Ye Olde Libertarian Pub

I wore my circle-A shirt (the one where the circle is the text "people are bad so we need a government made of people are bad so we need a government made of people are bad so [etc]") to work at Head Start a few times. Nobody said anything, except for my friend who already knows I'm an anarchist and just rolled her eyes at me.

So how do y'all feel about spanking, because I just saw an anarcho-capitalist community have a mini meltdown over the issue.

...Kinky... - YouTube

I was gonna make a similar comment, but then stopped myself.

Originally Posted by Nilloc

I might as well ask since we're on the topic and I've heard Molyneux's view on it, but how do you think child discipline plays into the NAP? Spanking would be unjustified unless the child was violent, correct?

For the most part, but I can also remember from personal experience times at which a swat on the bottom was probably the best way for my parents to keep me from harming myself - in particular, by persistently trying to run across a road when they weren't looking. I was not old enough to be reasoned with, and I don't believe it would have been better for me never to be allowed to be outside when my mom was hanging laundry. When I grew older I realized why my mom spanked me, and in retrospect I'm glad she did. Maybe there was a better way, but I don't begrudge her for not having found it. And as a now fully rational adult, I would consider her not having acted to be neglectful.

I believe that spanking should be extremely limited, even when the child is violent; ideally, avoided altogether. However, I - unlike Molyneux - do not consider myself to be so near-omniscient that I could declare that spanking is never, ever the best available means of dealing with destructive behavior. The first thing that people bring up in response to that is, "well, aren't you saying that force can legitimately be used in violation of the NAP whenever it is used paternally?" To which I would say no - not "whenever". Only when a paternal relationship is valid: that is, when it involves a rationally-impaired individual.

Originally Posted by Nilloc

What forms of punishment, if any, do you think would be justified? A child can't exactly make contracts and pay restitution. I don't think Rothbard ever talked about this in The Ethics of Liberty.

I think Rothbard felt that the NAP covered pretty much anything that the parent believed to be in the interest of exercising the child's hypothetical will. That's just an informed speculation, though. He never said as much.

I think that the question of what punishment is just, and what punishment is the best for the child are different questions. Justice has a very wide berth within the property-rights idea of "my house, my rules". What is best for the child... I tend to believe that punishments and rewards ought to be avoided altogether, ideally, as described in Alfie Kohn's book, Unconditional Parenting: Moving Beyond Rewards and Punishments to Love and Reason. However, I am not quite the idealist that Kohn is, so I think that in some cases the removing of privileges and "therapeutic holding" can be necessary (and as I described before, perhaps in an extremely limited number of cases, spanking). I do agree with Kohn that the key is not to seem as if you are withdrawing affection from the child when you address harmful behavior.

This was the idea behind the concept of the divine right of kings. By making the king appear to be an integral part of God's plan for the world rather than an ordinary human being dominating his fellows by brute force, the public could be more easily persuaded to bow to his authority. However, when the doctrine of divine right became discredited, a replacement was needed to ensure that the public did not view political authority as merely the exercise of naked power. That replacement is the concept of the rule of law.

But the myth of the rule of law does more than render the people submissive to state authority; it also turns them into the state's accomplices in the exercise of its power. For people who would ordinarily consider it a great evil to deprive individuals of their rights or oppress politically powerless minority groups will respond with patriotic fervor when these same actions are described as upholding the rule of law.

But how can it possibly provide the order-generating and maintaining processes necessary for the peaceful coexistence of human beings in society? What would a free market in legal services be like?

I am always tempted to give the honest and accurate response to this challenge, which is that to ask the question is to miss the point. If human beings had the wisdom and knowledge-generating capacity to be able to describe how a free market would work, that would be the strongest possible argument for central planning. One advocates a free market not because of some moral imprimatur written across the heavens, but because it is impossible for human beings to amass the knowledge of local conditions and the predictive capacity necessary to effectively organize economic relationships among millions of individuals. It is possible to describe what a free market in shoes would be like because we have one. But such a description is merely an observation of the current state of a functioning market, not a projection of how human beings would organize themselves to supply a currently non-marketed good. To demand that an advocate of free market law (or Socrates of Monosizea, for that matter) describe in advance how markets would supply legal services (or shoes) is to issue an impossible challenge. Further, for an advocate of free market law (or Socrates) to even accept this challenge would be to engage in self-defeating activity since the more successfully he or she could describe how the law (or shoe) market would function, the more he or she would prove that it could be run by state planners. Free markets supply human wants better than state monopolies precisely because they allow an unlimited number of suppliers to attempt to do so. By patronizing those who most effectively meet their particular needs and causing those who do not to fail, consumers determine the optimal method of supply. If it were possible to specify in advance what the outcome of this process of selection would be, there would be no need for the process itself.

Furthermore, virtually none of the law that orders our interpersonal relationships was produced by the intentional actions of central governments. Our commercial law arose almost entirely from the Law Merchant, a non-governmental set of rules and procedures developed by merchants to quickly and peacefully resolve disputes and facilitate commercial relations. Property, tort, and criminal law are all the products of common law processes by which rules of behavior evolve out of and are informed by the particular circumstances of actual human controversies. In fact, a careful study of Anglo-American legal history will demonstrate that almost all of the law which facilitates peaceful human interaction arose in this way. On the other hand, the source of the law which produces oppression and social division is almost always the state. Measures that impose religious or racial intolerance, economic exploitation, one group's idea of "fairness," or another's of "community" or "family" values virtually always originate in legislation, the law consciously made by the central government. If the purpose of the law really is to bring order to human existence, then it is fair to say that the law actually made by the state is precisely the law that does not work.