A Malebranche Quote for Consideration

zippy2006

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This first link discusses the structures of all three forms of Foundationalism
Okay, thanks. :oldthumbsup:

Now, your view is that strong foundationalism is unacceptable but moderate and weak are acceptable, correct?

I agree, epistemology isn't like choosing our favorite ice cream flavor. At the same time, I'm of the mind that epistemology is inconclusive on most theoretical fronts. I could be wrong, but sometimes you make it sound as if knowing about knowing is a clearly sure and discernible thing where the Christian faith is concerned.
Epistemology became a kind of first philosophy around the time of Kant, and I don't follow that move, so I don't lead with epistemology. As far as the Christian faith is concerned, there are certain truths which must be epistemically accessible (e.g. Jesus of Nazareth was an existing historical person), and this will inform one's epistemology.
 
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2PhiloVoid

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Okay, thanks. :oldthumbsup:

Now, your view is that strong foundationalism is unacceptable but moderate and weak are acceptable, correct?
No, that's not what I was getting at really. I'm only talking about the efficacy of each position as an identifiable descriptor of 'how' justification actually works. I'm not implying that foundationalism on the whole is utterly useless. No, it's useful as far as a generalized description goes about how epistemic structures can be modelled in our minds. I just don't think foundationalism of any sort really or fully conceptualizes the relations and flow of actual justification of beliefs where faith is the focus of concern.

If some person wants to conceptualize their epistemic praxis in foundationalist terms, and they think Moderate or Weak Foundationalism provides a reasonable structural description about 'how' justification works where their religious faith is concerned, then I have no felt impetus to reprove him/her for that choice: I'm not here to dominate other people who are attempting to walk a different, parallel, but still narrow, path through the same 100 acres that I am toward Jesus. (However, the caveat is that anyone who thinks they'll strong arm me with their "superior" theology, relying as they may with certain brands of ontology and epistemology in tow, should be prepared for me to shine a light on any fault lines running through their allegedly "superior" theology.)

One note of admission on my part here may be due in order to clear up some of what might be perceived by others as my own bias: I think I tend not to trust that Foundationalism is a clear, distinct and indubitable mode by which to conceptualize the structural integrity of reasons for the defense of the Christian Faith because, 1) I've read Descartes' Discourse on Method, and knowing the skeptical "whys" involved in his methodology are persuasive to me even if they're not fully convincing; however, I also think he failed to prove his ontological saving pitch for theology that he attempted through his Meditations, and 2) atheist philosopher, Peter Boghossian, fully relies on Strong Foundationalism as the mode by which he thinks he proves the truth of atheism in his book, A Manual for Creating Atheists (....of course, like Descartes before him, I think that even though he scores a few epistemic points, he still fails to prove that his epistemic approach using Foundationalism does what he claims it does on either the PRACTICAL level or even the META level.)
Epistemology became a kind of first philosophy around the time of Kant, and I don't follow that move, so I don't lead with epistemology. As far as the Christian faith is concerned, there are certain truths which must be epistemically accessible (e.g. Jesus of Nazareth was an existing historical person), and this will inform one's epistemology.

I get what you're saying, but in my case, not only do I lead with epistemology, I do so by way of a strong leaning toward more Naturalized Epistemology, one that is Realist rather than either Idealist or Anti-Realist, and at that, with an influence from Critical Realists rather than Direct Realists which allows me to have my cake and eat it too; I get to have my Wittgenstein and my Quine (and so many others) all at the same time.............because I "know" that where religious faith is concerned, no one philosopher, scientist or theologian has all of the "right answers." No, no one but God could have those answers, a fact that then takes on a completely different axis of epistemic conceptualization in our mental matrix, one that human reasoning will have to admit at the "beginning" is, and only can be, partial and fragmentary.

But yeah. Historical evaluation (and prayer) are the mode(s) by which I think Christianity is to be conceptually assessed. So, on that count, I think you and I have some epistemic commonality even though I know we'll land on different epistemic tracts that extend through the same 100 acres. I, too, "begin" with the idea that Jesus of Nazareth was an existing historical person, as were Peter, Paul and Mary and so many others ... but I don't assess these historical facts as being axiomatic in a way that is clearly demonstrable and sufficient for others to likewise accept or be involuntarily compelled by. Not that they need to be, really, or could be.

In other words, figuring out that Jesus is Lord and Savior is not a programming or engineering problem to be solved, and we confuse ourselves when we treat it as such in a 'Lockstep' fashion that should be expected in industries dealing with here and now Techne.
 
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zippy2006

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Sorry - finally getting back to this good post of yours.

No, that's not what I was getting at really. I'm only talking about the efficacy of each position as an identifiable descriptor of 'how' justification actually works. I'm not implying that foundationalism on the whole is utterly useless. No, it's useful as far as a generalized description goes about how epistemic structures can be modelled in our minds. I just don't think foundationalism of any sort really or fully conceptualizes the relations and flow of actual justification of beliefs where faith is the focus of concern.
Okay, so would you say that faith beliefs and non-faith beliefs are justified in entirely different ways? (This brings us close to the OP)

If some person wants to conceptualize their epistemic praxis in foundationalist terms, and they think Moderate or Weak Foundationalism provides a reasonable structural description about 'how' justification works where their religious faith is concerned, then I have no felt impetus to reprove him/her for that choice
So would you say that moderate or weak foundationalism is acceptable for the justification of faith beliefs, but strong foundationalism is not?


One note of admission on my part here may be due in order to clear up some of what might be perceived by others as my own bias: I think I tend not to trust that Foundationalism is a clear, distinct and indubitable mode by which to conceptualize the structural integrity of reasons for the defense of the Christian Faith because, 1) I've read Descartes' Discourse on Method, and knowing the skeptical "whys" involved in his methodology are persuasive to me even if they're not fully convincing; however, I also think he failed to prove his ontological saving pitch for theology that he attempted through his Meditations, and 2) atheist philosopher, Peter Boghossian, fully relies on Strong Foundationalism as the mode by which he thinks he proves the truth of atheism in his book, A Manual for Creating Atheists (....of course, like Descartes before him, I think that even though he scores a few epistemic points, he still fails to prove that his epistemic approach using Foundationalism does what he claims it does on either the PRACTICAL level or even the META level.)
Okay, interesting. So you see some associations between strong foundationalism and atheism. It is interesting to know that Boghossian does this.

I get what you're saying, but in my case, not only do I lead with epistemology, I do so by way of a strong leaning toward more Naturalized Epistemology, one that is Realist rather than either Idealist or Anti-Realist, and at that, with an influence from Critical Realists rather than Direct Realists which allows me to have my cake and eat it too; I get to have my Wittgenstein and my Quine (and so many others) all at the same time.............because I "know" that where religious faith is concerned, no one philosopher, scientist or theologian has all of the "right answers." No, no one but God could have those answers, a fact that then takes on a completely different axis of epistemic conceptualization in our mental matrix, one that human reasoning will have to admit at the "beginning" is, and only can be, partial and fragmentary.
Okay, fair enough. I do agree that things get tricker when it comes to God and theology.

In other words, figuring out that Jesus is Lord and Savior is not a programming or engineering problem to be solved, and we confuse ourselves when we treat it as such in a 'Lockstep' fashion that should be expected in industries dealing with here and now Techne.
I agree, but on the other hand it is hard to find a clear line of demarcation between philosophy and theology, or between natural beliefs and religious beliefs.

..So I guess I didn't have much to say in response to that very clear and substantive post. ^_^
 
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FireDragon76

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No, that's not what I was getting at really. I'm only talking about the efficacy of each position as an identifiable descriptor of 'how' justification actually works. I'm not implying that foundationalism on the whole is utterly useless. No, it's useful as far as a generalized description goes about how epistemic structures can be modelled in our minds. I just don't think foundationalism of any sort really or fully conceptualizes the relations and flow of actual justification of beliefs where faith is the focus of concern.

If some person wants to conceptualize their epistemic praxis in foundationalist terms, and they think Moderate or Weak Foundationalism provides a reasonable structural description about 'how' justification works where their religious faith is concerned, then I have no felt impetus to reprove him/her for that choice: I'm not here to dominate other people who are attempting to walk a different, parallel, but still narrow, path through the same 100 acres that I am toward Jesus. (However, the caveat is that anyone who thinks they'll strong arm me with their "superior" theology, relying as they may with certain brands of ontology and epistemology in tow, should be prepared for me to shine a light on any fault lines running through their allegedly "superior" theology.)

One note of admission on my part here may be due in order to clear up some of what might be perceived by others as my own bias: I think I tend not to trust that Foundationalism is a clear, distinct and indubitable mode by which to conceptualize the structural integrity of reasons for the defense of the Christian Faith because, 1) I've read Descartes' Discourse on Method, and knowing the skeptical "whys" involved in his methodology are persuasive to me even if they're not fully convincing; however, I also think he failed to prove his ontological saving pitch for theology that he attempted through his Meditations, and 2) atheist philosopher, Peter Boghossian, fully relies on Strong Foundationalism as the mode by which he thinks he proves the truth of atheism in his book, A Manual for Creating Atheists (....of course, like Descartes before him, I think that even though he scores a few epistemic points, he still fails to prove that his epistemic approach using Foundationalism does what he claims it does on either the PRACTICAL level or even the META level.)


I get what you're saying, but in my case, not only do I lead with epistemology, I do so by way of a strong leaning toward more Naturalized Epistemology, one that is Realist rather than either Idealist or Anti-Realist, and at that, with an influence from Critical Realists rather than Direct Realists which allows me to have my cake and eat it too; I get to have my Wittgenstein and my Quine (and so many others) all at the same time.............because I "know" that where religious faith is concerned, no one philosopher, scientist or theologian has all of the "right answers." No, no one but God could have those answers, a fact that then takes on a completely different axis of epistemic conceptualization in our mental matrix, one that human reasoning will have to admit at the "beginning" is, and only can be, partial and fragmentary.

But yeah. Historical evaluation (and prayer) are the mode(s) by which I think Christianity is to be conceptually assessed. So, on that count, I think you and I have some epistemic commonality even though I know we'll land on different epistemic tracts that extend through the same 100 acres. I, too, "begin" with the idea that Jesus of Nazareth was an existing historical person, as were Peter, Paul and Mary and so many others ... but I don't assess these historical facts as being axiomatic in a way that is clearly demonstrable and sufficient for others to likewise accept or be involuntarily compelled by. Not that they need to be, really, or could be.

In other words, figuring out that Jesus is Lord and Savior is not a programming or engineering problem to be solved, and we confuse ourselves when we treat it as such in a 'Lockstep' fashion that should be expected in industries dealing with here and now Techne.

I heard an American Buddhist kantoku (bishop) once say the problem with western civilization is the focus on leading by epistemology, rather than ethics. I have never heard a sufficient reply from any Christian philosopher, even though there's something about what the bishop said that seems intuitive true.

I guess as close as you get is John Vervaeke and his approach, maybe that is a way forward.

Edit: this might be relevant to the aformentioned point about ethics leading, rather than epistemology viz a viz metamodernism:

 
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Epistemology became a kind of first philosophy around the time of Kant, and I don't follow that move, so I don't lead with epistemology. As far as the Christian faith is concerned, there are certain truths which must be epistemically accessible (e.g. Jesus of Nazareth was an existing historical person), and this will inform one's epistemology.

That doesn't sound like a promising option, considering most actual historians will admit that positivist views of history are naive.

It seems to me, if we've learned anything from over two centuries of searching for "the real historical Jesus", we only have a slightly clearer picture on the "historical" Jesus of Nazareth than we did 200 years ago.
 
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zippy2006

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I heard an American Buddhist kantoku (bishop) once say the problem with western civilization is the focus on leading by epistemology, rather than ethics. I have never heard a sufficient reply from any Christian philosopher, even though there's something about what the bishop said that seems intuitive true.
Folks like Hadot or Zagzebski would seem to be on board, and perhaps Aristotle as well. The difficulty is that ethics pertains to practical reason whereas epistemology is usually meant to pertain to speculative reason. Probably what the Buddhist means by "epistemology" is a kind of scientific industriousness and inquisitiveness, and that makes sense.

That doesn't sound like a promising option, considering most actual historians will admit that positivist views of history are naive.

It seems to me, if we've learned anything from over two centuries of searching for "the real historical Jesus", we only have a slightly clearer picture on the "historical" Jesus of Nazareth than we did 200 years ago.
It sounds like you've managed to read me perfectly backwards. What you are proposing is a historical-epistemological starting point.
 
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2PhiloVoid

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Sorry - finally getting back to this good post of yours.


Okay, so would you say that faith beliefs and non-faith beliefs are justified in entirely different ways? (This brings us close to the OP)
Yes and no. Epistemologically speaking, there are some aspects of religious belief---specifically Christian belief--- that are justified in similar ways to non-faith beliefs, and as Pascal averred, there are some that are not. We both know that somewhere in the mix of beliefs that make up a person's faith in Christ, the Holy Spirit Himself has to play a role, however large or small it is alongside the usual belief structures we each relate with (or fail to relate with) regarding Truth and Knowledge.
So would you say that moderate or weak foundationalism is acceptable for the justification of faith beliefs, but strong foundationalism is not?
Any forms of foundationalism are "acceptable." But whether or not they're "acceptable" isn't, in my estimation, the problem. The problem is, as we've earlier discussed, that despite the claims and contestations I've seen from both Christians or Atheists, Foundationalism simply can't provide the certainty that is so sought after and assumed "should be there" prescriptively at the end of serious inquiry regarding Christian Theology.
Okay, interesting. So you see some associations between strong foundationalism and atheism. It is interesting to know that Boghossian does this.
Well, Street Epistemologists who have followed Peter Bogghossian have supported their antagonistic claims upon their insistence that we all "should" rely on Strong Foundationalism in order to justify our beliefs, of whatever sort. This isn't to say that all modern atheists do this though. No, as you well know, too, some atheists just pull out an existential flamethrower and attempt to burn and vilify the central beliefs of Christians, in whatever way possible, and they at times do it almost reflexively.
Okay, fair enough. I do agree that things get tricker when it comes to God and theology.


I agree, but on the other hand it is hard to find a clear line of demarcation between philosophy and theology, or between natural beliefs and religious beliefs.
Sure, it is often difficult to find a clear line of demarcation in all cases. But we can choose any Philosopher or Scientist or Technologist (or Christian Theologian) and pick apart their books, their journal articles, and/or their praxis and products and see where they may have committed fallacies, even IF our scrutiny can't be applied in more absolute terms. Still, epistemology can take a cue from Quality Control experts/engineers who go into a modern passenger aircraft manufacturing plant and see if the planes being built there are actually being built according to the epistemic and engineering requirements expected to be present in the construction of those aircraft. The difference here being that someone like me doesn't exactly have a incontestable blueprint to follow, especially where the writing of History or the actual past is involved ...
..So I guess I didn't have much to say in response to that very clear and substantive post. ^_^

Hopefully on some level, you and I find general agreement. I'm not really looking to get into verbal fisticuffs with fellow Christians. :cool:
 
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I heard an American Buddhist kantoku (bishop) once say the problem with western civilization is the focus on leading by epistemology, rather than ethics. I have never heard a sufficient reply from any Christian philosopher, even though there's something about what the bishop said that seems intuitive true.

I guess as close as you get is John Vervaeke and his approach, maybe that is a way forward.

Edit: this might be relevant to the aformentioned point about ethics leading, rather than epistemology viz a viz metamodernism:


FD, I appreciate the Buddhist sentiment, but as for myself, and maybe not to far off from John Vervaeke, I already assume that any Philosophical evaluations I make have to have at least some minimal ethical integration or holism involved. This is why I invoke Philosophical Hermeneutics and Critical Realism from similar figures to Vervaeke, like Jens Zimmermann, within my overall evaluative praxis; and it's in the Nature of Science as well to assume that honesty, accuracy and some amount of relevant transparency are integral to the praxis employed when making epistemological justification for this or that idea/belief or experiment.

As for putting Epistemology first, when I refer to this insistence, I'm simply describing what my own existential and psychological disposition requires. I'm not insinuating that it's an iron-clad operative prescription that anyone else has to incorporate into their own praxis. To some small extent, I know that even Pascal and Kierkegaard would likely tell me in Obi-wan Kenobi style to lighten up and [somehow, whatever that is] "reach out with my feelings."

Anyway, thank you for the link, FD.
 
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FireDragon76

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Yes and no. Epistemologically speaking, there are some aspects of religious belief---specifically Christian belief--- that are justified in similar ways to non-faith beliefs, and as Pascal averred, there are some that are not. We both know that somewhere in the mix of beliefs that make up a person's faith in Christ, the Holy Spirit Himself has to play a role, however large or small it is alongside the usual belief structures we each relate with (or fail to relate with) regarding Truth and Knowledge.

Any forms of foundationalism are "acceptable." But whether or not they're "acceptable" isn't, in my estimation, the problem. The problem is, as we've earlier discussed, that despite the claims and contestations I've seen from both Christians or Atheists, Foundationalism simply can't provide the certainty that is so sought after and assumed "should be there" prescriptively at the end of serious inquiry regarding Christian Theology.

Well, Street Epistemologists who have followed Peter Bogghossian have supported their antagonistic claims upon their insistence that we all "should" rely on Strong Foundationalism in order to justify our beliefs, of whatever sort. This isn't to say that all modern atheists do this though. No, as you well know, too, some atheists just pull out an existential flamethrower and attempt to burn and vilify the central beliefs of Christians, in whatever way possible, and they at times do it almost reflexively.

Sure, it is often difficult to find a clear line of demarcation in all cases. But we can choose any Philosopher or Scientist or Technologist (or Christian Theologian) and pick apart their books, their journal articles, and/or their praxis and products and see where they may have made fallacies, even IF the scrutiny can't be applied in more absolute terms. Still, epistemology can take a cue from Quality Control experts/engineers who go into a modern passenger aircraft manufacturing plant and see if the planes being built there are actually being built according to the epistemic and engineering requirements expected to be present in the construction of those aircraft. The difference here being that someone like me doesn't exactly have a incontestable blueprint to follow, especially where the writing of History or the actual past is involved ...

I like the analogy. Not enough people "kick the tires" of religious ideologies. Though like all analogies, it has limitations.
 
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2PhiloVoid

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I like the analogy. Not enough people "kick the tires" of religious ideologies. Though like all analogies, it has limitations.

True. But I suppose in all fairness we can't expect everyone to take up the deeper, evaluative riches of Philosophy, whether it's Western or Eastern.
 
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A quote from the early modern philosopher, Nicolas Malebranche "To be a faithful Christian one must believe blindly; but to be a philosopher one must see evidently."
(From Concerning the Search After Truth)


Do any of y'all have thoughts on these two claims? Is it the case that Christians believe blindly?

The claim that a faithful Christian must believe blindly is manifestly false and explicitly contrary to classical Christian thought and doctrine.

There was a significant shift in Christian philosophy and thought towards the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th century.

Prior to that time basically all Christian thinkers acknowledged that there was one unified truth which was to be found both through the efforts of reason in philosophy, based upon the study of nature, and through the efforts of reason in theology based upon the study of Divine Revelation.

They understood that these two sources lead to one Truth and thus could not contradict each other. As a result Reason and Faith must work together and build off of each other.

around the beginning of the 14th century, the idea of duplex veritas or "two truths" was introduced. Under this view certain thinkers argued that there were two distinct truths, religious truth known by faith, and natural truth known by reason, and that the two truths could contradict each other. Thus they argued that it was possible to believe by faith what you knew by natural reason to be false.

This idea would have been considered absurd and foolish by Christian thinkers before that time.

Personally I have my doubts that those who introduced it actually believed it. I suspect that it was a disingenuous form of plausible deniability which allowed them to deny Church teachings in their natural philosophy, but then claim that they still believed them by faith, thus avoiding having to answer for their heresies.

The net effect was to begin the divorce of faith from reason.

It is fascinating from a historical and philosophical perspective, but during that same time there are several major changes that take place in Christian / European thought that become foundational to the evolution of Modern thought, and to the destruction of Christian philosophy and the birth of secularism.

Really, those changes have brought us to where we are today, because they put the development of Christian and Modern thought on a path where it was doomed to failure. The basic assumptions involved were wrong and as such, no matter how intelligent, all thought based on those foundations would eventually fail to deliver working understanding of reality.

Nicolas Malebranche lived during an era when Modern thinkers were still early on in their development and they still thought that their philosophy could yield comprehensive truth. People like him, and Descartes were trying to redefine Christian thought to fit within the new Modernist framework, and trying to salvage the idea of God, within the framework of modern thought.

This was ultimately a fools errand, not because Christianity was wrong, or because the idea of God couldn't be saved, but because the framework of Modernist thought was wrong and doomed to fail.

I should note that I'm using the term Modern and Modernist here in a historic sense, not simply to mean "current". The modern era historically began about 1600 AD and Post-Modern thought began to supplant Modern thought beginning in the late 1800's. Currently Post-modernism dominates our intellectual culture (if you could call what we have either intellectual or a culture).
 
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Simon_Templar

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Malebranch was a convinced believer, and he was also a Cartesian. Like Descartes, he was enamored with the idea of certainty and securing everything down to a certain foundation. If a belief couldn't be secured in some way to certainty, it was not knowledge- strictly speaking. I don't have that kind of epistemic standard. I'm not sure it's possible, and I certainly don't see philosophy as needing a certain foundation in that sense. I'm happy if things are reasonable and not obviously false. We know all kinds of things that can be doubted.

Cartesian clear and distinct ideas simply don't work in philosophy at all and have proved to be a complete failure.

This development in thought, does however, show us an important point in the development of modern thought. Cartesian thought succeeded in narrowing the concept of knowledge down to only one particular type of knowledge. Specifically scientific or perhaps more accurately mathematical knowledge.

The only ideas that CAN be reduced to the kind of clear distinct certainties that Descartes wanted are mathematical or quantitative ideas. This ultimately lead to the notion that reality is only quantitative in nature, in other words, materialism. Descartes, of course, never intended that, but that is the problem with ideas, they often have unintended consequences.

The triumph of Cartesian epistemology lead to the reduction of knowing down to only mathematical knowing.

Once that happens basically everything of value in philosophy is lost. If all valid knowledge is only quantitative knowledge then things like justice, goodness, truth, love, hope, beauty, are all no longer valid knowledge. Wisdom itself basically becomes a non-entity. What is the point of philosophy that can't lead you to wisdom, or goodness, or love, or hope etc.

The topic of epistemology is important as well because it illustrates on of the major phases of the inevitable decline of Modern thought.

Modern thought basically began with Metaphysical skepticism. This occurred when Aristotelian and Platonic Realism was abandoned in favor of Ockhamist Nominalism.

This fundamentally changed how objects were viewed, and it forced philosophy to re-evaluate how we can know the true nature of any object.

Cartesian thought is an example of one of the ways that subsequent modern thinkers tried to prove that we could in fact know objects. Classical Metaphysical Realism allowed philosophers to begin from objects in the world and ask "how can this thing exist and how can we know the thing as it is in itself."

When that was lost as a result of Nominalism, philosophers found themselves regressing and having to find a new starting point. They could not longer start with the statement "this thing exists, what can I know about it." They eventually found themselves having to ask "can I prove that this thing exists, before I even ask if I can know anything about it?"

The only starting point left to them after the destruction of Classical Metaphysics was the mind itself. So they had to try and solve the dilemma "How do I reason from my own mind to the world existing, and then to me being able to know things in the world?"

This is how Descartes found himself in the position of having to prove that he himself existed before he could try to progress any further in philosophy.

Modern thinkers essentially found that it was basically impossible to progress beyond the mind to the objective world. There was simply no way to reason from "My mind exists" to "the objective world exists and is knowable", in the Cartesian sense of clear and distinct, certain ideas.

This lead to the next major phase of Modern thought, which was the beginning of the end of Modern thought and the beginning of Post-Modern thought. It was the Kantian revolution. More specifically it was Epistemological skepticism.

At that point we had gone from saying there are no real universal entities to saying, it is functionally impossible to know individual entities objectively within the world.

We are in the final phase now, which is linguistic skepticism. We went from there are no real universal entities, to individual entities cannot be objectively known, to language cannot express objective knowledge.

Another way of saying all that is, there is no universal truth, individual truth cannot be known, and truth cannot be communicated with language.

Virtually the whole of the development of modern thought consists of philosophers sawing off the branch on which they are sitting.

All epistemology and knowledge rests upon faith. Without faith, it is literally impossible for knowledge to exist.
 
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Simon_Templar

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Do you see a difference between Christianity and philosophy? If there is a difference, and it is not what Malebranche says it is, then what is the real difference?
Yes there is a difference, and no it is not what Malebranche says.

The difference is this.

Christianity is a set of beliefs about reality.

Philosophy is a process of seeking understanding of reality.

In other words, Christianity is a belief that has been arrived at. Philosophy is the journey of seeking what ought to be believed.

Philosophy, however, is not the ONLY such means. Theology is also a means of seeking and arriving at knowledge.

Philosophy seeks knowledge by means of reason exercised upon the natural world.
Theology seeks knowledge by means of reason exercised upon the Divine revelation.

Both of these things involve faith. Neither of them rely on "blind faith".

The difference between philosophy and theology is not so much the process as it is the realm in which the process is exercised, or in modern terms the data upon which the process is executed. (though I hesitate as the term data might be too reductionist.)

Christianity is the body of belief(knowledge) that is arrived at at the end of the journey of philosophy and theology.

*edit*
I should add that the word "philosophy" can be used to describe the ideas or beliefs that a philosopher arrives at as well as the process of using reason to arrive at those beliefs.

Thus we might say "modern philosophy" meaning not only the process that modern thinkers followed, but also the body of ideas that are common to the sets of beliefs about the world held by modern thinkers.

In this context the difference between "Christianity" and "Philosophy" is a question which is too vague to be meaningfully answered, in my opinion.
I would propose that the term philosophy, used in this sense is too broad and needs to be more narrowly defined in order to have the possibility of drawing an accurate distinction.

However, I would say that the basis for the distinction is the same as that which is found between Theology and Philosophy in terms of the processes.

The distinctive beliefs of Christianity are defined by Divine revelation and therefore are defined by Theology. Philosophy would be those areas of thought which do not depend upon Divine revelation.

However, there will certainly be overlap. For example, I would hazard the opinion that most of metaphysics and epistemology derive from the Philosophical process rather than the Theological process. Which is to say, most of our beliefs about those things derive from using reason based on the natural world, rather than using reason based upon the Divine revelation.

Yet, I would think that there are definitely points within Divine revelation that would have bearing upon those topics as well.

This distinction between a "philosophy" and Christianity (or any religion) is secondary, in my opinion. This usage of the term Philosophy, in my opinion is a derived usage from the fact that Philosophy is a process of seeking knowledge. It began to be used for the knowledge arrived at as well as the process of seeking it.

In terms of the knowledge/belief, the primary distinction is that which is arrived at by only natural means, and that which is arrived at by means of divine revelation.

In the middle ages and the ancient world, the distinction between philosophy and theology was sharply drawn. As such a Christian philosopher like Boethius could write a book of philosophy which basically made almost no reference to Christian theology at all. This wasn't because he disagreed with Christian theology, but rather simply because he wasn't DOING theology. He was doing philosophy, so he only brought in philosophical means and conclusions.

They saw no contradiction between the two, anymore than there was a contradiction between a hammer and a saw. A hammer was used for one job, and a saw for a different job.

If a contradiction arose, they understood that it arose from the fact that they had simply misunderstood one or the other, or both.
 
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zippy2006

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Thanks for your very interesting and thoughtful post. I will come back to this, but let me begin with a simple question or observation.

Christianity is the body of belief(knowledge) that is arrived at at the end of the journey of philosophy and theology.
I think Malebranche is trying to get at a particular distinction that you do not address in your post. It is this:

"...yet [the knowledge that comes from belief] does not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion." (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae, Q. 2, A. 1)​
Aquinas is saying that belief is like doubt, suspicion, and opinion insofar as it does not "attain the perfection of clear sight." Malebranche might have said something much blunter, "belief is like believing without seeing, or believing blindly." Regardless, in both cases a distinction is made between the clear sight of knowledge (scientia) and the less-than-clear sight of belief. I do not see this distinction appearing in your post, and yet I want to say that this represents one of the basic differences between philosophy and Christianity. Thoughts?
 
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FireDragon76

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The claim that a faithful Christian must believe blindly is manifestly false and explicitly contrary to classical Christian thought and doctrine.

There was a significant shift in Christian philosophy and thought towards the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th century.

Prior to that time basically all Christian thinkers acknowledged that there was one unified truth which was to be found both through the efforts of reason in philosophy, based upon the study of nature, and through the efforts of reason in theology based upon the study of Divine Revelation.

They understood that these two sources lead to one Truth and thus could not contradict each other. As a result Reason and Faith must work together and build off of each other.

around the beginning of the 14th century, the idea of duplex veritas or "two truths" was introduced. Under this view certain thinkers argued that there were two distinct truths, religious truth known by faith, and natural truth known by reason, and that the two truths could contradict each other. Thus they argued that it was possible to believe by faith what you knew by natural reason to be false.

This idea would have been considered absurd and foolish by Christian thinkers before that time.

Personally I have my doubts that those who introduced it actually believed it. I suspect that it was a disingenuous form of plausible deniability which allowed them to deny Church teachings in their natural philosophy, but then claim that they still believed them by faith, thus avoiding having to answer for their heresies.

The net effect was to begin the divorce of faith from reason.

It is fascinating from a historical and philosophical perspective, but during that same time there are several major changes that take place in Christian / European thought that become foundational to the evolution of Modern thought, and to the destruction of Christian philosophy and the birth of secularism.

Really, those changes have brought us to where we are today, because they put the development of Christian and Modern thought on a path where it was doomed to failure. The basic assumptions involved were wrong and as such, no matter how intelligent, all thought based on those foundations would eventually fail to deliver working understanding of reality.

Nicolas Malebranche lived during an era when Modern thinkers were still early on in their development and they still thought that their philosophy could yield comprehensive truth. People like him, and Descartes were trying to redefine Christian thought to fit within the new Modernist framework, and trying to salvage the idea of God, within the framework of modern thought.

This was ultimately a fools errand, not because Christianity was wrong, or because the idea of God couldn't be saved, but because the framework of Modernist thought was wrong and doomed to fail.

I should note that I'm using the term Modern and Modernist here in a historic sense, not simply to mean "current". The modern era historically began about 1600 AD and Post-Modern thought began to supplant Modern thought beginning in the late 1800's. Currently Post-modernism dominates our intellectual culture (if you could call what we have either intellectual or a culture).

Modern thought doomed to failure? And Medieval thought was perfect? This is simply romanticism and blindness.
 
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Thanks for your very interesting and thoughtful post. I will come back to this, but let me begin with a simple question or observation.


I think Malebranche is trying to get at a particular distinction that you do not address in your post. It is this:

"...yet [the knowledge that comes from belief] does not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion." (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae, Q. 2, A. 1)​
Aquinas is saying that belief is like doubt, suspicion, and opinion insofar as it does not "attain the perfection of clear sight." Malebranche might have said something much blunter, "belief is like believing without seeing, or believing blindly." Regardless, in both cases a distinction is made between the clear sight of knowledge (scientia) and the less-than-clear sight of belief. I do not see this distinction appearing in your post, and yet I want to say that this represents one of the basic differences between philosophy and Christianity. Thoughts?

What Aquinas seems to say here makes sense, given how religious symbols attempt to express something that is ultimately not comprehensible or ineffible. Therefore faith only attains to truth mediated through symbols.
 
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zippy2006

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What Aquinas seems to say here makes sense, given how religious symbols attempt to express something that is ultimately not comprehensible or ineffible. Therefore faith only attains to truth mediated through symbols.
Yes, but without trying to flush out Aquinas' theory of faith, he is also saying something more basic. The article I quoted from is on the act of faith, and what Aquinas is saying there is that the act of believing is different from the act of demonstrative knowing. So take a clearly intelligible and comprehensible proposition, "Jesus was no longer dead on Easter Sunday" (even though he died on Good Friday). Even if bodily resurrection is ineffable, "not dead" is easy enough to understand. Aquinas would say that even this comprehensible proposition is known by belief and not by scientia-knowledge, because it is not something that our mind understands on its own. Specifically, we know it is true because Scripture attests to it, not because we understand how someone who was dead can rise up from death.
 
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Simon_Templar

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Thanks for your very interesting and thoughtful post. I will come back to this, but let me begin with a simple question or observation.


I think Malebranche is trying to get at a particular distinction that you do not address in your post. It is this:

"...yet [the knowledge that comes from belief] does not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion." (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae, Q. 2, A. 1)​
Aquinas is saying that belief is like doubt, suspicion, and opinion insofar as it does not "attain the perfection of clear sight." Malebranche might have said something much blunter, "belief is like believing without seeing, or believing blindly." Regardless, in both cases a distinction is made between the clear sight of knowledge (scientia) and the less-than-clear sight of belief. I do not see this distinction appearing in your post, and yet I want to say that this represents one of the basic differences between philosophy and Christianity. Thoughts?

First let me say that I don't know Malebranche well enough to clearly define exactly what he means by something like "believing blindly". Thus I am proceeding based on the common thought that believing blindly means without any basis of reason or evidence. If Malebranche means something else by this phrase, I will rely upon you to correct me.

In the Question you cite from the Summa, Thomas is talking about belief in the context of the ways that we know things. More specifically he starts by defining what it means "to think". In the course of that discussion he mentions thinking as the action of the intellect and as the action of the "cogitative power".

Further, the action of the intellect is distinguished as applying to knowledge of universals which is arrived at apart from sensory experience and the cogitative power is mentioned as relating to knowledge of particulars based upon sensory experience.

Thus we have here two distinct ways of arriving at knowledge, that are geared at different types of knowledge. The intellect functions independently of the senses and is geared to the understanding of universals. The cogitative power mediates between sensory data and particular knowledge and the rational faculties.

It is worth pointing out, when Thomas first uses the phrase "the perfection of clear sight" in this question, he is speaking about the intellect and not upon sensory experience. Thus he is not talking about literally seeing. He is talking about arriving at certain intellectual knowledge. Certain knowledge of universals.

Here I suspect we already have a distinct difference between what Thomas is saying and what Malebranche is saying. Again I don't know Malebranche well enough to say definitively, but I would guess that he he thinks of certain knowledge quite differently than Thomas, and again, I would guess he may not even believe that Universals exist at all in the same way that Thomas does, let alone that they can be certainly known. Feel free to correct me if I am wrong on that point.

Now let us consider faith.

Faith is another means of knowing, in addition to intellection and the cogitative power. The difference between them, much like the difference between Philosophy and Theology, is primarily the source or the means by which they derive their data.

Faith, in the Christian sense, is fundamentally belief in the testimony of a person, namely God. Divine revelation is God's testimony, primarily about himself, but also about us, and to a lesser degree the world.

Most of the things that are central in Divine revelation (God's testimony about himself) are things that we cannot know by natural means. In other words, they can't be discovered by Philosophy.

The subject of Question 2, that you quote from is the definition of belief as "thinking with assent". Thomas holds that "thinking with assent" is the correct definition of "belief".

This already contradicts at leas the common understanding of "blind faith" or "believing blindly". The basic concept is that belief is a process of deliberation and thinking, based on assent (faith) to divine revelation.

Before I go further I'll also point out that Thomas' answer to object 1 contradicts the notion of believing blindly.

The first objection states that faith cannot be "thinking with assent" because thinking derives from a Latin word which implies a process of research and/or discourse and that faith is defined as "assent without research".

Thomas answers this objection by essentially saying that the word "research" is being used equivocally in the objection and that there are two different types of research. The natural research being described in the objection is a process of logical discourse that demonstrates the conclusion with certainty. This cannot be done with matters of faith because they are not discoverable from the natural world. Thus you can't reason to them from the natural world. He goes on to say that the type of research that is done with objects of faith is research into those things by which a man is induced to believe. In other words, the evidence that supports the faith claim. He specifically mentions, was it actually said by God? and is it attended by miracles?

Thus Thomas clearly does think that Faith and Belief involve seeking evidence.

Lastly on to what is meant by "thinking with assent." and Belief being similar to doubt, suspicion, and opining.

In talking about thinking Thomas gives three definitions. The first is a very broad sense of any action of the intellect. He basically says that this doesn't apply and leaves it out.

Second is the most pertinent to this discussion. He defines thinking as a deliberative process of the intellect where it considers ideas that it has not yet arrived at definitive knowledge of. The definitive knowledge is what he refers to as "the perfection of clear sight of truth".

Essentially he is saying, if you know something definitively because it has already been conclusively demonstrated to be true, then you are not thinking about it anymore. You know it.

This is further demonstrated by what he has to say about God and thinking. He essentially says that God does not "think" because thinking requires a process of movement from something not having form to taking form. God already knows everything. Nothing in his mind takes form, it is already there in fullness. Thus God does not think as human beings think.

Thomas goes on to say that "belief" is "thinking with assent" in this second way of thinking. When we believe we are considering in a deliberative process, and our process of thinking is guided by assent to God's testimony about himself, which is faith in the divine revelation. \

We do not already know with certainty, because the ideas in question have not been definitively and conclusively proven by logical demonstration.

This is where he draws the comparison with doubt, suspicion, and opining. All three of these things are a deliberative process of thought in which the person has not arrived at definitive knowledge.

In the case of doubt, a person is deliberating between two or more possibilities, with no inclination to favor one over the other.
In the case of suspicion, the person has an inclination to favor one of the options more than the others.
In the case of opining, the person desires one option to be true, but is afraid that it might not be.

In the case of belief, the person assents firmly to one option, based on trust in God's testimony, despite that option not being definitively proven by natural reason. Thus belief has this in common with scientia, that the knowledge is firmly assented to, and differs from scientia in that the knowledge has not been definitively demonstrated by natural means.

The main objection thus, to the phrase believing blindly, is that it implies belief without basis. To say that something has not been definitively proven by natural reason, does not mean there is no basis for it.

If all a person means by "blind belief" is that belief holds something to be true which has not been conclusively demonstrated. Then the meaning intended is correct, but I would tend to say that the wording is poorly chosen in that case, and lacks a degree of distinction that is to be desired.

One thinks of St. Paul's statement that now we see through a glass darkly, but then we shall see as we are seen.
It's not that we don't see at all, our faith is not blind. We simply don't have perfect sight.

Moreover, far from faith being blind, faith rightly used improves our sight. As Pope John Paul II said, faith and reason are two wings of a bird. The bird can't fly without both. Ultimately reason functions no better without faith than faith does without reason. We might as well talk about blind reason as about blind faith.
 
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Simon_Templar

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Modern thought doomed to failure? And Medieval thought was perfect? This is simply romanticism and blindness.
Funny... I don't remember saying that Medieval thought was perfect...

In any case, no human thought this side of eternity is perfect. Even in eternity it will not be perfect in the sense of entirely complete.

I am indeed a romantic, and frankly I struggle to understand how anyone could think calling someone a romantic would be a negative.

Obviously I don't think I am blind, though I am certainly foolish enough and doubtless I am blind to some things.

However, I am firmly convinced that Classical philosophy is more true than Modern philosophy. Which is to say that it more accurately depicts and describes reality.

That in no way means it is perfect.

I am also pretty firmly convinced that our current world is a cesspit precisely because of the failures of Modern philosophy. More precisely, the failures of Modern philosophy to deliver a sustainable intellectual framework for Western Civilization, lead directly to the birth of Post-Modernism, which finally killed Western Civilization and now sits atop it's rotting corpse.

Despite the fact that I am quite obviously anti-modern, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that modernity did produce some good things which ought to be preserved.

The biggest one which comes to mind is, in the turn to self and subjectivism it did give us a better understanding and appreciation for the importance of the subjective experience of the individual. Reality is both objective and subjective. So long as we don't lose the objective (which we basically have) adding the subjective is a good. This is particularly important because reality is heavily relational and thus proper understanding of subjectivity and appreciation for it is essential.
 
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zippy2006

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In the Question you cite from the Summa, Thomas is talking about belief in the context of the ways that we know things. More specifically he starts by defining what it means "to think".
Well, the article is on "the act of faith," and it appears at the beginning of the Secunda Secundae, which is devoted to the topic of the theological virtue of faith. Thomas is saying that the internal act of faith is "to believe," and in article 1 he is explaining what it means to believe. He will argue that Augustine correctly understood "to believe" as "to think with assent." The reason Thomas begins the body of the article by speaking about the different ways we think is because he is setting up an explanation of what "to think" means in the phrase, "to think with assent." Everything he says here is meant to shed light on faith.

The subject of Question 2, that you quote from is the definition of belief as "thinking with assent". Thomas holds that "thinking with assent" is the correct definition of "belief".
Okay good, I see that we are on the same page here.

Before I go further I'll also point out that Thomas' answer to object 1 contradicts the notion of believing blindly.

The first objection states that faith cannot be "thinking with assent" because thinking derives from a Latin word which implies a process of research and/or discourse and that faith is defined as "assent without research".

Thomas answers this objection by essentially saying that the word "research" is being used equivocally in the objection and that there are two different types of research. The natural research being described in the objection is a process of logical discourse that demonstrates the conclusion with certainty. This cannot be done with matters of faith because they are not discoverable from the natural world. Thus you can't reason to them from the natural world. He goes on to say that the type of research that is done with objects of faith is research into those things by which a man is induced to believe. In other words, the evidence that supports the faith claim. He specifically mentions, was it actually said by God? and is it attended by miracles?

Thus Thomas clearly does think that Faith and Belief involve seeking evidence.
In his reply to objection 1 I would say that Aquinas is making a distinction. Is faith "assent without research"? Aquinas seems to say, "Yes and no." It is assent without "that research of natural reason which demonstrates what is believed." But it is not assent without "a research into those things whereby a man is induced to believe." It seems, then, that faith is blind in the first sense but not the second sense. See also Article 9, Objection 3 of the same question.

Lastly on to what is meant by "thinking with assent." and Belief being similar to doubt, suspicion, and opining.

In talking about thinking Thomas gives three definitions. The first is a very broad sense of any action of the intellect. He basically says that this doesn't apply and leaves it out.

Second is the most pertinent to this discussion. He defines thinking as a deliberative process of the intellect where it considers ideas that it has not yet arrived at definitive knowledge of. The definitive knowledge is what he refers to as "the perfection of clear sight of truth".

Essentially he is saying, if you know something definitively because it has already been conclusively demonstrated to be true, then you are not thinking about it anymore. You know it.

This is further demonstrated by what he has to say about God and thinking. He essentially says that God does not "think" because thinking requires a process of movement from something not having form to taking form. God already knows everything. Nothing in his mind takes form, it is already there in fullness. Thus God does not think as human beings think.

Thomas goes on to say that "belief" is "thinking with assent" in this second way of thinking. When we believe we are considering in a deliberative process, and our process of thinking is guided by assent to God's testimony about himself, which is faith in the divine revelation. \

We do not already know with certainty, because the ideas in question have not been definitively and conclusively proven by logical demonstration.

This is where he draws the comparison with doubt, suspicion, and opining. All three of these things are a deliberative process of thought in which the person has not arrived at definitive knowledge.

In the case of doubt, a person is deliberating between two or more possibilities, with no inclination to favor one over the other.
In the case of suspicion, the person has an inclination to favor one of the options more than the others.
In the case of opining, the person desires one option to be true, but is afraid that it might not be.

In the case of belief, the person assents firmly to one option, based on trust in God's testimony, despite that option not being definitively proven by natural reason. Thus belief has this in common with scientia, that the knowledge is firmly assented to, and differs from scientia in that the knowledge has not been definitively demonstrated by natural means.
Okay, this is a good analysis. Let me quibble with one thing. I would say that "deliberation" is something that pertains to some general species of thinking, but doesn't really pertain to belief/faith. Thomas drops that term when he starts talking specifically about belief/faith, and replaces it with "unformed thought." More than deliberation, the act of faith represents a stance of inquiry or a "reaching out" of the intellect, and God responds to this with revelation. This is confusing, and more could be said.

The main objection thus, to the phrase believing blindly, is that it implies belief without basis. To say that something has not been definitively proven by natural reason, does not mean there is no basis for it.
Yes, good. I think this is more or less what Malebranche had in mind, although I see no need to enter into an exegesis of his writings. With Aquinas, I would respond, "Yes and no." Belief will appear blind to someone who has only natural demonstrative reason, but it is not blind to someone who accepts other ways of knowing. An extreme example here would be someone who adheres to Scientism; for such a person belief must be blind (or the product of erroneous thinking).

There is an interesting motif in the gospels of the blind man who sees better than those with sight, and because of this the blind man is granted also his physical sight ("to those who have, more will be given").

One thinks of St. Paul's statement that now we see through a glass darkly, but then we shall see as we are seen.
It's not that we don't see at all, our faith is not blind. We simply don't have perfect sight.

Moreover, far from faith being blind, faith rightly used improves our sight. As Pope John Paul II said, faith and reason are two wings of a bird. The bird can't fly without both. Ultimately reason functions no better without faith than faith does without reason. We might as well talk about blind reason as about blind faith.
Yes, I agree. :oldthumbsup:
 
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