differences at all. Presumably you think that sinfulness limits the will more than the average Arminian does. In the end though, this isn't an essential difference with respect to the Arminian-Calvinist debate. To my mind, that debate can be framed according to the question of whether there is a kind of ontological potency or responsiveness in God, such that He must wait to see how an agent acts and is not Himself the explanatory first cause of an agent's action. On that essential question it would seem that you clearly fall on the Arminian side. Yet it is possible that Catholic positions on predestination are coloring my perspective.
In one sense God is the explanatory first cause of an agents action, because God created him/her and holds them together by His will knowing exactly what they will do; yet I would say that God designed us with the ability to make choices both in line with and contrary to His will, so He is in that sense not the explanatory first cause of an agent's action, since I believe that God has given us the capacity to act of our own volition. Without that distinction, God would be the direct cause of both our good
and evil actions. My thoughts along these lines can be summarized by this:
God is completely good with no evil whatsoever,
therefore God cannot be the direct cause of evil.
Man has been designed with the ability to act on his/her own volition, and thus is capable of both good and evil,
This ability is necessary for the capacity to truly love, so this ability is ultimately good.
Yet because man can do both good
and evil, God cannot be the direct cause of man's volitional actions.
Therefore, man has free will*.
* Within the constraints of man's nature.
Calvinism seeks to avoid this trap by saying God is only responsible for our capacity to do good, but I consider that argument to be special pleading. I guess my view could be considered fully Arminian by your definition... it's just that Arminianism is often linked with works righteousness and denying God's sovereignty, so I don't like to be labeled fully Arminian.