Hi Kvothe,
I think chapter 2 has its interesting points, but Wallace continues to play his Evidentalist hand, suggesting that rather than sifting evidence through a framework of Positivism, we should rely more on an abductionist approach (one which originally came from the mind of a Pragmatist philosopher, specifically, Charles Sanders Peirce).
So I am just going to jot down some thoughts on chapter 2 and come back for a more detailed look (probably as result of 2PV's insightful questions).
Section one establishes the inference to the best explanation. In general I am OK with this as an approach. This might get tricky when we have to distinguish between sufficient and necessary because by definition God is a sufficient explanation for any possible phenomenon but perhaps not necessary.
To some general extent, I too think Abductionism is usable, as long as we don’t get lulled into the idea that it can establish much Christian truth all by its little lonesome. In fact, I don’t think any singular epistemological method is going to get any of one of us to ‘faith’ all by itself, and I say this for epistemic reasons which I find evident in the Bible, and not from mere exterior considerations. And as far our consideration about the cogency of the ‘argument to the best explanation,’ I think Baggini and Fosl (2010) have a few valid cautionary points:
Often we are presented with certain experiences and are called upon to offer some sort of explanation for them. But the problem we frequently face is that a given body of date may not determine or force us to accept only one explanation. Unsettling as it seems, some philosophers have even argued that for any possible body of evidence there will always be a variety of explanations consistent with it. This is just the claim that Duhem and Quine have advanced… (p. 43)
So, with the above in mind, I for one do not expect a book like Wallace’s to be able to motive us, or catapult us, to the precipice of doubt, from which we can fling ourselves wholeheartedly into the yawning chasm of Christian faith. It’s just not going to happen; or our attempt at faith will be fairly short lived, if we attempt to rely on any singular human method of evaluating the world (including the bible). Theologically and epistemologically, there’s more to it than that, and I don’t think we can’t just say, as Wallace does, “This rational approach [using probability] to determining the truth will help us come to the most reasonable conclusion in light of the evidence” (p.35). I doubt it, but I still give Wallace kudos for giving it the ol’ college try—and I think his detective approach can be is helpful in giving someone new to these issues a pattern by which to organize various, discordant thoughts.
I also liked his section on possible vs probable. I find this frustrating when trying to come to faith and someone tells me (to pick a random example) well it is possible that God did flood the entire earth and then changed all the physical evidence and the laws of physics to make it impossible to prove (usually followed by some odd appeal to the importance of free will). Sure it is possible if a God possessing all possible power exists but is that a probable explanation?
I agree, Kvoth, although I feel it is also a fallacy for someone to posit that something is either “possible” or “probable” when the hypothesis and analysis in question involve experiential elements or factors no one can confirm, or as far as we know, has actually experienced. Reasoning about probabilities in lieu of entertaining possibilities is, as you seem to aver, preferable and more useful on a local scale, such as it may be in the line of detective work, but in dealing with ancient history that is mixed up with a strong dash of metaphysics, I don’t think either “possibility” or “probability” will carry the day “unto faith.”
The truth must be feasible : that seems to make sense. Even when we don't know what the truth is, when we find it it will turn out to have been feasible by definition.
I don’t know about that, Kvothe, not if we take Kantian considerations into the picture. It seems to me that the feasibility of some entity under consideration will depend on our having “enough of,” and the “right kind of,” data, along with the “right access” to the data in order to bring all of our analyses, information, and intuitions, together for the purpose of targeting the truth. Furthermore, Wallace thinks that comparing “alibis” is a useful cognitive tool in finding what is feasible; well, in local detective work they may be, but I think we tangle our webs of meaning(s) if we try to imply that modern alibis and ancient testimonies are overtly similar.
Truth is usually straightforward : Occam's razor, I like that he included usually as a modifier because sometimes complicated things are true as well.
Yep; and as I’ve told others in other conversations here at CF, I think Occam’s Razor is overrated. And in the case of Christian faith, Wallace’s use of “straightforward” seems to imply that all the data is there if we just look for it. But, what and where are we looking? Is that enough?
Truth should be exhaustive: This one I am a little torn on. Generally I agree that if we arrive at the truth we will find it accounts for all the details. That said we can have theories or models that explain a certain set of phenomenon but not others without saying that that first theory is untrue. Grand unified theory eludes us but that does not mean that Newton's laws are false, some that they don't apply in all cases. I guess I worry about this because a well crafted story would certainly account for all the evidence especially if it includes an all knowing all powerful supernatural being. To me this doesn't seem analogous to a detective finding a suspect that accounts for most of the evidence. In some cases a human person could not account for a specific observed datum and so would be eliminated as an explanation but God can be a sufficient cause for any conceivable datum and so can never be eliminated in the same way. Am I making any sense here?
Yes, Kvoth, you make sense, although I don’t know that I agree with God being a sufficient cause “for any conceivable datum”; there has to be a line somewhere where we can discern the difference between the nature of Metaphysical Mystery and … just making stuff up (like our own private religion).
Truth will be logical : hmmm..not sure about this either. If he means that it will obey the logical absolutes I agree (non contradiction, excluded middle etc.) but if he means simply that the truth will make sense or seem reasonable then I disagree. Many findings in science are counterintuitive but true nonetheless.
Good comment, and I have nothing to add other than a question or two: how might the discordance between the respective nature of truth and logic play into one’s ability to have faith? Could this recognition allow you a little more latitude in what you expect from God? If not, why not? (I’m asking these questions more rhetorically, so there’s no need to answer unless you want to. They’re just something to think about in your leisure.)
Truth will be superior: again this one raises some questions. In a homicide case this makes sense but how do we determine that a supernatural explanation has more explanatory power. In so many cases I see supernatural explanations as solving one mystery by appealing to a bigger mystery. Invoking God doesn't seem to me to add anything to an explanation. For example how does consciousness arise in humans... God did it... Ok but why did God do that... It's his desire that we be conscious... But why is that his desire.... So that we can love and glorify him... Why does a God need us to glorify him... It's his nature...
You can all see where this leads. Essentially saying God did it doesn't add anything meaningful to an explanation. Of course maybe I am wrong on that so I'd welcome your thoughts.
Here too, I agree with your estimation of the extent to which truth might or might not evince a superior position among competing explanations. But, we don’t have to be simple about what invoking God as an explanation can mean. We may want to discern a little more about what diverse people mean when they say “God did it.” Do each of them really mean the same thing? For instance, does saying “God did it” mean the same thing if spoken by someone like Francis Collins versus being spoken by someone like Martin Luther?
OK I am going to pause here so that I can devote the study time required to the next few sections about the resurrection.
I will post again in the next couple of days though.
Sounds good. I’ll check back in a few days.
Peace
2PhiloVoid
Baggini, J., & Fosl, P. S. (2010).
The philosopher's toolkit: a compendium of philosophical concepts and methods. John Wiley & Sons.